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f  POLITICAL 1\ AND
Abstract
This thesis can be split into two sections. The first section is an argument against 
physicalism and its naturalistic pretensions. The second section presents an 
alternative to physicalism -  pragmatic pluralism. The arguments for the first 
section are split into four chapters. In chapter one it is argued that an examination 
of science lends no support to physicalist ontology. The case o f quantum 
chemistry is studied in some detail and its shown that higher-level chemical facts 
are needed to support the quantum mechanical explanations given. The second 
and third chapters look at various ways in which physicalist have sought to 
explain away the apparent lack of unity in the sciences. Various accounts of the 
supervenience relation and functionalism are discussed and shown to be either 
inadequate for the physicalist programme or empirically implausible. The final 
chapter of this section discusses the so called completeness of physics. It is shown 
that like physicalism in general, there is no way to formulate this doctrine to make 
it plausible in light of contemporary physics and able to underpin a physicalist 
ontology. The second section critically discusses alternatives to physicalism. The 
scientific pluralisms of John Dupre and Nancy Cartwright and the pragmatic 
pluralisms of Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are discussed in detail. 
Drawing on the work of Putnam, in particular, and presenting Davidson’s 
anomalous monism in a new guise, an original form of pragmatic or 
metaphysically deflationary pluralism is defended.
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Introduction 
Physicalism: What Matters
[T\he best guide we have to the nature of reality is the physical sciences. 
David A rm strong1
0.1 Something old, something new
What is the world like? That is a big question; and one might expect a 
correspondingly long and complicated answer, if any answer can be given at all. 
Philosophers, though, have traditionally provided one of four remarkably simple- 
sounding responses: materialism, idealism, dualism and, what I shall call for the 
lack of an agreed term, neutralism.
According to advocates of the first of these views, materialism, the world 
consists only o f bits of matter, arranged in various ways. Among the great and the 
dead who might be counted materialists, we may include Democritus, Gassendi 
and Hobbes. Diametrically opposed to materialists are idealists. They say that the 
world is made up of nothing but ideas and minds. Berkeley, Kant and Hegel in 
different ways represent this world-view. Then there are the two halfway houses -  
dualism and neutralism. Dualists think that there are both bits o f matter (like the 
materialist) and minds and ideas (like the idealist) but these two sorts o f entity are 
fundamentally different, neither can be reduced to the other. Descartes is the 
father of all such theories. Neutralists think that the fundamental stuff o f the world 
is neither matter nor mind or at least not solely matter or solely mind but 
something else which gives rise to matter and mind. Spinoza argued for 
something like this, as did Russell once. They have modern disciples in Thomas 
Nagel and David Chalmers.
1 Moser and Trout (eds.) (1995), p.45
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As ever in philosophy, traditional answers have traditional problems. How 
can materialists explain the workings of the human mind, the mysteries of 
consciousness and intentionality, in terms of the redistribution of matter? How can 
idealists explain the fact that the world does not seem to be made up of ideas but 
of people and cars and biscuits and oysters and phone boxes and sand and all 
kinds of other stuff? How can dualists explain the connection between matter and 
mind? What on earth is this stuff that neutralists are talking about? These sorts of 
question have broadly speaking set the terms of the debate since the time of 
Descartes -  at least as I say for metaphysicians.
A non-philosophical way to answer the same question -  what is the world 
like -  would be just to list the sorts of things that we come across there. A better 
way might be to try to create some sort of system to describe these objects and 
their interactions. Arguably, this is what the sciences (or at least some o f them) try 
to do. By extension then, the sciences also address the question ‘what is the world 
like?’. How should we understand the relation between these two projects -  the 
scientific and the philosophical?
The most popular contemporary answer sees them as complementary. 
Materialism has been recast as physicalism; a doctrine which sees itself in broad 
outline as a successor to the views of Democritus, Hobbes and others but which 
derives its detail from contemporary science -  in particular physics. There are at 
least two reasons for such a change: one to do with the content o f materialism, the 
other to do with its justification. First, it is clear that although old-style 
materialists were in some sense right that there exists tiny atoms, the way they 
conceived of them was seriously mistaken. What we now know about atomic 
structure suggests that atoms are far from the tiny billiard-ball-like objects that
many materialists had in mind. Moreover, physicists have come up with all sorts 
o f other entities, fields for example, which seem to have no counterpart in past 
materialist metaphysics. So modern physicalism has shifted away from the atoms- 
in-the-void conception of the world to one in which they defer to physicists for 
information concerning the fundamental constituents of the universe. Modem 
physicalists, in other words, want to stop a priori speculation about how the world 
is and, as David Lewis (1986) puts it, “take sides with physics”.
More significant than this change of content is the belief that physicalism 
is the ontology employed in and supported by the sciences.
Broadly empirical character [physicalism is] supported inductively by 
scientific practice. (Hellmann and Thompson (1977))
According to contemporary physicalists, the principles of physicalism 
are to be treated as high level empirical generalisations. (Post (1991))
On the theory side, developments in science, successful reductions of one 
discipline to another for example, are supposed to confirm the physicalist 
ontology. In terms of practice, it is often argued that physicalism is presupposed 
in much scientific inquiry and this leads to fruitful research. So there is a 
descriptive and a normative part to the argument from science. On the descriptive 
side, physicalists will claim that the way science portrays the world and the way 
scientific descriptions seem to be developing lends support to physicalism. On the 
normative side, presupposing physicalism, it is claimed, makes for good science.
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Even when physicalists seem to be offering justifications that rely on other 
considerations, it becomes clear that whatever force such arguments have depends 
on the implicit understanding that physicalism has the backing o f the sciences. For 
example, one common argument heard in favour of physicalism is that it is the 
simplest explanation o f how the world is. Setting aside the question o f why 
simplicity should be seen as a guide to truth, the argument, unless fleshed out, 
cannot discriminate between physicalism, idealism and neutralism. It only has any 
force if we already accept the idea that science correctly describes most o f the 
world in physical terms. Then the choice is simply between dualism and 
physicalism -  and physicalism is clearly simpler.
Another argument sometimes put forward is that any metaphysics other 
than physicalism involves believing in some kind of ‘spooky’ ontology -  weird 
mind-type substances and the like. But again this by itself is a woeful argument. 
What one does and does not consider ‘spooky’ tends to be a function of one’s 
favoured ontology. For example, Berkeley given his theory of ideas found the 
notion of matter incoherent. Again, if this argument has any force at all, it is only 
given the presupposition that natural science backs up the idea that the world is 
largely as physicalists take it to be. Therefore to advocate any other ontology is to 
go against the sciences, obviously a bad thing. Arguments for physicalism cannot 
be divorced from the idea that science supports this ontology and only this 
ontology.
Contemporary physicalism then is the combination of two ideas: 
materialism and what we might call naturalism. It retains the idea that the world is 
made up of some fundamental constituents but lets physicists tell you what that 
something is; and it seeks ultimate justification through the practice and theory of
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the sciences. It is important to see that this is not merely the handing over of the 
question o f how the world is to the scientific community. Physicalist philosophers 
want to take the claims o f the physicist and, like their materialist forebears, 
expound a metaphysical thesis which goes beyond the current claims o f the 
sciences. If we were to try to sum it up in a sentence, physicalists believe that 
everything is, or is dependent upon, the physical.
There remain some ambiguity in the definition. One needs to clarify what 
is meant by the physical in physicalism. Narrowly construed, we might take it to 
refer only to the discipline of physics itself; so the science which fills in the 
content o f old-style materialism is only physics. More broadly construed, 
physicalism could refer to all the physical sciences, so that would include 
chemistry and maybe biochemistry as well as physics. Many physicalist seem to 
take their doctrine in the broad sense only. Hence they consider the only 
explanatory tasks for the physicalist are to fit the life sciences and the mental into 
their favoured metaphysical picture.2 One possible reason for such a liberal 
attitude might be the thought that the relation between the other ‘physical 
sciences’ and physics is unproblematic. Perhaps it is even thought that successful 
reductionist treatment of these domains provides data to support the claim that 
physicalism is confirmed by science. Whatever the reason, once we recognise that 
there are domains that are not covered by physics, other than just the mental or the 
biological, the case for physicalism must be made there too. If physicalism is 
genuinely meant to be a naturalistic metaphysics, it will have to prove itself in all 
domains.
2 See for example David Papineau (1993).
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The thesis divides into two sections. The first section is an argument 
against physicalism. The second section is an attempt to provide a better answer to 
that question.
The first chapter of this thesis will discuss the support science lends to 
physicalism and in particular will discuss the relation between physics and 
chemistry in the context of quantum chemistry. The sketch I provide o f that 
relation will form the basis o f a claim that I will make regarding the state of 
science in general, viz., no neatly hierarchical or reductionist ontological 
conclusions can be drawn from the current state of the sciences. I do not consider 
this claim either surprising or in itself o f great philosophical interest It is, I take it, 
a fact that anyone acquainted with the practices of the sciences will be familiar 
with. Sociological evidence for this can be found in the oft-repeated idea that even 
scientists working in similar fields find it difficult to communicate their theories 
and ideas to one another. The messy and complicated relations of the sciences 
form the background against which all metaphysical discussions that purport to be 
remotely naturalistic must take place.
Given this background, two questions arise: how the physicalist should 
articulate his ontology and more importantly why physicalism is the right 
ontology to be articulating in the first place. The second and third chapter o f this 
work will deal with the first of these points: two sorts of ways of connecting the 
physical to the non-physical that supposedly do not commit one to reductionism 
(and therefore allow for a certain conceptual messiness) will be discussed -  
supervenience and functionalism. The fourth and last chapter of the first section 
will discuss an argument for physicalism that does not rely on articulating 
precisely the relation between physics and the other sciences: the argument from
the completeness of physics. The thrust of this argument, as I interpret it, is that 
certain widely accepted facts about physics itself oblige us to be physicalists. 
Again the dialectic strategy will be to relate this claim to actual scientific theories 
and show that if physicalists have anything like the sort of physics employed by 
scientists in mind, this argument is a non-starter.
I hope to convince the reader that there is little or no support given by the 
sciences for the particular ontological commitments of physicalists and that the 
so-called arguments for physicalism, whether they be descriptive or normative in 
character, are either empty and rhetorical or simply invalid. In short, physicalism, 
it will be claimed, is no more a naturalistic metaphysics than any o f the 
alternatives.
0.2 The rights and wrongs of physicalist metaphysics
Physicalism, in intent, if not implementation, contains a thought worth pursuing. 
The idea that we should move away from traditional metaphysical assumptions 
and positions and look to the sciences to tell us how the world is, is one I applaud. 
The problem with contemporary physicalism, I shall argue, is that it is still bound 
by some of the claims o f older materialisms into exaggerated, unwarranted or 
empty claims. The second half of this thesis will be an attempt to liberate our 
thought about how the world is from the traditional metaphysical positions listed 
above; an attempt to remove the metaphysical backdrop and articulate a pragmatic 
pluralism. Not only is this more in tune with the broadly naturalist objectives of 
the physicalist programme, but I shall argue that it is also inevitably the only 
position that we can make sense of. We are all de facto pragmatic pluralists.
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Section 1 
Against Physicalism
Chapter 1 
Physics, Chemistry and the Science of Metaphysics
1.0 What sort of evidence?
In what way are the disciplines of physics and the other sciences meant to lend 
support to the metaphysics of physicalism? There are at least two arguments or 
kinds of argument that are used. First, it is often claimed that general 
considerations about the subject matter of physics itself and its supposed 
universality force physicalism upon the philosopher on pain of absurdity. 
Arguments from the so-called completeness of physics fall into this category. 
(They will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.) O f present concern here will be 
another argument. An argument that seeks justifications o f physicalism that 
proceed not from consideration of physics itself but the relation physics bears to 
other disciplines. What I shall call arguments from reduction.1
1.1 Arguments from reduction
Arguments from successful reduction might be thought to work in two ways. 
Either as direct evidence that all there is to some area can be captured by physics
1 Another argument that has sometimes been put to me in person but that I cannot find anywhere 
in the literature is that cosmology forces us to be physicalists. The argument can again be given in 
descriptive or prescriptive form. On the descriptive side, it might be suggested that what we 
already know about the beginning of the universe implies a physicalist ontology. Since the world 
had a physical beginning, it might be argued that it cannot be anything other than result of basic 
physical interactions, unless you are willing to posit some novel and weird sorts of interaction or 
law to explain the existence and workings of the apparently non-physical. On the normative side, 
one might contend that if a science like cosmology is possible, it must be premised on the idea that 
the complete evolution of the universe can be explained in terms of the elements that occurred at 
the beginning of the universe. In other words, since what occurred at the beginning was physical, 
everything must be explicable in terms of physics. The fact that such arguments rarely surface is I 
think tacit acknowledgement of the fact that cosmology is not the ideal science on which to base 
physicalism. Cosmological theories are so speculative and so highly susceptible to revision it 
would be a brave individual who based his metaphysics on such results. Also phenomenon like 
spontaneous symmetry breaking make it far from obvious that cosmologists do behave as the 
argument-sketch I have provided suggests. See Auyang (2000) for a discussion of symmetry 
breaking.
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or as part of a more general meta-inductive argument. Clearly single cases of 
reduction can lend no general support to physicalism; such reductions show only 
one particular part of the world is captured by physics. Thus, without a complete 
reduction of all disciplines to physics (which I take it no one believes we have) 
the only argument that can proceed from reduction is the meta-inductive one.
Putting it roughly (for that is the only way it has ever been put) the success 
of physics in providing reductions in (say) chemistry and biochemistry leads one 
to expect similar successes for other disciplines, most notably psychology. 
Generally those attracted to reductionism assume that there is a hierarchical 
structure to the world2; starting at the bottom with physics and progressing 
through chemistry and biology eventually to psychology and maybe sociology. 
Each level is supposed to represent a new level of complexity that can be 
explained by the level below and ultimately, in theory at least, physics. As it 
stands this picture is no doubt far too simple: much of what is rightly termed 
physics involves complex entities -  galaxies for example. Nevertheless, this 
general hierarchical picture pervades and informs much physicalist-reductionist 
thinking. The argument from reduction thus proceeds from successful cases of 
reduction to the conclusion that it is reasonable to believe that all domains within 
the hierarchy must be reductively related to the domain below; and hence, all 
domains are ultimately reducible to physics.
There are a number of issues that need to be discussed here, not least what 
we understand by the term reduction. However, first I want to draw the reader’s 
attention to what seem to me basic problems with an argument of this form. 
Granting for the moment that there do in fact exist such reductions, the meta-
2 See Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) for a classic account.
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inductive argument, as stated here, strikes me as unsustainable for two reasons. 
First, it is not at all clear why success in one area should lead one to expect 
success in another. At the very least, some argument is needed to justify the idea 
that all other, as yet unreduced domains can be reasonably be expected to conform 
to the pattern of the supposedly successful reductions. In other words, that we can, 
in fact, perform a reliable induction over such cases. After all, it might well be 
part o f the traditional dualist picture to expect physics to explain everything in just 
the way physicalists envisage, except for the mental. So there needs to be some 
justification of the idea that reductionist principles will extend into every domain.3 
Second, if this meta-inductive argument is to be successful, as with any inductive 
argument, the evidence must all point in the same direction. Physicalists must 
expect that these reductive successes point towards the same underlying physical 
ontology. But that just does not appear to be case. Consider two plausible 
candidates for reduction: thermodynamics and the chemical concept o f valence. It 
might be argued that thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics4 and that 
valency can be explained in terms of a quantum mechanical treatment o f electron 
orbitals. So for the physicalist these two ‘successes’ might be considered data 
points in their inductive argument. However, as far as the ontology is concerned 
(and that is what is at issue here) they provide no reliable pattern at all. The 
ontology of statistical mechanics is radically different from that of quantum 
mechanics. One employs a notion of particles with definite position and 
trajectories and the other does not. One theory uses a classical account of
3 As Sober (1999) remarks the meta-inductive argument can make it sound as though reductionist 
successes were balls drawn at random from an urn. Clearly, though, scientists have not achieved 
their reductionist successes by random sampling from all of science. They have investigated areas 
in which they believed such reductionist ploys were likely to succeed, given the techniques and 
tools that they had available to them.
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probability; the other does not. One assumes an underlying deterministic 
ontology; the other does not. The differences are many and varied. There just is no 
general ontological picture that can be inferred from these two cases, even if we 
grant that they are both successful reductions. At the very best, such cases point 
towards the methodological maxim that searching for underlying mechanisms can 
often be fruitful. But this principle, as I shall argue below and in subsequent 
chapters, has a life quite independently of the ontological claims o f physicalism.
I believe such considerations count powerfully against arguments from 
reduction. However, I now intend to shift tack and argue that that the general 
presupposition that underpins the meta-inductive argument is flawed: namely that 
there exist many clear-cut cases of reduction which can form the premises of the 
meta-induction. As I mentioned at the outset many physicalists believe that 
reductions of chemistry to physics in particular provide powerful reasons to 
believe there should be reductions elsewhere. By looking at quantum chemistry I 
shall show that this simple reductionist story misrepresents the relation between 
modern physics and chemistry.
1.2 Reduction: formal and informal
Before we can assess the plausibility of the claim that reductions in science 
provide some kind of evidence for physicalism, in particular reductions of physics 
to chemistry, it is necessary to have some idea o f what a reduction is. Traditional 
formal accounts have focused on the idea of deducibility of one theory from 
another. According to Ernest Nagel’s classic account, a reduction is effected using 
bridge principles (generally biconditional statements) connecting the terms of one
4 This claim is of course often challenged. See for example, Sklar (1995) for an account of the
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theory to another. The reduced theory is then deduced via the bridge laws from 
the reducing theory. So for example there is a bridge law connecting the term 
temperature in thermodynamics with mean molecular kinetic energy in statistical 
mechanics. Using such a bridge principle, Nagel claims we can deduce 
thermodynamics (or some part of it) from statistical mechanics.
Nagel’s account has largely fallen out of favour. Doubt has been expressed 
about whether bridge laws provide the right sort of connection between the terms 
(or the properties) of the reducing and the reduced theory. In particular, one might 
wonder whether a number of relations that intuitively speaking are not o f the right 
sort might count as bridge laws; for example, properties connected by causation. 
More importantly, though, the bridge laws themselves demand some kind of 
explanation. Questions arise concerning their ontological status: are they on a par 
with the laws being reduced? If so, then the very idea of reduction seems to be 
undermined, since there are true laws which ineliminably involve the properties of 
the supposedly reduced theory. If not, then precisely what is supposed to 
differentiate them from other laws? There is also the danger of trivialisation. If 
there are no restrictions on the kind of statement that counts as a bridge law, then 
it is possible to deduce one theory from any other simply by introducing a bridge 
law which states that if the reducing theory holds then so does the reduced theory. 
That is to say take our reducing theory to be A (say Newtonian mechanics), our 
reduced theory B (say, that Englishmen are bad losers), B can be deduced from A, 
given the bridge law A B.
complexities of the reductionist claim.
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Robert Causey (1980) offered a natural strengthening of the Nagel model 
by replacing bridge laws by identity statements.5 The benefit o f this approach is 
that identity statements require no further explanation, metaphysically speaking at 
least. If water is actually H2O, then one does not need to explain why wherever 
there is water there is H2O. (Although, of course, one would expect there to be 
some justification for positing the identity statement in the first place.) Moreover, 
identity statements cannot be arbitrarily invented. Philosophically speaking this is 
certainly an improvement. Causey’s account clearly does away with the need to 
explain the bridge law. However, it seems to rule out almost all putative cases of 
reduction from the history o f science. It is difficult to find even one example of a 
deduction of one theory from another employing only identity statements to 
connect the properties of the different theories.
Consider the example of light and its supposed reduction to 
electromagnetic radiation. On a standard and simplified account o f this episode 
from the history of science we might say that what is termed Tight’ in one theory 
is identified with electromagnetic radiation in the other. But this ignores the 
ontological disparities between the then extant theory of light and 
electromagnetism. Fresnel’s theory of light, the most up-to-date before the advent 
o f electromagnetism, described light as propagating through a solid, mechanical 
elastic medium (an ether). In Maxwell’s theory light is described as a periodic 
disturbance in an electromagnetic field. As John Worrall (1988) has said “[o]ne 
would be hard pressed to cite two things more different than a displacement 
current, which is what [electromagnetism] makes light, and an elastic vibration
5 Arguably this is also Nagel’s view. (The issue is somewhat clouded by whether or not you adopt 
a nominalist line with regard to properties and therefore shy away from property identities. A 
fuller investigation of Nagel’s views would require more discussion of this point. However, such 
niceties of exegesis shall not concern us here.)
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through a medium, which is what Fresnel’s theory [makes i t ] ” So the 
identification of light (as understood by Fresnel) with electromagnetic radiation is 
highly problematic.
Acknowledgement of this kind of radical ontological change opens up 
another possibility for the physicalist. Instead of claiming that the relation 
between physics and other disciplines is best described in reductionist terms, she 
may think ot is better to take an eliminativist line. That is to say, non-physical 
theory is to be taken to be largely false and at best an approximation to the true 
physical description of the world. Such a picture undercuts the hierarchical image 
o f the sciences described above. Given an eliminativist conception, there only 
would be a hierarchy of descriptions, most of which are false, but no hierarchy o f 
reality. We shall have occasion to examine eliminativism and some o f its 
consequences in later chapters. One should merely pause to note here that there is 
no eliminativist analogue to the reductionist argument for physicalism. The 
eliminativist will agree with the non-physicalist that certain theories cannot be 
reduced to physics. However, the eliminativist will draw the conclusion that such 
theories are therefore false; the non-physicalist, on the other hand, will conclude 
rather that physicalism is false. One can only arbitrate between such positions by 
considering the arguments for physicalism that rest upon physics itself. For this 
we will have to wait until chapter 4.
In any case, as perhaps my example suggests, the distinction between 
elimination and reduction is a matter of degree, rather than a hard and fast one. 
There are some cases which seem more plausibly reductions, others perhaps that 
are better described as eliminations. More sophisticated accounts of reduction 
have been developed by others, notably by C.A. Hooker (1981) and Paul
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Churchland (1979), to deal with such problems. However, here I am not much 
concerned with the technical details of reduction and the semantic and 
epistemological difficulties they create. All we require is a definition that will 
allow us to assess the plausibility of the meta-inductive argument; and as others 
have argued a rough and ready idea of the notion can easily be given, even if we 
lack the highly refined analysis that some philosophers seek. Peter Smith (1992) 
nicely sums up this rough and ready reductionist account:
[T]he essence of reduction is simply an explanation in terms o f one 
theory of why another [theory] works and [such] explanations come in 
a variety of flavours (p.2 1)6
Let us apply this informal notion of reduction to the case o f quantum chemistry.
1.3 Reductionism: a watery grave?
According to the Smith-style basic notion of reduction, if chemistry is reducible to 
physics then we should expect an explanation of chemical phenomena in some 
fashion or other purely in terms of physics. Let us consider quantum chemical 
explanations of some of the spectroscopic properties of water.
If one is of a reductionist turn of mind, one would expect the quantum 
chemist to write down a Schrodinger equation (the equation which describes all 
interactions in quantum mechanics) solely in terms of fundamental physical 
interactions for the molecule in question. However, this is not what happens. 
What quantum chemists seek is a model in which they can apply their theory and
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provide some useful and tractable results. Here is a brief qualitative summary of 
how one might go about investigating the spectroscopic properties o f water 
molecules:
Spectroscopic properties of any molecule (or atom) are determined by the 
energy levels of the electrons. As an electron falls from one energy level to 
another, a photon with a frequency corresponding to the energy difference 
between the two levels is emitted. The quantum chemist thus wants to come up 
with some way of calculating the value of these energy levels. To do this she has 
to be able to model the sorts of interactions that dictate the features o f the 
Hamiltonian, i.e., the part of the Schrodinger equation that describes the possible 
energy functions of the orbital electrons. A basic construction o f the Hamiltonian 
might begin something like this. First one would assess the sorts of interaction a 
molecule like water might undergo. It is known from chemistry that the water 
molecule is a three atom, non-linear structure with one heavy nucleus bonded with 
two lighter nuclei. One would therefore expect there to be vibrational motion 
between the nuclei, along the bonds, as well as rotational motion for the structure 
as a whole. The quantum chemist can model these vibrational modes using the 
harmonic oscillator (with a few adjustments); in other words by treating the 
movement between the bonds like the quantum version of a spring. For the 
rotational modes a rigid rotator model is used, which is the quantum analogue of 
the classical motion of rotation without deformation. One can solve these 
Hamiltonians and obtain theoretical values for the electron energy levels, which in 
turn can be used to calculate the value of the spectral lines. More accurate results 
can be obtained by adding perturbations -  for example coupling effects, and
6 Note of course that this is arguably what Nagel’s model is a version of, employing the deductive-
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possible deformations to the basic molecular structure. Alternatively, so called 
variational calculations may be made. Essentially, this involves exploiting certain 
mathematical properties7 of quantum mechanics to obtain an approximate solution 
to the ground-state energy for the molecule by varying certain judiciously chosen 
parameters. Here again knowledge of the structural properties o f water is essential 
in applying this strategy as well as modelling the Hamiltonian. The sort o f co­
ordinates that one chooses to model the system is dictated by knowledge of the 
structure of water. Moreover, in making the actual calculations when employing 
this method, one has to know certain facts about the typical bondlengths and 
angles of water in order to break it down into computationally tractable chunks. 
So what we see, in fact, is that prior knowledge of classical chemistry is imported 
into the quantum chemist’s treatment at every stage. First, in modelling the kind 
of motions that one would expect the molecule to undergo and thus allowing the 
theoretician to write down appropriate Hamiltonians. And second, knowledge of 
the typical values for certain features of the molecule are necessary before one can 
even begin to make calculations. Generally, one can say that the application of 
quantum theory depends on prior knowledge o f the structure o f the water 
molecule.
What we find then is that quantum chemical explanation of spectroscopic 
effects must assume certain facts about the structure of the molecule, facts which 
are not derived from fundamental theory but from classical chemistry. Now, as
nomological model of explanation.
7 The exact energy values for any Hamiltonian are known as eigenvalues, and corresponding to 
each there is a wave function, an eigenfunction. Any arbitrary wavefunction can be written as the 
sum of these eigenfunctions. One can then show that the expectation value for the function must 
be greater than or equal to the ground state energy level. The approximate ground state is thus 
found by varying (hence the name) the parameters of the arbitrarily selected function until one 
obtains the lowest possible value. My thanks to Sophie Kain for her careful explanation of this and 
quantum chemistry in general.
8 Radau co-ordinates. Those interested in the technical detail are referred to S. Kain’s thesis
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said at the outset, I do not expect anyone to be particularly surprised by this 
description of quantum chemistry. A physicalist could argue that although there is 
in fact no reduction here, that does not mean there could not be a reduction in 
principle. It is, after all, by physicalists* lights, not mysterious why one cannot 
explain the spectroscopic effects in purely physical terms. Schrodinger equations 
which attempted to describe only basic physical, in particular Coulombic, 
interactions for this system would be mathematically intractable. Given that the 
direct route to reduction is blocked off, the only way one could explain the 
spectroscopic features of water is by introducing knowledge from other domains. I 
have no objection to offer at this point9 to that response but one should bear in 
mind that it reverses the order of the explanation. Instead o f arguing fo r  
physicalism, one is now justifying the apparent failures of reduction assuming 
physicalism. In short, science is no longer supporting physicalism, physicalism is 
explaining away certain features of science. This is, o f course, a game any 
metaphysical theory can play and physicalism’s claim to be special, to be a 
naturalistic metaphysics, is thus weakened.
The above considerations provide yet another nail in the already well- 
sealed coffin of the meta-inductive argument. There are, in reality, very few data- 
points for on which to base the meta-inductive argument. As the above discussion 
shows, even favourite cases like chemistry turn out to be problematic for 
physicalists and there are many other, more detailed case studies that demonstrate 
the same point for other disciplines. For example, Nancy Cartwright (1999) and 
Sunny Auyang (2000) have independently discussed cases where reductions in 
different areas o f physics are seen to be problematic; Sahorta Sarkar (2000) shows
9 However, in chapter 4 I will argue that this explanation is unsatisfactory for other reasons.
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the inadequacy of thinking that molecular biology reduces to physics or even 
chemistry; John Dupre (1993) discusses similar cases in biology more generally. 
Moreover, the whole philosophical world knows the enormous number of anti­
reductionist arguments that have been put forward regarding the mental. The 
conclusions the various authors wish to draw from such cases are as varied as the 
areas they have chosen to discuss. What is undeniable though is that their case 
studies, taken together, show that the world described by the sciences is a mess. A 
whole host of theories that make all kinds of different ontological assumptions are 
employed to describe the world. Contemporary science provides nothing like the 
sort of picture that could support the meta-inductive argument.
Physicalists might argue that such considerations are not of the greatest 
importance. “O f course,” they might say, “until we have the full reductionist story 
it will be easy to point out failures. However, if we look at the history o f science, 
then one sees the long-term success of reductionism. It is this rather than current 
science, which physicalists wish to base their meta-inductive argument upon.” But 
the history o f science is littered with as many, if not more, reductionist failures as 
successes: the attempt to reduce electromagnetic phenomena to mechanics; 
Einstein’s attempt to come up with a unified field theory, a whole host of 
discarded unification projects in particle physics. Again, there is an easy 
physicalist reply to such failures -  they don’t show the inadequacy o f physicalism 
per se, just of the particular physics being used in the reductions. But physicalist 
can hardly claim then (unless they know the one true physics in advance) that any 
part of science lends support to their metaphysical position. As before this kind of 
physicalist response would merely explain away science and its history, rather 
than draw from science support for physicalism. The history of science, as much
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as contemporary science tells a tale of theoretical disunity.10 The data now and in 
the past is unequivocal; there is no curve o f best fit converging in the limit to a 
physicalist ontology. This is a theme that will be elaborated in chapters 4 and 5.
We may summarise our discussion of the meta-inductive argument as 
follows. The argument in the abstract is flawed because it provides no basis for 
thinking that one can reasonably infer that successful reductions in one area will 
lead to successful reductions in another. Moreover, the putative cases of reduction 
provide no pattern from which a physicalist ontology might be inferred. Once we 
look at science in detail we see that even favoured cases of reduction turn out to 
be complex and at best partial; and the history of science testifies as much to the 
failure of reductionist programmes as to its successes.
Let me reiterate what I take it has been shown: there is no argument from 
reduction in science to physicalism. We should conclude no more than this from 
the arguments so far given. It certainly has not been shown that physicalism is 
false. All we are entitled to claim is that there is no support for physicalism from 
this quarter.
1.4 Methodology and metaphysics and the methodology of the 
metaphysician
Let me separate my anti-reductionist observations from possible anti-reductionist 
methodological conclusions one might want to draw. I don’t want to suggest that 
scientists should not look for reductions or underlying causal mechanisms. Such a 
tactic has proved fruitful in the history of science even if it has not lead to 
completely successful reductions. But a commitment to such a methodological
10 I agree with Ian Hacking (1983) when he says: “Every single year...physics alone has used
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principle in no way forces upon one any metaphysical position which has 
implications beyond the domain one is investigating. As I have suggested for 
different sciences, the idea of an underlying mechanism and what one hopes to 
explain with it will be different. There is no global metaphysics which follows 
from the sage advice that it often helps to understand how the parts work, if you 
want to get a better understanding of the whole. Even this concession has to be 
tempered with the observation that like all pieces of sage advice, it is limited in its 
application. Sometimes looking for underlying mechanisms is just not the right 
thing to do. For example, thermodynamics and the theory of relativity are derived 
from some general and empirically supported statements, not an investigation of 
underlying mechanisms. Sometimes this axiomatic approach proves fruitful but 
one cannot tell in advance; as bohemians say, you have to try these things. I shall 
have more to say on the role of metaphysics in methodology in chapter 7.
successfully more (incompatible) models of phenomena in its day to day business.”
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What I have said thus far will probably meet little opposition from many 
contemporary physicalists. Seldom, today, do physicalists seek to justify their 
position by invoking arguments from reduction. Generally a more abstract, bi­
partite form of reasoning is employed. On the one hand, physicalists seek to 
explain how the non-reducibility of non-physical domains is compatible with a 
physicalist ontology. On the other hand, justifications for the physicalist doctrine 
are sought from general features of physics. This divides the tasks between the 
scientists and the metaphysicians equally. It is the metaphysician’s role to explain 
to us how there can be ontological unity beneath phenomenological disunity. It is 
up to the scientist, more specifically the physicist, to provide evidence for the 
truth of the doctrine.
Some physicalists will perhaps not see the need to carry out the first part 
o f this task. They will be content to rest with the idea o f reduction in principle.u  I 
think that is a mistake. Since we have no general characterisation o f what
• 19reduction involves, this claim strikes me as empty. The braver physicalists will 
attempt to articulate exactly what sort of relation might exist between physics and 
other disciplines which apparently do not reduce to it. It is to these braver souls I 
turn next.
11 Eliminativists need only concern themselves with the latter task as well.
12 John Worrall has suggested to me the idea that reductionist thinking is captured in the idea that 
we should try to do with as few primitives as possible. But this is surely just a platitude. Who has 
ever suggested we should have more primitives than are necessary? What is at issue is whether it 
is possible to capture everything using just physical primitives (whatever they are).
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Chapter 2 
Supervenience: Order out of Chaos
Science bequeaths the metaphysician an untidy world. Many physicalist 
philosophers, unsatisfied with this mess, take it upon themselves to uncover the 
order that lies deep within. Two ideas are used to effect this trick of finding order 
out of chaos: the completeness of physics and supervenience. The completeness of 
physics provides the order. It will be the topic of a later chapter. First, though, I 
wish to turn to the principle which explains the apparent chaos -  supervenience. 
Supervenience, so it is hoped, will bind the physical to the non-physical in a way 
that will allow the metaphysician to retain the label physicalist without 
commitment to reductionism. The combination of these two views results in the 
metaphysical orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy, non-reductive physicalism. 
The non-reductive position shares many assumptions with the ordinary classical 
reductionist picture. It retains the idea that the world can be split into many levels: 
the physical, the chemical, the biological, etc. However, the notion that we should 
be able to reduce these to one base level is given up.
Historically at least, the main motivation for this retreat from reductionism 
has not been the phenomenology of the sciences, outlined in the previous chapter 
but what are called multiple-realisation arguments. Such arguments make the, 
perhaps obvious, point that certain kinds of property or state can have many 
physical bases. For example, the computational states required for the calculation 
2+2=4 can be realised by a silicon-based calculator, a carbon-based life-form and 
a host of other more or less complicated mechanisms. If  a property or state can be 
multiply realised, then there can be no hope of identifying it with any one single,
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unified physical base and hence reduction is blocked.1 At least, that has been the 
general texture of the argument traditionally given2 but recently doubt has been 
cast on the conventional view that multiple realisation blocks reduction, notably 
by Jaegwon Kim (1993, 1995). Whether or not this is the case will not concern me 
here greatly. What I want to investigate is the plausibility, the pros and cons of 
this orthodox position (whether or not one ultimately decides that it is reductionist 
or not). In short, the chapter is concerned with the plausibility of physicalistic 
views defined using supervenience. (For the sake of simplicity I shall refer to 
physicalist accounts employing the concept of supervenience as non-reductive 
throughout.)
The topic of supervenience has spawned a large technical literature so 
some definitions and clarifications are in order first. The following discussion will 
be abstract and I shall, at least to begin with, simply make reference to physical 
and non-physical properties without detailed discussion of what these might be. 
Mainly, in accordance with the literature, I will talk of the relation between 
physical and mental properties. That is to say, I shall assume whatever the basic 
physical properties are they do not include mental properties. Occasionally, 
though, I shall have cause to talk of the relation between physical and other non­
physical properties. When I do so I shall make this clear. Later sections will tackle 
the issue of defining the physical in greater detail.
1 Clearly this account interprets reduction in terms of something like the Causey-model in which 
bridge laws are identity statement.
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2.1 Defining supervenience
The origin of the term ‘supervenience’ in the context of the modem mind-body 
problem3 can be traced to Donald Davidson’s seminal paper “Mental Events”. 
There the idea is presented somewhat informally as ‘no change in the mental 
without a change in the physical’.4 The technical explication of this basic idea is 
mostly, if not solely, due to the efforts of Jaegwon Kim. From his work several 
permutations of supervenience have arisen which are standardly classed into three 
different types of relation. One set of possible definitions runs as follows:
(SS) Strong Supervenience M strongly supervenes on P just in case necessarily 
for any object x  and any property F in M, if x has F, then there exists a property G 
in P such that x has G, and necessarily if any y  has G, it has F.
(WS) Weak supervenience M weakly supervenes on P just in case necessarily for 
any object x and any property F in M, if  x has F, then there exits a property G in P 
such that x has G, and if anyy has G, it has F.
(GS) Global Supervenience M globally supervenes on P just in case for any two 
worlds, w l and w2, if they are P-property indistinguishable, then they are M- 
property indistinguishable.5
2 See Putnam (1960), Fodor (1974), Boyd (1980) and many others.
3 Certain emergentists also used the word in the first half of the 20th century.
4 In fact I will not discuss Davidson’s ideas in this chapter. The special context in which his ideas 
arise deserve separate and detailed attention (which they get in chapter 7).
5 Different philosophers will defend subtly different variations of these relations depending upon 
on how they construe the modal terms (e.g. whether a possible worlds analysis is appropriate or 
not) in these definitions and depending on whether they think the supervenience relation holds for 
objects or events. Those with a taste for such nuances are referred to Brian McLaughlin’s paper
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Where M and P are non-empty families of properties.
To put the general idea in English: if the mental strongly supervenes on the 
physical then wherever there are certain physical properties there will be certain 
mental properties and that relation holds counterfactually. (WS) is identical, 
except the relation does not hold counterfactually. (GS) simply implies that given 
the complete physical state of the universe, the complete mental state of the 
universe is fixed. Intuitively (although there is room to disagree depending on 
how one construes the modal terms) (SS) implies both (WS) and (GS). Note that 
although the above definitions of (SS) and (WS) are framed in terms of relations 
between properties copresent in an individual, the definitions need not be that 
restrictive. One could easily rephrase both (SS) and (WS) in terms o f a relation 
between properties in a certain region. That is to say, take some region o f space. 
Then fix all the P-properties intrinsic to that area and (according to this form of 
supervenience) all the M-properties are fixed too. Terence Horgan calls this 
regional supervenience. I prefer to think of it as a more general definition o f (WS) 
or (SS).6 In the limiting case where the subvening properties include all physical 
properties then (SS) becomes a version of (GS).
Let us turn to then to the question o f the appropriateness or otherwise of 
these forms of supervenience as explanations of the mind-body relation. There is a 
powerful and well-known objection to (GS) which goes along the following lines. 
Assume that mental properties globally supervene on physical properties. Now, 
imagine two worlds which are physically identical and hence, by (GS), mentally
“Varieties of Supervenience” in Savellos and Yalpn (1995). These nuances will not affect my 
criticisms.
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identical. Let us suppose there is some minor change in physical properties in one 
of the worlds: that for example, a few hydrogen atoms are shifted in a galaxy far, 
far away. The two worlds now differ physically. It is perfectly consistent with 
(GS) that the two worlds may differ radically in the distribution of their mental 
properties (or that there may be no mental properties at all in one of the worlds). 
It seems therefore utterly mysterious what the relation between physical and 
mental properties is, given (GS) or why one should believe that the mental is 
actually dependent upon the physical in any interesting sense at all.7
In response, John Post (1995) has argued that although global 
supervenience is consistent with the sort of story told above, it does not imply its 
truth. It may well be that moving a few hydrogen atoms has no affect at all on the 
mental properties o f the universe. Post suggests that (GS) be understood as 
programmatic. It defines the minimum structure which physicalism has to satisfy, 
the detail o f which will be filled in later. However, when one considers what that 
extra detail might be it is difficult to resist the thought it will involve citing 
particular physical bases upon which particular mental states supervene. In other 
words, it will involve setting out the sorts of relations that characterise (SS); at 
least as liberally construed by me. I do not see any way o f defending (GS) as 
providing an explanation for the link between the mental and the physical that 
does not make it into a version of (SS).
Weak and strong supervenience look more promising alternatives. They 
are clearly explanatorily more robust forms of the supervenience relation because 
they tie the supervenient property more closely to the physical manifestation of
6 Note that the above definition I have provided will already be an adequate account of regional 
supervenience, if one is liberal in what one counts as an individual and as property that may be 
predicated of it.
7 Kim (1989) first makes this point, as far as I am aware.
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the thing we take to have that property. That is, if the mental supervenes on the 
physical it supervenes on the sort of physical thing that has mental properties, i.e. 
human bodies (or human bodies plus the local environment).8 Both (WS) and (SS) 
imply the existence of psychophysical correlations as the informal summary I 
provided implied. From the above formulations (WS) implies laws of the form 
Gx->Fx and (SS) implies laws of the form Gxd->Fx. (WS) is consistent with 
reading the correlation between the subvenient and the supervenient as merely 
accidental; and most philosophers would think that accidental covariance of 
properties is not a strong enough relation to ground a metaphysically robust form 
of dependency. Certainly, this is Kim’s view. Hence, the only relation that appears 
as though it might ground dependency is (SS) which implies the existence o f at 
least nomologically necessary connections between Fx and Gx. Let us consider 
this type of supervenience in more detail.
Kim in his 1989 paper, “The Myth of Non-reductive Physicalism” 
suggests that the existence of such laws should lead us to expect reductions. It is, 
though, quite interesting to follow through the steps of Kim’s argument to see 
how his own analysis leads to a rather surprising result and provides an 
illustration of a general problem for non-reductive physicalism.
Kim assumes the Nagel model o f reduction in which it is sufficient to 
reduce one theory to another if the reduced theory may be deduced from the 
reducing theory plus appropriate bridge principles. Kim’s idea is that given (SS) 
we may use laws of the form cited above as our bridge laws in Nagel-style 
reductions, either singly to yield local reductions or jointly (and disjunctively) to
8 I think that Post is scared off (SS) because he takes it to imply individualism, that is narrow 
content. (An issue which I shall discuss directly in chapter 3.) This is obviously not the case, even 
if historically advocates of (SS) have also been believers in narrow content, as my extension of 
(SS) to cover Horgan’s (1993) notion of regional supervenience shows.
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provide us with a global reduction of some special science discipline to physics.9 
However, I think it pays to look more closely at the sort o f relation between the 
mental and the physical implied by the (SS) relation. One can best appreciate the 
sort of picture Kim has in mind with the following diagram:
M M ’
The diagram represents the general structure o f mental causation on Kim’s theory. 
We take the horizontal arrow to indicate causation and the vertical arrows the 
dependency relation that is described by (SS). Only P-type events directly cause 
other P-type events, given the completeness o f physics; and M-type events 
supervene on P-type events. It seems to be perfectly consistent with this picture 
that we imagine the M ’s to be caused by the P ’s. In other words, we may imagine 
the diagram represents the relations a form of dualistic epiphenomenalism, rather 
than a form of physicalism. Indeed, it seems that is exactly what it does represent, 
if  we suppose that the mental property is not identical to a physical property and 
we follow Kim in identifying an event as an exemplification of a property at a 
particular time. In that case M and P represent different events and if we take the 
(SS) relation as a causal relation, we have a classic form of epiphenomenalism.
Kim, however, places an extra condition on a property being real which 
would seem to rule out construing the supervenience relation as a form of
9 This will allow Kim to overcome the problems multiple-realisation supposedly creates for 
reduction. In his writings Kim prefers local reductions, fearing disjunctive predicates will not be
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dualistic epiphenomenalism. He claims that in order for any natural property to be 
construed realistically it should do some causal work.10 Since, by construction, 
one would think epiphenomenal mental properties or events do no causal work, 
they must be ruled out as real by this strengthening condition. But Kim’s own 
analysis of what makes higher-level states causally efficacious is revealing. In the 
original paper, he maintains that one can reasonably claim that some mental event 
caused some physical event if the mental event in question strongly supervenes on 
the physical base which would feature in a complete physical explanation o f the 
cause of the physical event. In terms of the diagram above, we could say then that 
M caused P ’ for example on the Kim model. Not because it does so directly: a 
direct diagonal causal arrow from M to P’ is ruled out because if M causes P ’ 
directly that would violate the completeness of physics; or if it does not then it 
would at least mean P ’ was causally overdetermined which Kim thinks is 
unacceptable. Rather, because it stands in the correct (SS) relation to the physical 
cause, it itself may be considered a cause. Kim sometimes refers to this as 
supervenient causation. So the above diagram is an acceptable form of 
supervenient causation by Kim’s lights. That is all well and good but we have yet 
to see any reason not to interpret the diagram as describing a form of dualistic 
epiphenomenalism. All that Kim’s analysis has added is the counterintuitive idea 
that if one is a dualistic epiphenomenalist then one can claim Kim-style that 
mental events are causally efficacious because they strongly supervene on the 
physical.11 Moreover, Kim still maintains that the relation between the mental
projectible and hence inapt for natural laws.
10 Kim calls this Alexander's dictum
11 The argument can probably be run with a version of psychophysical parallelism as well. 
However, it might be objected since that theory of the mind-body relation severs any connection 
between the two domains it would only be strong enough to support (WS), not (SS). (Although it is 
not obvious that must be the case.)
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properties and the physical properties is strong enough to support reduction. So, 
according to Kim although it would appear non-reductive physicalism is not a 
tenable position, given the various constraints he has placed on the mind-body 
relation, what we might call reductive dualism is perfectly acceptable.
I think this must show there is something deeply wrong at the heart of 
Kim’s argument. The most obvious culprit is the Nagel-model o f reduction. 
Simple deducibility of one theory from another plus “bridge laws” does not 
capture the intuitive idea of reduction. But that is not the most worrying problem 
for the advocate of supervenience. After all, most contemporary physicalists wish 
to resist the idea that the mental reduces to the physical. The disturbing thought is 
that the relation (SS), the strongest form of supervenience, is not by itself strong 
enough to rule out forms of dualism. Even that is only half the problem. The very 
fact that the kind of dualism supervenience plus the completeness o f physics 
permits is a version of epiphenomenalism seems by analogy to lead to the 
conclusion that the mental is causally inert no matter how the supervenience 
relation is interpreted. If it does not, if in other words physicalists can explain how 
the mental can conform to the pattern of (SS) and still be causally efficacious, 
then the possibility that dualists may use the same form o f explanation to account 
for the efficacy of substantially different mental properties and events is opened 
up. Either way, one, perhaps the main, motivation of physicalism is undermined: 
its claim to remove the problems of mental causation that have plagued dualists 
since Descartes.12 This is why I think the question of reduction matters little one 
way or the other. The non-reductive physicalists needs an account of the relation 
between mental properties, states or events and physical properties, states or
12 Tim Crane (1995) makes the same point.
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events which rules out dualism and rules in mental causation. The standard 
account seems to do neither.
Kim and many other writers on this subject are aware of these problems. 
For example, Kim (1993) has written that:
Mind-body supervenience, therefore, does not state a solution to the 
mind-body problem; rather it states the problem itself, (p. 168)
And
But the Thesis itself [supervenience] says nothing about the nature of 
the dependence involved: it tells us neither what kind of dependence it 
is, nor how the dependence grounds or explains the property 
covariation.... When we reflect on mind-body supervenience and 
compare it with the traditional options, we are struck by its failure to 
address the explanatory task. (p. 166-7)13
In fact, Kim has invented the term, causal exclusion arguments, for the general 
sort of argument we have considered which seems to lead to the conclusion that 
the mental is epiphenomenal. This is a problem which he takes very seriously and 
has dominated his recent writings.
Clearly then the notion of supervenience as it stands is not adequate to 
ground a form of non-reductive materialism. One reason for this is that the 
technical notion of supervenience is non-symmetric. Strong supervenience implies
13 See also Horgan (1993) and Heil (1998)
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that supervenient properties covary (admittedly necessarily covary) with 
subvenient properties, whereas the intuitive idea behind non-reductive 
physicalism is that the physical determines the mental. Determination should, 
intuitively, be an asymmetric relation. Moreover, when one reflects upon the 
conventional position it is a strange mix of views. It involves a commitment on 
the one hand to monism, since everything is fundamentally physical, and on the 
other hand property dualism (or pluralism), since the world contains irreducibly 
non-physical properties. What non-reductive physicalists need to combine these 
monistic and pluralistic parts o f their view is an explanation o f why the mental 
supervenes on the physical which is physicalistically kosher; an explanation that 
converts the standard non-symmetric relation of supervenience into an 
asymmetric relation of dependence and addresses the apparent problems o f causal 
exclusion reasoning. What is needed, in Terence Horgan’s words, is 
sup erdup ervenience.
2.2 Covariance to determination
How is the move from supervenience to superdupervenience to be effected? 
Different philosophers have different ideas about the best way to go. These, I 
believe, can be grouped into three types of solution. First there is the idea that the 
relation between sub and supervenient properties should be modelled on that of 
the relation of parts to wholes. Second that the relation between determinants and 
determinables provides the paradigm for an acceptable version of supervenience. 
Third it is has been claimed that by analysing mental states in terms of their causal 
powers, an acceptable account of the supervenience relation can be constructed. 
To assess the plausibility of each of these claims two kinds of question must be
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addressed: what I shall call internal and external questions. The internal questions 
concern whether or not the relation between the sub and supervenient properties is 
acceptable by physicalist standards; and whether construing the relation in that 
way removes the apparent problems created by the causal exclusion argument. 
The external question is whether the relation so described is a plausible 
description of the relation between physical and non-physical (in particular 
mental) states.
Take for example the idea of property identity as an explanation of the 
supervenience relation. It clearly satisfies the internal questions. If mental 
properties and thus events and states are identical to physical properties it is 
unmysterious how mental events cause physical events. They are physical events. 
However, modern scruples regarding multiple-realisation mean this suggestion 
fails for most philosophers to answer the external question. It is implausible that 
mental states are identical to physical states. We shall consider the same questions 
for the three versions of superdupervenience.
2.3 A model for superdupervenience I: parts and wholes
First consider the idea that the supervenient properties are related as parts are to 
wholes, what Kim calls mereological supervenience (MS). Perhaps something like 
(MS) plays a role in many people’s intuitive understanding of the supervenience 
relation. The analogy between parts and wholes is obviously a tempting one, one 
which fits naturally into the hierarchical picture o f the universe which forms the 
background to much contemporary physicalist thinking. Moreover, intuitively one 
would not think of parts and wholes in causal competition with one another. That 
is to say, it would hardly be credible to claim, for example, that because the bricks
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and mortar caused the ball to change direction that ruled out the wall, composed 
of those bricks and mortar, from causing the change in the ball’s flight. Worries 
here about epiphenomenalism would simply be misguided.14
What an advocate of (MS) requires is some general account of the relation 
between parts and wholes that could serve to flesh out these intuitions and provide 
an account of superdupervenience. The most obvious method (for a philosopher) 
would be to employ some form of mereological logic as, for example, developed 
by Nelson Goodman. Subvening properties would be characterised as proper parts 
of supervening wholes. However, this logical characterisation of (MS) would be 
at once too restrictive and too permissive. Too restrictive because there are 
obvious examples where classical mereological logics fail to relate parts to wholes 
in, intuitively speaking, an illuminating way. For example, biological entities are 
such because they have a certain evolutionary history; an organism summed from 
the same physical parts but with a different selection history would be a different 
type of species. But that is not a distinction that can be made using a classical 
mereological logic. Similar points could be made regarding artefacts and social 
institutions. The properties of such entities that are special, that help identify them 
as what they are, cannot be captured by the simple idea of mereological fusion. 
Wholes like artefacts, social institutions and biological entities have properties 
that we would not attribute to a mere mereological sum of their parts. On the other 
hand, mereology is also too permissive. If the idea of mereological supervenience 
is merely the logically summing of parts, then (MS) will be trivial and ubiquitous.
14 There are some general conceptual problems regarding the relation between parts and wholes 
which need to be cleared up, most importantly the problem of vagueness, before any (MS) relation 
could get going. One can think of the classical sorites paradox as a paradox of mereological 
composition. That is to say, wholes are relatively and to a vague degree insensitive to changes in 
their parts (or at least some wholes are). Trenton Merricks (1998) objection to microphysicalism
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There will be thousands and thousands of entities composed of arbitrary parts. 
There could be no change in any mereological sum without a change in its 
elements and conversely no change in the elements from which entities are 
summed without change in some (many in fact) arbitrarily composed 
mereological sums. So the intuitive asymmetry of a satisfactory 
superdupervenience relation would be lost.
Indeed, although it might be tempting to start there, I do not know of any 
philosopher who has actually offered an account of non-reductive materialism just 
using a mereological logic.15 What is needed to give (MS) some bite is an 
explanation of how it is that the properties of the parts combine and give rise to 
the properties of wholes.
Gabriel Segal and Elliott Sober attempt something like this by defining 
(MS) as follows:
(MS) M mereologically supervenes on P iff it is nomologically 
necessary that if any object, x, has P at any time, t, then x has M at t.16 
(1991, p. 10)
The relation that Segal and Sober are after is some kind of lawlike connection 
between M and P. Insisting on a nomological connection between parts and 
wholes should discriminate between the significant and interesting supervenience 
relations and the arbitrary conjunctions of Goodman-style logics. Moreover, such 
lawlike connections might help us understand the relation between the properties
turns on this fact. Nevertheless, I would prefer not to make my argument against physicalism on a 
par with an argument that said heaps of sand were not constituted by grains of sand.
15 It does form part of Heilman and Thompson’s (1972) definition.
16 I have adjusted the notation to fit with my diagram. The italics are mine.
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of, say, artefacts and the properties of their parts that the mere summing of parts 
cannot. However, there are some familiar problems here. First of all, on the 
conceptual level, it is not clear why such connections are physicalistically 
respectable. After all, since such a law involves citing a physical and a mental 
property, it cannot be a physical law. Moreover, one could hardly claim that such 
a law supervenes on a physical law because again we would need an explanation 
o f what was meant by supervene. If we simply invoked another ‘nomologically 
necessary’ connection between this law and the supervening psychophysical law 
then we would have the beginnings of an infinite regress. That is to say, since the 
psychophysical law (call it P I) itself is not physical it must supervene on 
something which is. Call the supervenience relation which relates P 1 to a physical 
law, P2. P2 is not physical either so it must supervene on something physical. Call 
this new supervenience relation P3. P3 is not physical either so... and so on. 
Unless we are to understand these psychophysical laws in a special way, which 
can avoid the need for further explanation that I have adumbrated above, Segal 
and Sober have failed to explain supervenience. In fact, they offer no such 
account. So it remains unclear to me why what Segal and Sober have presented is 
not just a version of dualistic epiphenomenalism or emergentism, as described
17earlier, in which non-physical laws relate physical to non-physical states.
In addition to their failure to explain the supervenience relation adequately, 
Segal and Sober provide an equally unsatisfactory solution to the problem of 
mental causation. What they require for a mental state to be efficacious is that
17 It might be thought that the condition that the properties be instantiated in the same individual 
rules out dualism since substance dualism implies the existence of two individuals. However, 
various emergentist views would not be ruled by this condition. Classical British emergentists 
thought there were precisely these kind of physical-non-physical laws which were basic and 
irreducible.
41
there exists a law18 connecting the supervening properties (M and M ’ in the 
diagram above). But it is unclear what such a condition amounts to without some 
analysis of what makes a lawlike connection, a lawlike connection. For example, 
if all that is meant by lawlike is that there exists some regularity pertaining 
between M and M ’, Segal’s and Sober’s condition can easily be fulfilled by the 
sort of epiphenomenalism I have described. For example, it may be that there are 
regular connections between M and M ’ because P causes M, P ’ causes M ’ and 
there are regular connections between P and P ’. The point holds generally as long 
as we consider the lawlike relation between the M ’s to derive from the lawlike 
connections between the P ’s; and given that the M ’s are supposed to supervene on 
the P’s this seems inevitable. However, because we have no explanation o f the 
mental to physical connections such that they can rule out certain kinds o f non- 
physicalist positions, it looks like Segal’s and Sober’s account if it worked would 
also allow epiphenomenal dualists to claim that mental states really are causally 
efficacious. This must show it can’t work.
To put the same point another way, any law connecting mental states looks 
like it will supervene on physical laws connecting the physical bases on which the 
mental states supervene. If the M-law does supervene on the P-law or laws, then 
we need an account of that supervenience relation, one which is physicalistically 
respectable. As I argued above, Segal and Sober have failed to provide such a 
general account. On the other hand if the M-law is not derivative then there would 
seem to be a non-physical fact (a true law) which does not supervene on the 
physical; and it is difficult to see how that could be consistent with physicalism. 
In short, just as Segal’s and Sober’s account of supervenience is inadequate
ly The actual condition is a little stricter than this to rule out grue-type cases. The laws must be 
‘‘useful”, meaning here as far as I can see just that they are the sort of laws scientist might actually
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because it fails to explain how the supervenient connection fits into a physicalist 
ontology, so their account of mental causation is inadequate because it fails to 
explain how invoking lawlike connections between non-physical states can be 
compatible with physicalism without being supplemented by some further 
unexplained supervenience relation.
A possible means of giving (MS) more empirical bite than Segal’s and 
Sober’s account allows would be to consider some concrete cases o f micro-macro 
connections. One could then argue that the appropriate, explanatorily robust 
connections between sub and supervening properties19 were more of the same 
sort. Terence Horgan makes essential this suggestion:
For at least some kinds of property we have a fairly good idea about 
what would count as a materialistically acceptable explanation o f why 
such a property is supervenient on a given configuration of physical 
properties... We understand well enough the essential features of 
liquidity... Thus explaining why liquidity supervenes on certain 
microphysical properties is essentially a matter of explaining why any 
quantity of stuff with these microphysical properties will exhibit these 
macro-features. (1993, p.579)
But even if we grant that there exists an explanation in the above case, it 
provides no general account of (MS). At best, it provides a general aspiration: that 
there should be explanatorily robust, physicalistically kosher explanations 
between the sub and the supervenient states. What is needed in any particular
use.
19 Jeffrey Poland’s (1994, p.209) fourth thesis of physicalism is essentially a version of this.
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case, if one is to plausibly claim that any (MS) relation holds, are actual 
explanations of the relations between sub and supervenient properties. It is clear, 
though, that in many cases we do not have anything like that as the example of 
quantum chemistry I discussed in the previous chapter indicated.
The prospects look gloomy for any piecemeal account o f supervenience 
along these lines, as Horgan himself admits (1993, 581-2). Whether or not the 
mental mereologically supervenes on the physical in this way is at best idle 
speculation about a we-know-not-what relation.20
One final point should be made against the whole idea of (MS) as a 
generally adequate account of supervenience. The relation between the mind and 
the body is for modern day physicalists a relation between brain states (plus 
maybe something else) and mental states. It is difficult to see in what way that 
relation can be said to model the relation between parts and wholes. It is frankly 
incredible to say that bits of the brain add up to make up wholes which are 
thoughts. Bits of the brain only seem to add up to more brain. Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how the properties thought to be definitive of the mental, its 
normative and intentional aspects can be thought to relate to the physical as 
wholes do to parts 21
20 Nor would it help I think to say that the connection between sub and supervening properties is a 
physical law. First because it is difficult to see how any non-physical property could be the result 
simply of the combination of physical parts according to physical law. That would surely at best 
give rise to just a physical whole. But also second and more seriously, it is not clear what invoking 
the idea of a physical law would amount to here without some better understanding of what does 
and does not count as physics; and again the point should be made that contemporary science 
raises serious concerns about the general viability of such claims. See the discussion of quantum 
mechanics in chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the problems.
21 Kim (1998,1999) has emphasised this point. Sober has informed me in correspondence that his 
characterisation of (MS) is not an attempt to model supervenience on the part-whole relation. 
Rather he is suggesting that certain properties supervene on physical wholes, the properties of 
which are in turn dependent on the properties of their parts. For Sober then such supervenience 
relations that exist between say the brain and the mind remain unexplained.
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In summary then, mereological supervenience fails to provide satisfactory 
answers to either the internal or external questions. Understood as a logical thesis, 
it fails to explain the relation between parts and wholes in an illuminating way. 
Stated vaguely as a nomological connection it is unclear why it rules out various 
dualist positions or how it can avoid a possible infinite regress. Put forward as a 
suggestion that there needs to be detailed explanation between the micro and 
macro parts which demonstrates that the relation is physicalistically kosher, it 
suffers from the obvious defect that we have no such explanations in the cases that 
we are interested. Furthermore, there has been no satisfactory response to how this 
account of supervenience avoids the causal exclusion problem. All o f the internal 
problems from which supervenience suffers remain. Moreover, it is clear after a 
moment’s reflection that the relation between parts and wholes does not describe 
many of the supervenience relations in which we are interested, in particular the 
mind-body relation.
2.4 A model for superdupervenience II: determinates and
determinables
Let us turn then to other views. Stephen Yablo’s is undoubtedly the most 
interesting. He believes that the relation between sub and supervenient properties 
and hence the relation between mind and body should be thought of as a species 
o f the determinate-determinable relation.22 That is to say, mental properties are 
related to physical properties as the property of being red is related to the property 
of being scarlet. Prima facie, this seems most implausible since the relation 
between a determinate and its determinable is a conceptual one, whereas that
clearly does not seem to be the case for the relation between the mental and the 
physical. To soften us up a bit, Yablo appeals to the well-known examples of a 
posteriori identity claims -  water = H2O, etc. He then reasons as follows: if there 
can be identities which are only known a posteriori, then there can be relations of 
determinate to determinable which are equally a posteriori. Just as we may be 
deceived into thinking that water and H2O are distinct, so might we be deceived 
that the mental is not a determinable of certain physical determinates. I think the 
initial intuition carries more weight than Yablo allows here but it is worth 
discussing his ideas in greater detail; in particular, how it is he thinks he can avoid 
epiphenomenalism.
First, let us begin Yablo’s definition of the relation between determinates 
and determinables:
(A) P determines Q iff: for a thing to be P is for it to be Q, not
simpliciter, but in a specific way. (1993, p.252)
The specific way being that described by the determinate-determinable relation: to 
be scarlet is to be red in a specific way. As with strong supervenience, if  P is 
instantiated, then Q must be also but Q may be instantiated without P; that is to 
say, such an interpretation of the mind-body relation looks open to the possibility 
of multiple-realisation.23 This leads naturally to the following analogous relation 
for events:
22 Segal and Sober’s (1991) complete account arguably employs a version of this notion as well. 
This is how they make air being present efficacious for the lighting of match even though only the 
oxygen in the air is necessary.
23 See below though.
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(6) p [event] determines q [event] iff: for p to occur (in a possible
world) is for q to occur (there), not simpliciter, but in a certain way.
(p.260).
But since events are particulars some sense needs to be given to the idea that they 
may occur in a certain way; in other words, what it is to be a particular event 
needs to be explained. Yablo does so by introducing the notion of the essence of 
an event. Technical complications aside, an essence is the set of properties 
necessary for the existence of the event, excluding trivial analytic properties and 
those which are consequences of the basic and (hopefully) logically independent 
set of essential properties.24 This is a variation on the Kim model of events. An 
event is understood as an instantiation of a cluster of properties, its essence. On 
Yablo’s account physical events ‘subsume’ mental events; that is the essence of 
the mental event is determined by the essence (or part of the essence) o f the 
physical event. So far this is just a more explicit version o f the standard 
supervenience account. Mental events and physical events are non-identical, they 
have different essences in Yablo's terminology, but physical events determine 
mental events. The original part of Yablo’s claim is just the thought that the 
determination relation is to be explained as a species of the determinate- 
determinable relation. In other words, the essence of any particular mental event is 
the determinable which is subsumed by a physical, determinate essence. 
Epiphenomanalism is then side-stepped since “determinates do not contend with 
their determinables for causal influence”(p.259). For example:
24 For more technical detail on the properties that make up an essence see Yablo, p.262, n.37
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[Archimedes] shouting “Eureka!!” was causally sufficient for his cat’s 
startled flight, nobody would think that this disqualified his (simply) 
shouting from being causally relevant as well. (p.272)
In fact, Yablo goes further than simply saying that determinates do not compete 
with their determinables for causal influence. There should be, he claims, a “fit”25 
between causes and their effects. “[T]hey should incorporate a good deal o f the 
causally relevant material and not too much of the causally irrelevant 
material...the cause was the thing that made the difference between the effects 
occurring and it not.” So, in some situations it is better to say the determinable 
caused the event and let the determinate with all its extraneous detail drop out of 
the picture. Understanding the determinable event then as a cause of another 
determinable leads to this kind of picture:
Determinable (Socrates drinking the hemlock) —» Determinable (Socrates death)
T
Determinate (Socrates guzzling the hem lock)26
Since Socrates drinking the hemlock is sufficient to cause his death, being told 
that Socrates guzzled the hemlock only adds unwanted and unneeded detail.
To summarise: Yablo’s account makes use of two principles to overcome 
what I have called the internal problems of supervenience. First, supervenience is 
a version of the determinate-determinable. This clearly renders the supervening, in
25 Yablo employs the term ‘proportionality’.
26 In case this is not obvious: the vertical arrow is the supervenience relation here given by the 
determinate-determinable relation; and the horizontal arrow represents the causal connection.
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Horgan’s words, physicalistically kosher. The determinate-determinable relation 
is not a mysterious or emergent kind of property relation. Second, Yablo’s 
account of causation, in which the cause of one event brings about the essence of 
its effect, combined with his analysis o f supervenience overcomes the causal 
exclusion problem. It follows on this account that sometimes the determinable 
(that is the supervening event) plays the role of cause.
Yablo’s account is certainly interesting and I think it succeeds in avoiding 
epiphenomenalism for higher-order properties and thus events. However, he fails 
to convince me of his central thesis that the relation between the mental and the 
physical is a version o f the determinate-determinable relation. I just find that 
implausible. But what say you (and Yablo too) of the analogy between H 20  and 
water? In the following I will try to articulate my reasons from my dissatisfaction 
with Yablo's account.
First one should note that Yablo’s solution to the mind-body problem 
seems impossible to combine with certain theses concerning the mental that have 
wide currency at present. For example, if you agree with Searle that there is 
something irreducibly subjective about the mental, then you are unlikely to be 
persuaded that the determinate-determinable relation is the right way to describe 
the connection between the mental and the physical. The relation between third- 
person and first-person perspectives does not seem to be a species o f the 
determinate-determinable relation. If you hold that the mental involves irreducibly 
rational-normative qualities, then it seems unlikely that such an is-ought gap can 
be bridged in the way Yablo suggests. Similarly, if you hold that mental 
properties are historically-based, that is to say the content of mental states in some 
way depends on the individual’s causal history, then similar problems arise. The
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determinate-determinable relation seems inappropriate to bridge the gap between 
the physically ahistorical and the non-physical, historical properties.27 Perhaps, 
though, Yablo rejects such subjectivist or normativist or historicist views of the 
mental. If so, then the onus is on him to tell us how the mental should be 
characterised so as to fit his model.
Even if we are willing to be charitable here, the analogy between 
determinate- determinable relation and supervenience is not a perfect one, as 
Douglas Ehring (1996 p473-474)28 has pointed out. Yablo, like most 
philosophers, accepts the idea that mental states are multiply-realisable; and, as I 
explained in my sketch of his views he takes it that the determinate-determinable 
relation captures this idea. Indeed it is the fact that the determinate-determinable 
relation corresponds so closely to many o f the intuitive ideas behind non- 
reductive physicalism that leads Yablo to recommend it as an interpretation of 
supervenience. However, Ehring demonstrates that if we press the analogy with 
determinates and determinables we discover that in reality it is not consistent with 
standard ideas about multiple-realisability.
Consider again a classic example of the determinate-determinable relation. 
Red and blue are both determinants of the determinable colour. Ehring points out 
that as determinates, they are different with respect to their determinable: they are 
different colours. This is a general feature of the determinate-determinable 
relation. Now consider the usual multiple-realisability story. Two individuals have 
the same belief but with different physical realisers. On Yablo’s theory the 
realisation relation is the determinate-determinable relation. As we have seen
27 A similar point may be made with regard to extemalism. That said, Yablo (1998) has an 
excellent paper which argues that wide-content is efficacious. However, this argument depends on 
Yablo’s analysis of causation in terms of essences. He fails to make it clear how we can think of 
wide-content states being determinables of physical determinates.
50
determinates that are different are different with respect to their determinable. 
Hence, since the two individuals have different realisers, they must have different 
beliefs, which contradicts the initial assumption of multiple-realisability.
Yablo could of course reject multiple-realisability. But we must remember 
that the attraction of Yablo’s account is supposed to be how closely it conforms to 
the intuitive ideas behind supervenience and all that comes with it, including 
multiple-realisation. Once Yablo’s account begins to move away from those 
intuitions and perhaps more importantly the arguments which support them, his 
case for the determinate-determinable relation correctly describing the mind-body 
relation is weakened.
Perhaps these considerations are not sufficient to abandon Yablo’s 
programme. Yet even if Yablo denies multiple-realisibility, the normative, 
historical and subjective elements of mental life, I believe his view still 
encounters problems when we turn to the one property which is undeniably a 
characteristic o f the mental -  intentionality.
Let us consider more closely the determinate-determinable relation. A 
feature of the relation is that relates a more specific with a more abstract property. 
In general, we proceed up a hierarchy of determinate-determinable relations. For 
example, we proceed from scarlet to red to colour to, perhaps, ultimately, 
property. (We might say the determinable property has all other properties as 
determinates.) What we expect from properties that stand in the determinate- 
determinable relation is that they should exhibit this general structure. A 
determinable is more abstract than its determinate. When we turn to consider 
intentional states they do not seem to be in that sense more abstract than the
28 He has others objections to Yablo’s account which I find less convincing.
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physical states which putatively realise them. Given a physical realiser, call it X, 
couldn’t we imagine a belief state which is equally specific: namely the belief that 
X? Of course, this is not to suggest that the actual realiser of the belief that X is 
X, just that whatever the realising state is, it will be no more specific than X. If 
that is possible then mental states do not exhibit the right kind of relation to 
physical states to be determinables of physical determinates.
Perhaps this is impossible. Perhaps one cannot have a mental state which 
has content as specific as the state which realises it. (In that case, assuming 
physicalism is true, it would be impossible ever actually to discover the physical 
state which gave rise to a particular mental state. Such a state being too specific 
for our minds to cope with.) Even, if the argument falls short o f a refutation, it 
does highlight how counterintuitive Yablo’s claims is. When we consider the rich 
detail o f intentional states, it is difficult to believe that they are abstract enough to 
figure in the kind of determinate-determinable relation that Yablo claims they do.
The combined weight of the foregoing considerations make the case 
against Yablo’s theory a powerful one, particularly since he provides no detailed 
attempt to articulate how the determinate-determinable relation would actually 
apply to the relation between the mind and the body. Without an account o f the 
mental which enables us to see how the determinate-determinable relation could 
be relevant in describing the connection between mind and body, and given the 
above reasons to think that there could not be one, I think we should reject 
Yablo’s theory. At the moment, all we have is an interesting and partial analogy 
between the formal notion of supervenience and the determinate-determinable 
relation; one which admittedly in the abstract solves the problem of the causal 
exclusion argument. However, there are obviously other necessitating
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relationships between properties that are not determinate-determinable relations 
which might do the same for us. One possibility that plagues all non-reductive 
accounts is causation but there are others. For example, red is a determinate o f the 
determinable colour: nothing can be red without also being coloured. It is also true 
that nothing can be red without also being extended in space. Redness and 
extension are quite different properties, why shouldn’t this provide a better model 
for the mental-physical connection?29 If Yablo is to persuade us his proposal is 
right, he needs to provide some positive reasons for favouring his account over 
others like the red-extension example. He also needs to be able to explain away 
the apparent disanologies between mental-physical relations and determinate- 
determinable relations that have been highlighted in the foregoing. He needs to 
provide some reason for believing that mental-physical connections are a species 
o f determinate-determinable connection. So far we have nothing like that. Thus I 
believe there is no reason to accept Yablo has given an adequate account of 
superdupervenience.
Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (1995) offer a solution to the problem of 
mental causation very similar in spirit to Yablo’s but which takes a different and 
important line on causation. Yablo and Kim take mental events to be different 
form physical events and this raises serious concerns about dualism, which we 
have explored at length above. However, one need not accept this; and indeed the 
Macdonalds do not. They advocate a token-token event identity thesis. That is to 
say, each concrete instance of a mental event is identical to a physical event but 
not type identical.
29 Would this be compatible with physicalism? I have no idea because as with Yablo’s account I 
can’t see how to apply it to the mind-body relation.
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The Macdonalds also draw an important distinction between causation and 
causal explanation. Causation, they claim, is an extensional relation between 
events, explanation an intensional relation between properties. The Macdonalds 
are therefore in a position to distinguish three varieties of epiphenomenalism, all 
of which have to be avoided if  non-reductive monism is to be a viable position.
1. That mental events are causally inefficacious
2. That mental properties are causally irrelevant
3. That mental properties are explanatorily irrelevant
Presumably any account that deals with (1) and (2), should have little difficulty in 
tackling (3).
The Macdonalds’ account, with its emphasis on the extensionality o f the 
causal relation and advocacy of token-token identity has some very obvious 
similarities to Donald Davidson’s Anomalous Monism. One important area where 
they diverge from Davidson, however, is in their account of events. Here they 
follow Kim and most other modern advocates of the supervenience relation in 
defining an event as an exemplification of a property at a particular time.
Let us consider now how these views on events, even identity and 
causation and explanation fit together. A token-token identity thesis for events 
takes us a long way to answering epiphenomenalism 1. If  some mental event 
causes some piece of behaviour, then it must be identical to some physical event -  
if the physical event is causally efficacious then the mental event must be too. On 
this account then we don’t need the determinant-determinable relation to make
sense of the connection between mental and physical events. Mental events just 
are (that is, token-identical to) physical events.
So far so good. It seems relevant to ask then what makes any event, a 
cause. According to the Macdonalds (again closely following Davidson) an event 
is a cause if it is an instantiation of a physical property that falls under a strict (i.e. 
exceptionless) law. Troubles are clearly looming. If it is in virtue of the fact that 
the event falls under a physical law that the said event is efficacious, then it seems 
natural to say that only the physical event or the physical part of the event is 
involved in causation.30 One might put this by saying that the mental event qua 
mental event is epiphenomenal, the cause is the physical event qua physical event. 
The Macdonalds’ response is to claim that: “two properties, one mental and one 
physical, can be jointly instanced in a single instance (i.e. in an individual event). 
The mental property will then have an instance which is (i.e. identical with) a 
nomological [i.e. physical] property.” That is to say, they invoke their token- 
identity thesis. Like Davidson they claim that to talk of events causing one 
another in virtue of certain properties is to contuse explanation with causation. To 
repeat, on this account if  any token event, any particular occurrence of a physical 
property is causally efficacious, which again it surely must be, then, since the 
particular instancing of the mental property is identical to that physical property 
instance, it must too be causally efficacious. And since the instancing o f the 
mental property is what we would call the event, epiphenomenalism 1 is avoided.
At least so the Macdonalds say but some pretty strange ontological claims 
are made in this account. What can it mean here to say that property-instances are 
identical? How can token instances of properties be identical, without being type
30 This is, of course, a standard of criticism of Davidson. See below, chapter 7, for why I don’t 
think it applies to his version of Anomalous Monism.
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identical? Well, of course, if we construe each property instance as an 
instantiation of a universal, then they can’t really. Mental properties are different 
from physical properties so instantiations of mental properties must also be 
diffierent from instantiations of physical properties. Intuitively, either properties 
or property instances are type-identical or they are not identical at all.
It is here that we see the importance of the Macdonalds’ break with 
Davidson. Like Davidson the Macdonalds wish to claim that causation is only a 
relation between events and since, ex hypothesis the mental event and physical 
event are the same then no problem regarding epiphenomenalism should arise. 
However, Davidson can pull off this trick because events qua events are neither 
mental nor physical, only the predicates used to pick the events out have these 
characteristics.31 The Macdonalds, though, do not adopt a Davidsonian theory of 
events, nor do they follow his nominalism regarding properties -  events 
remember are objects instancing a property at a certain time. But since mental 
properties and physical properties are obviously different, I repeat, it surely 
follows that instances of mental properties at a time are different events from 
instances of physical properties at a time. And if they are separate mental and 
physical events, then epiphenomenalism 1 re-emerges as a problem for the 
Macdonalds. Given that it is only in virtue of falling under a strict physical law 
that any event is efficacious at all, if mental events are different from physical 
events since they don’t fall under strict laws, they must be epiphenomenal.
The alternative to this conclusion would be to insist that all the properties 
instantiated by an object at a time t are part of the same event. But that is going to 
lead to some frankly absurd event identity commitments. For example, I, as an
31 See ch. 7 for a fuller discussion.
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object, currently instantiate the properties of typing and of feeling hungry. Surely 
no-one would claim that the typing event and the hunger-feeling event were one 
and the same? Yet that appears to be exactly what the Macdonalds would have to 
say in order to avoid epiphenomenalism 1. So it seems that either the Macdonalds 
cannot claim that the mental event is causally efficacious because they have no 
grounds for saying that the mental event and the physical event are identical or 
they must adopt a highly counterintuitive and profoundly implausible account of 
event identity. If  the Macdonalds are to avoid both of these possibilities they must 
be able to provide a principled account of when we would say that two different 
properties are part of the same event, and convince us that the relation o f the 
mental to the physical is such a case
The Macdonalds do indeed offer an example o f when we might 
reasonably say two different properties are coinstanced in the same event. What is 
it? None other than Yablo’s example of determinates and determinables. If a 
particular event is the instancing of red at a particular time, then the very same 
event is also the instancing of colour at the same time, (p.65)32 But we have just 
seen that the determinate-determinable relation does not satisfactorily characterise 
the relation between the mental and the physical. In fact, the Macdonalds concur. 
The example is simply used to demonstrate that there is no absurdity in claiming 
that one event may co-instance different properties.33 I gladly acknowledge there 
is no absurdity here. In the case of determinates and determinables it is very clear 
why this is possible: there is a conceptually necessary connection between a 
determinate and its determinable. (This is what the Macdonalds say too.) The
32 Of course, on Yablo’s account we should still construe the mental and physical events as 
different even though they stand in the determinate-determinable relation.
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relation between physical properties and mental properties is not prima facie a 
conceptual one. How then can they be accommodated into this picture? Because, 
so the Macdonalds claim, the mental supervenes on the physical; and that is 
another way, a metaphysical way, in which two different properties can be co­
instanced in the same event (p.66). Now we are right back where we started. We 
want to know how it is that supervenience is supposed to guarantee this. In 
particular, why the coinstancing and covariation o f properties renders them 
causally relevant.
It may seem that a solution to epiphenomenalism 2 could help us out of 
our difficulties with epiphenomenalism 1. If the Macdonalds could provide clear 
reasons for explaining the causal relevance of mental properties, then that might 
go some way to alleviating the worries I have raised about their token-identity 
thesis. That is to say, in explaining the importance of the mental property qua 
causally efficacious event, that is its relation to the physical property, we might be 
able to construct some sort of theory which can make sense of the Macdonalds’ 
claim that the token physical property instance and the token mental property 
instance are one and the same.
Unfortunately, the Macdonalds’ solution to the question o f the causal 
relevance of the mental event is disappointingly familiar. Like Segal and Sober, 
the Macdonalds claim a property is causally relevant if it is part of an efficacious 
event and, in virtue of the fact that its property type falls under some kind of 
pattern (in the case of mental states this is the pattern of rationality). Again things 
seem mighty queer. The fact that the individual instantiation o f the event falls 
under some pattern or other seems to do nothing to remove the threat that all the
33 In actual fact, the Macdonalds offer up other examples -  functional properties. It does not seem 
though they endorse this understanding of the mental either. See the discussion of Kim below,
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causal work has been done by the physical properties. What makes an event 
efficacious in the first place has to do with, and only to do with, the physical 
properties of the event. It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the 
mental properties are causally superfluous unless you follow Davidson down the 
path of nominalism and deny that any properties (or predicates) are causally 
significant beyond picking out events which are causally related.
I just cannot see how to tie together the Macdonalds’ token-identity claims 
with their view on events and the causal relevance of properties. Because there is 
no worked out story of how the mental and physical relate, just an open-ended 
appeal to supervenience, there seems no reason to believe that the mental aspects 
of any event are anything other than superfluous to causal requirements.
One way of avoiding some of these strange claims about event identity and 
retaining some of the benefits of the token-identity view is offered by John Heil 
(1992). Instead of thinking of the event as a property instantiation, he takes it to 
be a trope, an abstract particular. This has some obvious advantages over the 
Macdonalds’ account. Because tropes are already particulars there does not seem 
the same tension between accepting event identity and rejecting property identity. 
Nevertheless, there are some similar problems on the horizon once we consider 
the question of how to construe tropes.
Tropes normally are thought of as providing a sparse theory of properties 
(see Campbell (1990), ch.l). In other words, there exists a set of tropes which 
stand in a relation o f exact similarity (i.e qualitatively identical but numerically 
distinct) corresponding to every property required by a complete science (i.e. 
physics, for a physicalist). The properties picked out by these elite classes feature
ch. 3, for the drawbacks of a functionalist approach to these matters.
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in genuine and complete laws of nature. Hence, a trope must be individuated on 
this theory by its physical aspects. The sense in which these physical tropes can be 
said to be identical to mental property instances is somewhat jejune. Mental 
property instances do not directly correspond to any trope. The class o f mental 
properties must be constructed out of other sparse tropes. But the mental property 
so constructed is nothing more than a construction: a classification o f tropes that 
do not stand in a relation of exact similarity to one another. So on a sparse theory 
o f tropes, there are only mental properties as a result o f a construction from 
physical tropes -  it is difficult to see how such constructed properties can be said 
to be genuinely causally relevant.34
On the other hand, if  we try to construe tropes as abundant, i.e. there is at 
least one class of exactly similar tropes for every predicate, then we run into even 
more serious problems. Why should we say the mental trope is identical to the 
physical trope, why are they not two different tropes? What are the identity 
conditions for tropes? It can’t be spatial location, since different tropes are 
supposed to be able to instance different properties while being located in the 
same place. For example, a red box is the coinstantiation of a red trope and a cube 
trope (and possibly some others). All o f these tropes must be in the same place: 
that is where the red box is. It can’t be done by picking out the same cause and 
effects, since the causes and effects would also have to be tropes and an obvious 
circularity would threaten. That is to say, the individuation of tropes would 
depend upon some prior individuation of other tropes. So it looks like we have the
34 The Macdonalds might be interpreted in an analogous manner. All events are strictly speaking 
physical events but they may fall under different patterns that allow them to fit into non-physical 
classifications; mental properties such as they are, are merely reclassifications of physical states. 
See the discussion of Kim’s views below to see how this might form part of a functionalist view.
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same problem that Macdonalds have: we have no way to make sense o f the 
putative token-identity claim.
In truth, neither Heil nor the Macdonalds is able to provide a satisfactory 
characterisation of how it is the mental and physical events can be one and the 
same, while making the mental part o f the event causally relevant in any but the 
most Pickwickian of senses. The benefits of some kind of token-token identity 
theory turn out to be a mirage.35
2.5 A model for superdupervenience III: causal powers and the return 
of functionalism
Jessica Wilson (1999) claims that all we need to add to supervenience to render it 
superduper is the constraint that supervening and the subvening properties (or 
causal powers) be related internally to one another. Her paper offers one 
suggestion as to what that internal relation might be. Let us first consider the 
general claim that all that is needed to render the relation between the supervening 
and the subvening physicalistically kosher is that relation be internal, before going 
on to consider Wilson’s own particular proposal.
Wilson follows Armstrong in defining an internal relation as one which “is 
dictated solely by the nature of the relata, and is such that given certain entities 
with certain natures, the relation must hold between the entities.” Since it is in 
some sense metaphysically necessary that internally related properties supervene 
on one another there is no threat that the relations between the subvening and the 
supervening will not be physicalistically respectable.
35 Davidson is a different matter, see chapter 7.
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This is all right again as far it goes. But it seems to me doomed to failure 
as a general account of the supervenience relation since it is highly controversial 
exactly what is and what is not an internal relation. There are, o f course, some 
obvious examples of internally related properties, self-identity for one. And there 
are probably some non-controversial examples of external relations, spatial and 
temporal distance for example. (Leibniz, would of course, demur.) But for the one 
relation which really matters -  the causal relation -  it is a point of contention 
amongst philosophers whether or not to characterise it as an internal relation. 
Indeed, sometimes disputes between Humean*s and non-Humearf*s regarding 
causation are characterised as concerning whether causation is an internal or an 
external relation. Now if we can plausibly regard causation as an internal relation, 
then we clearly have a physicalistically unacceptable relation between the 
supervening and the subvening properties as this is exactly the relation that 
epiphenomenal dualists have in mind as we have seen. Moreover, as we have also 
seen, if all that is required to allay fears that the mental may be epiphenomenal is 
that the sub and supervening properties be internally related, then Cartesian 
interactionism can be made a philosophically respectable position so long as we 
construe the causal relation between the sub and supervening properties as an 
internal one.
Is there then a respectable construal of causation as an internal property? 
Ironically, one of the philosophers that Wilson quotes with approval -  Sydney 
Shoemaker -  provides an account of causation which is exactly that. He argues 
that no property would be what it is if it lacked any of its causal/conditional 
powers.
[A] 11 of the causal powers possessed by a property ... are essential to 
it. This has a very strong consequence, namely that causal necessity is 
a species of logical necessity. (Shoemaker, 1984, p.222)
Hence, all its conditional powers stand in an internal relation to the property. So if 
one such conditional power is to produce non-physical states, then the relation is 
at once supervenient, internal and causal; and thus not physicalistically kosher. 
How much sense any philosopher thinks he can or cannot make of the idea that 
causation is an internal relation or talk of causal powers is not for the moment 
important. What is important to note here is that a simple quasi- 
logical/metaphysical distinction like that between internal and external relations 
will not help when trying to define superdupervenience. It does no good, for 
example, to say that the appropriate relation is internal but we should not consider 
causation an internal relation because the question immediately arises: why should 
we exclude causation, i.e. what kind of internal relation is supposed to be 
acceptable? To repeat, what is needed is a concrete and detailed explanation o f the 
supervenience relation and why anyone should believe this accurately 
characterises the relation between super and subvening properties. An appeal to 
internal relations is a long way from this.
As well as offering a general diagnosis o f what is wrong with 
supervenience, it fails to characterise the relation as internal, Wilson suggests a 
particular remedy. An adequate supervenience relation must obey the following 
principle:
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Condition on Causal Powers (CCP). Each individual power associated 
with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal 
power associated with its base property, (p.42)
(CCP) rules out the possibility that the relation between the subvening and the 
supervening properties is causal because “effects (as property instantiations) 
generally (and at least sometimes) have causal powers that are distinct from those 
of their causes (as property instantiations).” (p.42)
The caveats in this definition should already begin to suggest that 
Wilson’s proposal is inadequate to ground physicalism. In fact, if we regard the 
causal relation as transitive, as most do for deterministic causation at least, it is 
not clear to me why it would be wrong to say that causes contain all the causal 
powers of their effects. Unless Wilson is denying the transitivity o f causal powers, 
which she provides no argument for doing, her statement seems just false. 
Moreover, if causal powers are universals o f some sort, then there will be genuine 
cases o f causal overdetermination which fulfil (CCP). For example, if Smith is 
shot in the heart simultaneously by two separately fired bullets, then both shots 
arguably share the causal power (i.e. the numerically identical universal) o f killing 
Smith (and perhaps all others causal powers too). But the relation between these 
two firings cannot be of the sort that physicalists have in mind for the mental and 
the physical. One would think then either the relation between these generals must 
be constrained in some further way or causal powers are to be construed as 
particulars, perhaps something like tropes. Wilson provides little guidance here. 
However, I suggest Jaegwon Kim’s (1998) recent writings provide one possible
64
and plausible way to construe Wilson’s (CCP) condition: as a version of 
functionalism.
On such an account mental properties are to be defined as whatever takes 
an individual from various sensory inputs to various behavioural outputs. 
According to Kim then what must first be done is to reconfigure mental properties 
in terms of their causal powers: to functionalise them. The functionalised states 
are then to be identified with their physical realisers. The mental supervenes on 
the physical (the brain) because mental states are identical, given their 
functionalised definition, to certain physical states. Kim’s new position is redolent 
of (in fact identical to, I would say) the old analytic functionalism of the Davids 
Lewis and Armstrong.
Does this recasting of an old solution, solve all our worries? Well, 
consider what perplexes Kim most, mental causation. If the mental and physical 
are identical then there can be no concern that the mental is epiphenomenal in 
they way that has plagued other supervenience accounts. However, one might be 
worried by the way we have arrived at the conclusion that the mental and the 
physical are identical i.e. simply by redefining the mental in terms o f the physical. 
Kim is sensitive to this objection. Mental properties as functional properties are 
second-order properties defined over the first-order physical base. But are such 
second-order properties really properties, particularly if we think they may be 
multiple-realised? Kim thinks not since: “By quantifying over properties, we 
cannot create new properties, anymore than by quantifying over individuals, we 
can create a new individual.” (p. 104) So, second-order, functionalised mental 
properties are best thought of as not properties at all but “second-order 
descriptions or designators or second-order concepts” (ibid.). Note how similar
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this is to Heil’s theory of events as tropes. Those events are essentially physical 
but they may be grouped together in such a way as to fall under the patterns 
associated with mental states. What mental predicates do then is pick out sets of 
physical tropes, just as what mental concepts do on Kim’s view is pick out 
physical realisers. As with Heil, then it is not really correct to say that mental 
states cause physical states since there are not really any mental properties, just 
words, concepts, etc. that can be used to pick out physical properties and states 
that do the causing.
Kim’s position also draws on elements of (MS). Before mental concepts 
can be functionalised, macroscopic objects must be built up out of microscopic 
objects. This he seems to think is unproblematic. So reduction comes in two 
stages: building the macro world out of the micro world and then functionalising 
non-physical parts of the macro world so they can be identified with the 
macroscopic physical parts. This for Kim is the only way to avoid the problems of 
causal exclusion argument.
As we can see then Kim’s position draws on elements of all three accounts 
discussed. (MS) is used to build the macrophysical from the microphysical. We 
are to understand mental properties as a way of classifying physical types as with 
Heil’s and possibly the Macdonalds’ theory and that classification proceeds on the 
basis of identifying causal powers as Wilson suggests. Kim’s new position then 
seems to be the natural end point for the discussion. Interestingly, this has led us 
back to a kind of reductionism. Kim’s position inherits all o f the weaknesses o f 
(MS) and it is questionable whether it really gives an account of mental causation. 
Nevertheless, it is a clearly stated and influential version of the physicalist project; 
and demands deeper discussion, along with other philosophical attempts to
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provide a functionalist-reductionist account of the relation between the mental and 
the physical.
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Chapter 3 
Functional Analyses
A return to functionalism and reduction and a move away from supervenience 
solves the problem of epiphenomenalism which plagued many o f the accounts 
discussed in the previous section. If mental events are just a sub-class of physical 
events, then there is no question, or at least no special question, of how they can 
cause certain physical events, given other physicalist assumptions. What we need 
to consider in this chapter is if functionalism can save physicalism. That is to say, 
is it all plausible that the mental reduces to the physical in the way that 
functionalists maintain? In addition to Kim’s analytic functionalism, we shall also 
consider biofunctional versions of the reductionist project. Both kinds of 
functionalism, it will be argued, fail to make plausible cases for reduction.
3.1.0 Analytic functionalism
Let us first consider Kim’s analytic functionalism. The idea here is that mental 
states can be defined in terms of causal dispositions stated in physical terms:
For functional reduction we construe M as a second-order property 
defined by its causal role -  that is, by a causal specification H 
describing its (typical) causes and effects. So M is now the property of 
having a property with such-and-such causal potentials, and it turns 
out that property P is exactly the property that fits the causal 
specification. And this grounds the identification of M with P. M is 
the property of having some property that meets the specification H 
and P is the property that meets H. So M is the property of having P.
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But in general the property o f having property Q = property Q. It 
follows then that M is P. (Kim (1998), pp98-99)
What we need to assess then is the plausibility o f there being a specification H 
which singles out each mental state and that H in turn is realised by some physical 
state Q.
3.1.1 Qualia
One main source of opposition to this account comes from advocates of what is 
sometimes called qualia, the phenomenal aspects o f conscious experience. Frank 
Jackson (1986) and David Chalmers (1996) have argued that certain thought 
experiments show that qualia cannot be cashed out in functional terms. According 
to such thinkers, it is supposed to be possible to imagine someone just like you or 
me who has all the same beliefs and acts in exactly the same way but who 
experiences, for example, the colour spectrum as completely inverted. When we 
see red, he sees purple, when we see orange, he sees blue, etc. So, the argument 
goes, if that is possible, then our conscious experience of colour cannot be defined 
functionally since there is no functional difference between me and my colour- 
inverted double. Moreover, because qualia cannot be functionalised, they are 
taken by such theorists to be epiphenomenal.
I don’t want to discuss qualia and the problems they create in detail for 
three reasons. First of all because I am not entirely sure what they are. In 
particular, it is a mystery to me how philosophers like Jackson and Chalmers can 
form beliefs about qualia, especially their own qualia and yet claim that they are
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epiphenomenal.1 Where do they get these beliefs from? Second, and more 
importantly in the present context, Kim and some other physicalists are willing to 
acknowledge that qualia cannot be functionalised. This leaves two options for the 
physicalist. Either they can go for a type-identity theory with respect to the 
phenomenal aspects of the mental -  Kim adopts this positions reluctantly, David 
Papineau (1998), somewhat more enthusiastically -  or they can question the 
clarity and adequacy of the idea of qualia as formulated by philosophers and opt 
for a kind of eliminativism with regard to qualia. The third and most important 
reason why I will not discuss the problems of qualia at any length is that Jackson 
and Chalmers are both functionalist with regard to other mental states. The 
arguments regarding qualia are very much a local dispute between philosophers of 
a largely functionalist/physicalist persuasion. It would be a hollow victory for an 
anti-physicalist like me to find the only real difficulty for functionalism was 
created by qualia. For these reasons I want to discuss what appear to me more 
fundamental problems with functionalism.
3.1.2 Three problems with functionalism
Let us turn our attention to belief, desires and other intentional states. Can they be 
functionalised and reduced as Kim envisages? There are three general objections 
to this programme that I will discuss. All are familiar from the literature on 
functionalism. Nevertheless, they are worth considering in light of the specifically 
reductionist aims of Kim’s functionalist programme.
The first thing to notice is that what we consider mental states to cause are 
typically actions and these are not individuated in physical terms. For example, if
1 Chalmers (1996) view seems to involve a mysterious kind of parallelism between functional
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I believe that there is beer in the fridge and I desire a beer this will cause me 
(normally at least) to perform the act of opening the fridge. That would be a 
typical causal potential of the conjunction of these two mental states. But the 
effect -  the action opening the fridge -  is not a physical effect or in any 
straightforward sense identical to a physical effect. We can see this when we think 
about the various different ways in which one might open the fridge. I might 
perform the act just by reaching out with my hand and pulling the handle or 
wrench it open from the top or maybe open it with my foot if I ’m agile enough 
and my hands are full. All o f these seem to be fridge openings, all plausibly the 
result of the same combination o f beliefs and desires but they involve different 
physical movements. Moreover, the same movement might be a different action. I 
might raise my arm to hail a taxi or to block someone’s passage, to push a door 
open, etc. So it seems that we do not get the identities Kim’s analysis might lead 
one to expect. Beliefs cause actions and actions do not seem to be identical to any 
particular bodily movement. It looks as though we might have to invoke some 
kind of supervenience thesis here to link actions with bodily movements; and that 
begins to look like trouble given the problems we have highlighted with 
supervenience in the previous chapter. (Not to mention embarrassing for Kim’s 
claim that functionalism is the right way to explain supervenience.)
The second problem relates to what philosophers call extemalism : the 
view that intentional states are in part individuated by reference to objects those 
states concern. The standard line of argument used to motivate externalism 
involves recourse to some recondite possible worlds reasoning. The story usually 
goes something like this: imagine there is a world exactly like ours but where
states and qualia.
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there is a substance that looks like water, has the same macrophysical features as 
water and happens to be called water too but has a different microconstitution, 
XYZ, rather than H2O. Now imagine two physically identically individuals staring 
at a pool of liquidy, refreshing stuff. One thinking that water is wet and his twin 
on twin Earth thinking that twin-water (a different substance, remember) is wet. 
Intuitively it is argued, they have different beliefs because their beliefs are about 
different substances. Since they are physically identical there must be more to the 
content of any belief than simply what goes on in the individual’s head.2 Such 
stories are fine as far as they go. However, objections to this kind of possible 
worlds talk can often obscure what is what is a quite general and readily 
appreciable point. One which arises in a particular vivid way when one begins to 
think of mental states in terms of their causal role.
Consider again my desire for a beer and my belief that there is beer in the 
fridge. It seems reasonable to infer given these intentional states that I will reach 
out and open the fridge. The relation this belief bears to other intentional states 
and actions partially defines it, according to the functionalist. If I hold this belief 
in different circumstances, if, for example, I have a different set o f beliefs or 
desires, or the environment is different, then I will act differently. I f  the fridge is 
already open, I won’t reach to open it; or if I feel hungover from the night before,
1 might think better of it; or if I believe that by moaning enough I can induce my 
girlfriend to get the beer for me, then I might do that instead and so on and so 
forth. The sum total of all these dispositions is supposed to provide us with the 
specification H that completely defines the mental state and the state so picked out 
is, according to Kim, realised by (that is to say, identical to) some physical,
2 See Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979) for the glorious details.
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presumably neurophysiological, state. So in the case I have described above, Kim 
is committed to there being some internal physical state which causes the action 
of opening the fridge (since it is one of it causal outputs, which, as I said, partially 
defines it). The act of opening the fridge, as we have seen, is not an internal state. 
It clearly involves reference to an object outwith my own body, namely the fridge. 
Given the functionalist story Kim wants to tell, if mental states like beliefs are 
partly defined in terms of the actions they produce, then if those actions are 
individuated by objects external to me (which, as we have seen they are) then so 
too must the beliefs.
So an intuitive understanding of functionalism leads to a form of 
externalism; and that looks like bad news for Kim since if mental states are 
identical to anything one would think it would be brain states. But if mental states 
are what they are in virtue of factors external to any thinker this can’t be right.
The third problem is not everything that might be caused by some mental 
state should be essential to that mental state being what it is. For example, my 
belief that there is beer in the fridge might cause my heart to beat faster with 
excitement. It might, on the other hand, elicit no such reaction in a more moderate 
person. According to the simplest analysis of functionalism in that case we should 
hold different beliefs. The specification, H, associated with my belief-that-beer-is- 
in-the-fridge has different causal potentials to the moderate person’s belief-that- 
beer-is-in-the-fridge. But that is, I take it, absurd; such effects should not matter to 
the individuation of belief. Kim is clearly aware of some sort of problem like this 
since he limits the specification H (in parenthetic apology) to typical causes and 
effects. The problem for the functionalist is to say what typical means here in a 
principled way that does not undermine his reductionist programme.
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3.1.3 Narrow and broad contents
One possible solution to some of these problems is offered by invoking a 
distinction between narrow and broad content. Advocates of such a distinction 
accept the general externalist point that the content (of some) intentional states is 
dependent on facts outside the head. However, they will claim that the right way 
to think of what is going on here requires a two-part story o f content. Part o f what 
it is to believe that beer is in the fridge is to do with something internal to the 
individual who holds such a belief and part is to do with the environment o f the 
individual. So, roughly speaking, there is a story to tell about what is going on in 
the individual’s head which when combined with the right environment will 
constitute the belief that beer is in the fridge. The narrow-content is that internal 
state. It also follows on this story that if the same internal state were combined 
with a different environment, it might be part of a different belief. For example, if 
it were an environment where there was no beer but only a similar drink, queer, 
let’s call it, brewed from quops and quarley but otherwise indistinguishable, then 
the same narrow content would be part of a different wide belief -  namely the 
belief that there is queer in the fridge. Such theories o f content are often called 
‘two-level’ semantic theories since part of the content is fixed by the narrow state 
and part by the environment and context; and it is the narrow part that is to be 
functionalised and reduced.
Clearly this seems to represent the beginning of an answer to the second 
objection I raised. It raises hope of a solution to the first objection too. What 
makes the action, the action it is, is the narrow state combined with the right
environment. So if the idea of narrow content defined in terms of physical inputs 
and outputs can be made good, then we would have an explanation for the relation 
between intentionally described behaviour and bodily movements. That is to say, 
one could argue given John has narrow content X, that will cause movements A, 
B, and C which when combined with the particular environment constitutes some 
action or other. In the abstract this looks good. What we need now is a defence of 
the notion of narrow content that could do all this and be apt for Kim-style 
reduction.
Narrow content entered the philosophical lexicon at the same time as the 
twin Earth thought experiments and as my sketch of the idea should illustrate, the 
sense of the concept is strongly dependent on that counterfactual structure. Away 
from the metaphysically rarefied atmosphere of possible worlds reasoning, the 
general notion of narrow content seems pretty hard to motivate. In particular, it 
seems difficult to articulate an interesting account of the identity conditions for 
narrow contents. Consider two obvious proposals. One might say that X and Y 
have the same narrow contents when they have the same beliefs. That would seem 
to make the idea of narrow content entirely superfluous and conceptually 
dependent upon normal (that is wide) content. One might wonder what work such 
a concept is supposed to be doing. Twin Earth thought experiments, it might be 
maintained, could come to the rescue. The definition might run as follows: two 
creatures have the same narrow content when they are in exactly the same internal 
physical state. The advantage of this definition is that it allows for variation in 
wide contents; narrow contents are liberated from their dependence on ordinary 
contents. However, as a serious theory of psychological states it does not look any
3 The narrow content is often thought to play a role like Fregean sense: distinguishing belief states
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better than the first proposal. No two actual creatures ever are in exactly the same 
internal physical state. This definition renders narrow content useless for any real 
psychology. A serious advocate of narrow content needs some means of defining 
his notion which is independent of wide content and mere physical identity, if  it is 
to be of any theoretical interest at all.
It may seem that functionalists have a ready-made solution to the problem; 
defining a state by its functional role would seem to require neither wide-content 
nor physical identity. However, as the arguments I have outlined above 
demonstrate, if functional role is related to action, then that has unavoidable 
externalist consequences for beliefs and other intentional states. What the 
functionalist-reductionist requires is a plausible functionalist account of content 
that operates with only narrow states.
Conceptual role4 semantics (hereafter, CRS), as championed by Ned Block 
(1986) and Hartry Field (1978), advertises itself as fitting this very bill. According 
to CRS the narrow part of the content of a belief is given by its conceptual role, 
which is just a more rationalistic version of the functionalist idea that it is given 
by its causal role. In fact, we can see it as the beginning of the answer to third 
problem I raised for functionalism. The typical connections Kim needs are the 
inferential ones. While, like other two-level theories, environment and context fix 
reference and truth. So we have a possible answer to all three problems that I 
posed for functionalism. A CRSist can claim that an account of narrow content 
can answer the first two problems and construing the appropriate or typical 
relation between mental states in terms of inferences can answer problem three.
like Muhammad Ali is the greatest boxer ever and Cassius Clay is the greatest boxer ever which 
are indistinguishable in terms of their broad contents (i.e. their reference).
4 People, perhaps more accurately, also talk of inferential roles.
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The idea that the conceptual role is in some way important to the meaning 
of a term has some intuitive appeal. Block takes his view to be a more scientific 
and explicit rendering of Wittgenstein’s slogan that “meaning is use” and it is not 
hard to provide a general sketch of the idea that suggests it has a certain 
plausibility. For example, given that someone holds some belief, call it X, one 
would expect that person to be able to exhibit certain patterns of inference which 
demonstrates this fact. To take an elementary example, it might be considered 
constitutive of having the belief P&Q that one is able to infer P. The CRS theorist 
claims either that there are similar inferences for all such beliefs and the set of 
these will individuate each (narrow) state or that there exists a basic stock of 
beliefs which can be defined this way from which all one’s other beliefs may be 
constructed.
The most obvious (and extremely serious) problem with CRS is that there 
just do not seem to be the sorts of conceptual relations between beliefs and other 
mental states that would fix content in the desired way. Consider some o f the 
well-worn examples from the philosophy o f science. It is well known, for 
example, that people possessed different beliefs about the sun than we do now. So 
they would be willing to make inferences from the belief that they are seeing the 
sun which we would not and vice versa. (For example, they would infer that they 
are seeing a planet, we would infer that we are seeing a star.) But, intuitively 
speaking at least, we would not say that we possessed different beliefs. However 
that appears to be precisely what the CRS theory commits one to.
In fact that is very much the tip of the iceberg. CRS threatens to make it 
impossible to disagree with people or change your mind. Consider my belief that 
beer is in front of me. I might be inclined to infer from that is beer to that is
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refreshing. Such an interferential connection would partly constitute the belief 
that is beer5 But what if I have a tea-total friend who does not infer from that is 
beer to that is refreshing. We have different specifications H for the belief that is 
beer, so, according to the functionalist, we have different beliefs and thus we 
cannot disagree because what I mean by beer and he means by beer are different. 
Say I change my mind. I become dehydrated once too often after consuming too 
much alcohol. I no longer believe beer is refreshing but then my own inferential 
connections change. So what I mean by beer is refreshing now is different from 
what I meant earlier by beer is refreshing. The belief has different inferential 
connections. So, I can’t change my mind because any apparent change in mind 
must cause a change in content of the belief.
It is obviously open to the CRS theorist to respond by claiming that only a 
certain stock of inferences are necessary for sameness o f belief, not an absolute 
match. If this sort of response is to be made credible, then CRSists need to be able 
to provide principled reasons for saying what is and what is not content 
constitutive. That is to say, they still need to provide some more specific response 
to problem three. No-one has actually done this and I think if we attend to some 
facts from everyday psychology it seems unlikely that it could be done. We are all 
familiar with the psychological phenomena of being shown that our beliefs have 
some surprising or unwanted consequence or failing to recognise something 
which we later take to be an obvious consequence o f our views. Philosophers 
should be more familiar with this than anyone else. The industry o f filling 
philosophy journals is partly driven by the fact that we often miss the conceptual 
or logical consequences of some of our beliefs that other people spot. The natural
5 In some derivative sense, it would also partly constitute the meaning of the terms that compose to
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way to describe such situations is to say that we held some belief but we failed to 
recognise that it had a certain consequence. Such phenomena show how difficult 
the task before CRSists is. Even inferences that we often take to be obvious are 
not necessary for holding some belief. So it seems very unlikely the CRS theorists 
could provide a story of content-constitutive inferences which would be at once 
rich enough to individuate content and at the same time accommodate the obvious 
fact that we often miss or fail to notice consequences of our beliefs.6
Block’s( 1996) actual response to the problem of the instability of content 
in light of changing of beliefs and inferential connections has been to claim that 
the two-level nature of his version of CRS could come to the rescue. The broad 
part of content acts as some kind of constraint on the variations in narrow content. 
Beliefs about beer are still beliefs about beer despite changes in inferential 
connections because the environment fixes them as such. How this is supposed to 
work is utterly unclear but it does point to a problem with CRS that we have up 
until now been overlooking.
So far we have been taking the idea of inference for granted but in the 
context o f narrow content theories, the very idea of conceptual role as used here is 
problematic. When we consider relations between ordinary beliefs, the idea of 
conceptual role has at least some intuitive plausibility but what on earth (or twin 
Earth, for that matter) are narrow conceptual roles? How are we to understand the 
notion of inference when we are only dealing with narrow contents? An objection 
that Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore (1991) have raised becomes particularly 
pertinent once we recognise this: what guarantees that the two elements o f any 
two-level semantic theory like CRS will work in tandem? What is to stop the
make the belief. That is to say, the meaning of the term beer is to be explicated in terms of all the
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narrow conceptual role individuating a belief content as water is wet, the truth 
conditions for which are given by 4 is a prime number, for example? When we 
consider ordinary conceptual connections between beliefs this objection can seem 
odd. It is surely evident that the role our beliefs play do indeed cohere with their 
reference. Yet we can only be so sanguine concerning the apparent relations 
between the putative parts of the semantics because when considering the 
conceptual role we already have in mind ordinary (i.e. wide or truth-functional) 
beliefs and other mental states.
These considerations show the poverty of the CRS theorist response to the 
problems with functionalism I have outlined. An appeal to narrow content was 
supposed to help answer the first and second difficulties that we encountered. If 
that is to work then we need some clear account of narrow content and how it 
combines with the environment to form wide contents that plausibly can be said to 
be the causes o f actions. But we have just seen CRS theorist have no such 
account. We don’t know how to answer problems one and two because we don’t 
have an account of narrow content. We don’t have an account of narrow content 
because we don’t know what is meant by narrow inferences. We don’t know what 
is meant by narrow inferences because the idea of inference seems to involve 
wide or truth functional contents. And the CRS theorist has given us no story or 
theory as to how narrow inferences, whatever they are, are supposed to be linked 
to normal inferences. Far from solving the problems of mental contents in a 
functionalist manner, CRS merely makes them more vivid. We still have no story
• • 7which tells us what narrow contents are or how they connect with wide contents.
beliefs in which it appears.
6 This point is also made by Putnam (1999), p. 117
7 One possible response (see Carruthers and Botterill (2000)) is to suggest that some new 
psychology will make sense of the relevant connections for us. That is to say, there will be a
80
One final way of overcoming some of the problems with functionalism 
that we have raised is worth considering. We might be able to answer problem 
three and avoid some of the absurdities of CRS by including not only actual 
inferential or causal connections but also counterfactuals ones (see for example 
Carruthers (1996), ch.4). So although the actual conceptual or causal role of my 
beliefs about the sun are different from someone in the past, if  the other beliefs 
they held were the same, then they would draw the same inferences and act in the 
same way as me. This looks like it might solve many o f the problems that have 
confronted functionalism and it is, perhaps, suggested by Kim’s talk o f causal 
potentials. However, it is a non-starter.
First one should notice that a specification o f all the potential causes a 
belief might be involved could be endless given the infinite number of possible 
combinations o f beliefs and other intentional states there could be. The 
specification H would be impossible for anyone to write down or conceptualise; 
and thus any actual reduction would be impossible. Moroever, given the 
possibility of such an open-ended disposition, one might start to doubt Kim’s 
claim that there could be one simple neurophysiological state that could be 
implicated in such a variety o f possible effects. It just seems implausible that there 
is one physical state that could be causally implicated in the vast variety of things 
one might do given that one had some particular mental state. Just consider the
psychological theory that picks out narrow states, the laws of which will relate one state to another 
in a way which is consistent with what are intuitively the right inferential connections. In fact, it 
might do better than that: it might correct our intuitions about inferential connections between 
beliefs and so improve upon our commonsense psychology. This suggestion can be summarised 
(in only moderately tendentious terms) as follows: there is a something or other (narrow content), 
governed by some laws or others (new psychology) which will solve all our problems (hooray). 
But of course no-one has any idea what this sort of new psychology will be like and when and how 
it would be applied or tested. This is all pie-in-the-sky. Impossible to discuss because there is no 
actual theory that can be assessed. Furthermore it is inconsistent with analytic functionalism since 
it would need to presuppose some prior understanding of narrow contents on the basis of which
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endless way one might further supplement the possible actions I might take given 
I believe beer is in the fridge. Perhaps this does not look like such a huge problem. 
Can’t the functionalist invoke multiple-realisability here? So there might be a 
range of causal specifications, H, H’, H ” ..., which each pick out a subset of the 
dispositions associated with any given belief. Each of these specifications in turn 
would be identical to a different physical state. But that would be a disaster for the 
functionalist project. What would these causal specifications have in common by 
physicalist lights; on what basis should we regard them as the same belief? 
Multiple-realisability o f this sort excludes the possibility that they are physically 
or indeed even functionally identical.8 What else could be said -  that the mental 
states supervene on the physical basis? We know that won’t work.
Such arguments are as fine as far as they go and help to highlight the 
implausibility of the functionalist claim. However, Kim and others may 
stubbornly insist that there is in fact one neurophysiological realiser that has all 
the dispositions we might associate with a given mental state and that reduction in 
principle is thus not ruled out. The real problem, however, with the suggestion 
that we try to individuate functional items by including counterfactual connections 
is that what is and is not relevant to the counterfactual is most plausibly decided 
by a prior grasp of the semantic content and what it is reasonable to think and do 
given such mental states. Consider the following story: because someone has the 
belief that seagulls have gold in their stomachs, and they have a desire for fortune, 
we might think that they would try to hunt down and disembowel seagulls. On the 
other hand, they might have further beliefs about gulls, say that they are in some 
way sacred which prevents them from doing this, however much we may imagine
psychological laws might be investigated. It would thus make the connection between narrow
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they secretly desire the gold they believe is there. We can tell stories like this, 
even if as a matter of fact no-one has ever held such beliefs because we 
understand such beliefs to be about the world; that is to have a certain content. 
Then given somebody thinks the world is some way we can further imagine how 
he or she might reasonably be expected to act.
It is always tempting to think that there must be a functionalist story to tell 
about mental states because we can quite easily construct stories like this to 
explain why someone with such and such mental states did what he did. And of 
course, we can construct lots and lots of stories about what people might do given 
that they have or might have certain intentional states; such is the basis o f our 
ability to tell stories at all. It is tempting, therefore, I suppose to think that the sum 
of all these constructions provides the functional specification that Kim is after. 
But that overlooks, of course, how it is that we are able to construct these 
counterfactual scenarios. We can do it because we have a grasp of the contents of 
the agent’s mental states and then given also the idea that the world is some way 
or another, we can infer what might reasonably happen, as we do in the case of 
man who believes that there is gold in the stomach of seagulls. To make sense of 
the counterfactual claim in the required reductionist sense we would need a 
criterion of identity of the state which is independent of our understanding of the 
belief state qua belief state. But we do not have that. Our understanding here is 
entirely top down. So although it is always apparently possible to save 
functionalism by appeal to counterfactuals connections of the form we have 
discussed above, the result is a Pyrrhic victory for the reductionist. The resulting 
theory depends upon a prior understanding of the content of the beliefs and what it
states and inference an empirical one, not a definitional one.
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might be reasonable to think and do given such beliefs. It is in virtue o f such 
considerations that we can decide what is and what is not relevant. Since this 
already assumes the content is what it is and because there is no functionalist story 
to tell us how to think about this notion of reasonableness or rationality (that is to 
say, still no answer to problem three), there is no reduction here.
To put it succinctly, the problem with CRS is that it does not exist.9 It fails 
to answer problems one and two because it fails to provide an adequate account of 
narrow content and how it is connected to truth-functional content. It also fails to 
answer problem three. When we construe CRS in terms of the actual inferences 
that any individual makes, CRS leads one to the absurd conclusion that we can 
never disagree with anyone or change our minds. When we consider 
counterfactual connections as well, then we can avoid this problem but only at the 
cost of giving up on reduction. Deciding which counterfactual are relevant 
requires a prior grasp of the mental contents and intuitions about what it is 
reasonable to do given such mental states. A reductionist treatment here would 
have to analyse away or otherwise explain this idea of what it is reasonable to do. 
No CRS theorist has any suggestion how this might be done. Moreover, reflecting 
on the kinds o f inferences and relations between mental states that we have (and 
sometimes do not have) just makes the whole idea of CRS implausible. For almost 
any mental state, it is surely possible to construct some counter-example in which 
we attribute say belief X to so-and-so but not one of the supposed meaning 
constitutive inferences.
8 Similar arguments can be found in Prades and Corbi (2000) and Ben-Yami (1999).
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3.1.4 Eliminativism
A more radical solution to the three problems I outlined at the beginning o f this 
chapter is possible. Recall that Kim does not think that there are really any 
functional properties, merely functional and therefore mental concepts. Strictly 
speaking then one might want to interpret Kim’s position as a version of 
eliminativism.
Now this could be a quick way of disposing of most o f the objections I 
have raised. If there aren’t really any belief or desires then there is no reason to 
agonise over the exact set of inferences or causal connections which defines any 
mental state. Nor is there any reason to be too concerned about how it is that we 
arrive at that conclusion since no such decision would carry any metaphysical 
weight; such states would not have to refer to anything. Rather we would just 
have certain concepts that could be used to help us get by in the world. I do not 
suggest that Kim’s own quasi-eliminativist views are as radical as this. He does 
not arrive at his eliminativist conclusions because he believes that psychology is 
at best of instrumental value; rather eliminativism is forced on him because o f the 
physicalist idea that the only real properties are physical properties. Nevertheless, 
once the idea of eliminativism has been introduced, it is tempting to use the 
general idea as a way o f overcoming the problems that functionalism has 
encountered.
I don’t think this can possibly be the solution functionalists are after. 
Consider the claim shared by Kim and more radical eliminativists that there are 
not really any mental properties, only mental concepts. What on this account are 
concepts? On the radical eliminativist line it does not seem concept talk
9 As Paul Boghossian says, “Inferential role semantics is no more than a twinkle in the eye of its
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corresponds to anything. There can be no concepts, any more than there can be 
beliefs because concepts do not belong to the basic physical ontology. But then 
how are we even to understand the eliminativists claim; a claim which clearly 
employs concepts? In short, an eliminativist uses certain concepts to express the 
belief that there are no beliefs or concepts. I can make no sense of this claim.
I think an analogous problem arises for Kim, even given his weaker 
eliminativist line. It is not entirely clear what Kim means by concepts and how 
they would fit into a physical ontology. Perhaps there is some reasonable answer 
that can be given here in terms of the causal potentials of agents. So you might 
define a concept by reference to all the mental states in which they can figure, 
which are in turn defined by their causal potentials. But Kim’s account still has 
features which trouble me. To understand a theory like Kim’s we need to be able 
to grasp the concepts involved -  both mental and physical. We need to understand 
how such concepts can be related to form complex concepts -  like physicalism 
and anti-physicalism; and then Kim and I need to understand that we disagree 
about the truth of sentences or propositions employed using such concepts. If all 
there is to such a disagreement is supposed to be given (or analysed away) by a set 
o f causal dispositions, then the sense in which we might be said to disagree seems 
to be difficult to recover. What I take it Kim and I are disagreeing about is how 
things are, not which causal dispositions one should have. However, in the 
context of Kim’s ideas of what mental states are, it seems that one cannot recover 
that sense of disagreement. Having the belief that physicalism is the true ontology 
and having the belief that physicalism does not make any sense turn out just to be 
ways to designate certain physical states. Like the more radical eliminativist,
advocates”. And quite probably less.
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accepting Kim’s position makes it difficult to make sense of the questions it was 
designed to address; questions about how the world is.
3.1.5 Why functionalism?
Kim-style functionalism suffers from a poverty o f explanation. First, it requires a 
we-know-not-what relation between the microphysical and the macrophysical to 
guarantee (MS). Then it requires at very best a we-know-not-what theory of 
psychology involving narrow contents (whatever they are) that can be 
functionalised and reduced to the macrophysical. Kim’s return to reductionism 
has brought little in the way of enlightenment as to what the relation between the 
mental and the non-mental might be.
What is perhaps most perplexing is that having once espoused anti­
reductionist views and thought, perhaps as many did that this suited the 
phenomenology of the sciences better, that Kim should feel compelled to return to 
hopeful reductionism in order to avoid the problems o f the causal exclusion 
argument. A position which marks out little positive but makes a few vague 
promises that things will work out in the end. I find it difficult to see what the 
attraction of such a view is supposed to be. I find it difficult to believe that Kim 
finds it attractive given remarks like the following:
I don’t think it is good philosophy to say as some materialists used to 
say, “why can’t we just say they [the mental and the physical] are the 
same? Give me good reasons why they shouldn’t be the same.” I think 
that we must try to provide positive reasons for saying that things that 
appear to be distinct are in fact one and the same. (p.98)
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Likewise, I don’t think it is good philosophy just to say something which 
does not look like it is fiinctionalisable, is. But Kim, appears to do no more than 
that:
There has been much skepticism about the viability of a functionalist 
account of intentionality ...However, like many others, I remain 
unconvinced by these arguments; I don’t see any principled obstacles 
to a functional account of the intentionality. (p. 101)
What positive reasons are there supposed to be for believing 
functionalisation is possible? Only “that it seems inconceivable that a possible 
world exists that is an exact physical replica of this world but lacking wholly in 
intentionality.” (p. 101) But what on earth are such appeals to intuitive 
conceivability supposed to show? That there must be a reductionist (functionalist) 
story to tell about intentionality in terms of physics? I find it inconceivable that 
anything could be coloured without occupying some space. Does this mean there 
must be a reductionist story to tell about colour in terms of extension? Obviously 
not. There is no reason to believe that the mental can be suitably functionalised 
and, pace Kim, I would suggest the problems adumbrated above should make us 
sceptical that there can be any such account.
Let’s move on. Analytic functionalism looks wholly implausible account 
of anyone’s mental life. A better alternative, more obviously naturalistic in spirit, 
which might still be broadly considered to be physicalist and functionalist, is 
provided by what is sometimes called teleosemantics. The general idea here is that
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the notion of functionality found in biology may be used to effect a reduction of 
psychology. The best (i.e. the most entertaining) way to discuss teleosemantics’ 
reductionist claims is in terms of a well-known thought experiment.
3.2.0 The man from nowhere
Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing 
nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by 
coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my 
physical replica. My replica, The Swampman... moves into my house 
and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell 
the difference [between him and me], (Davidson, 1986)
But there is, of course, a difference between Davidson and the imagined 
Swampman; a difference in causal origin. Is that an important difference? 
Philosophers are divided. Some say the peculiarities of Swampman’s origins 
mean he cannot have beliefs or desires; he cannot, in short, have a mind. On the 
other hand, some philosophers believe that that it is unreasonable to say that 
something that looks like a philosopher, walks like a philosopher and most 
importantly talks like a philosopher, is not a philosopher and therefore (though 
perhaps this step is questionable) a thinker. Advocates of the mindless view fall 
into two broad categories: what I shall call historical externalists and 
teleosemanticists. The historical externalist thinks that causal history o f the 
individual is vital to the meaning of the words he uses and the thoughts he has. He 
believes that the process of language learning is somehow essential in making
someone a thinker. This is certainly Davidson’s view. The teleosemanticsts, 
although they may agree that learning is important in determining semantic 
content, think that it is only part o f the story. Prior to the correct learning process, 
thinking beings must have the correct phylogeny. That is, they must have an 
evolutionary history from which emerged a certain set o f characteristics that were 
selected for the function of thinking10. No evolution, no thought, no mind. Ruth 
Millikan is undoubtedly the leading advocate of this bio-functional approach, 
among her acolytes we may count David Papineau, Karen Neander and sometimes 
Daniel Dennett.
My concern here is not really to decide the question: does Swampman 
think. Rather, I am interested in using Davidson’s famous thought experiment as a 
means of expounding and criticising teleosemantics as a reductionist account of 
content. But before I look at the theory in any detail, I feel I need to say a few 
words in support of the value of Swampmen (whether thinking or non-thinking).
3.2.1 Thought experiments, naturalism and intuitions
Almost all philosophers who attach themselves to teleosemantic views proudly 
associate themselves with a strong version of the naturalist doctrine. With this 
kind of naturalism tends to come a certain hostility to what are perceived as 
traditional ways of doing philosophy; ways of philosophising that, for example, 
rely heavily on a priori arguments, logical possibilities and our supposed 
intuitions. Many such naturalists thus quickly and airily dismiss Swampman as an 
example of this rather limited and not very insightful way o f thinking. Dennett 
expresses this bristling impatience most vividly:
10 When I say thinking, throughout this section it is meant to imply thought which involves
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Does Swampman have thoughts and use language, or not? Is a cow- 
shark a shark? It swims like a shark and mates successfully with other 
sharks. Oh but didn’t I tell you? It is atom for atom indistinguishable 
from a shark except that it has cow-DNA in all its cells. Impossible?
Not logically impossible (say the philosophers). Just so obviously 
impossible as to render further discussion unnecessary. (Dennett 
1996)
Similar, although less aggressively stated, thoughts can be found in Millikan 
(1996) and Papineau (1996). Beyond the rhetoric though what is supposed to be 
so wrong with Swampman. Is it that it is only a thought experiment, an event 
never likely to happen in this world? It cannot be that simple. All philosophers, 
even Dennett, employ thought experiments. More importantly, many scientists 
employ thought experiments. For such naturalist philosophers, sense and nonsense 
are merely mispronunciations of science and non-science; if scientists do it, then it 
must be all right. No, it cannot simply be that it is a thought experiment, which so 
offends Dennett, it must be a bad thought experiment.
What then differentiates a good thought experiment from a bad one? 
Dennett seems to be implying that Swampman is physically impossible; that is to 
say, that imagining such an occurrence contradicts the laws of physics. If  this is 
so, it is obvious why, by naturalist lights, Swampmen are thoroughly disreputable. 
We should only be interested in the world as described by science not by various 
crackpot philosophers. But is it really the case that physics rules out Swampmen?
representation or semantic content.
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There might be certain reasons to think so. Certainly it cannot be the case that the 
right sorts of chemicals are just flung together at random. The macromolecules 
that are the building blocks of life can only formed by a series of quite specific 
complex chemical reactions. Random collisions o f even these molecules will not 
create Swampman, just more swamp slush.11 However, perhaps we can by-pass 
the chemical domain altogether and create Swampman simply from the 
spontaneous coalescence of fundamental physical particles; or at the very least we 
might say that i f  one is a physicalist, this should be entertained as a possibility.
There might be reasons to doubt this too. The tremendous energy required 
to do this may make any such structure unstable. Of course, this is not to say it is 
physically impossible as Dennett insists. Rather, we are simply uncertain one way 
or the other.12
I think, though, we can retell Swampman stories in a way that maybe 
makes them more acceptable to naturalists. After all, Davidson's particular 
description is not important. What matters is one or both of two things. First that 
this being lacks an individual history and second that it lacks an ancestral history. 
There are a number of different ways one may ‘create’ beings with such features. 
For instance, one might imagine that in the future we are able to create a replicator 
of some sort. That is to say, we might invent some sophisticated bit o f technology 
which can scan a person’s physical structure and then reproduce that structure 
from different elements. Is this physically possible? I have no idea but enough 
naturalists discuss such examples to make me confident that they have no special 
philosophical problem with the concept. Of course, the reason that many
11 Millikan (1996) and Neander (1996) both make this point against the possibility of Swampmen.
12 Of course, if we were to think about what is going on in terms of statistical mechanics, then 
there is no reason to suppose Swampman should cause any special difficulty. There are many 
different paths particles can take to end up in the same position, with the same velocity.
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philosophers, in particular those hostile to Swampman, discuss the possibility of 
replication by such machines is to distinguish it from the spontaneous coalescence 
of Swampman. Replication by a replicator is non-accidental; and this fact, so it is 
argued, allows one to think of the replicated being as having both a history and an 
ancestry. Because the replicated being is an intentionally created copy, it can, so 
to speak, inherit all the features of the being that it is a copy of. Even if we grant 
this is true, replication by a replicator might still be accidental in at least two 
ways.
Let us imagine I have been given a replicator for Christmas. I have never 
seen one before, and so do not recognise what it is. Suppose further that the 
generous individual who has provided me with this gift has neglected to enclose 
any instructions. Somewhat puzzled by my piece of gadgetry, I start to fiddle with 
it. Unbeknown to myself I flick the thing on to replicate me at the same time as I 
accidentally electrocute myself on the Christmas lights. At the moment I die a 
replica of me is produced by the machine. However, no one intended to do this. I, 
after all, did not even know what the machine was supposed to do. So my double 
is accidental, like Swampman.
It might be argued that my intentions are unimportant here. It is the fact 
that the machine has been reproduced in order to replicate that matters. So 
anything replicated by it does, so it happens, inherit all the functional attributes of 
the original. However, one can easily construct another tale to counter this 
objection. We are back in the swamp and Davidson, for it is he, is not there just 
for a pleasant stroll. No, it transpires that Davidson has been sent there to 
construct a secret military device. He has been working on this weapon for many 
weeks now but with little success. The weapon is supposed to reduce human
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individuals to their constituent elements but what he has actually and quite 
inadvertently invented is a replicator. Davidson turns it on and is simulataneously 
destroyed by a lightning bolt and replicated by his machine. The function the 
machine performs is accidental, therefore Davidson's replica is, it seems to me, 
truly a Swampman.
If one is unhappy with the idea of replicators, another tale might be told in 
which we might find a creature without ancestors. The teleosemanticist, as I said 
earlier, dislikes Swampman because of his lack of pedigree, the historical 
externalist dislikes him because of his lack of education. One way to make this 
contrast clear is to consider a Swampbaby. The teleosemanticist will claim that 
this baby is a non-thinker, and will always be a non-thinker. The historical 
externalist will claim on the other hand that Swampbaby is no different from any 
other baby, he just needs time to be educated. I can think of at least one other, 
admittedly far fetched but possible in a respectably naturalistic understanding of 
the term, story that would produce a kind of Swampbaby. The tale involves time 
travel so let me defend this idea first.
If we take general relativity seriously there is no reason to suppose time 
travel is impossible. Indeed there are certain space-time structures, Godel space­
time structures, in which time travel would be no more problematic than space 
travel. Let us imagine that we are in such world. Within this world there exists a 
twin boy and girl. They have been separated at birth. One day each independently 
decides to go back in time -  till approximately a year before they were born. 
There they meet up, fall in love and soon have twins of their own. But their 
children are actually just their young selves; they are each their father and
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mother.13 Now this story is more than merely a mix of science fiction and Greek 
tragedy -  it is of some philosophical importance. The result is two humans with 
no ancestry whatsoever. So on the teleosemantic view neither o f these individuals 
can be described as a thinker: they are both Swampbabies. So even if you eschew 
the idea of replicators, you can still obtain Swampman-style examples through a 
normal process of human14 sexual reproduction.
O f course, one might not be persuaded that any o f these examples is more 
reputable than the original thought experiment. Replicators and time travel might 
be too far fetched for some. I must admit that replicator talk in particular makes 
me a little metaphysically queasy. Nevertheless, this much does hold true, I think: 
if  you are a physicalist, there seems little or no reason to rule out Swampmen; and 
the time-travel story gives you a way of understanding how it might, in fact, be 
possible. Since the target of this work is physicalism that is enough for me.
3.2.2 The teleosemantic view
Some details need to be filled in to see exactly why on the teleosemantic view 
Swampmen just ain’t thinking men. The most elaborately worked out of all the 
teleosemantic theories is Millikan’s, so I shall concentrate on her position in the 
following and demonstrate that once the full details are worked out it leads to an 
unexpected result.
The keystone in the arch of Millikan’s philosophy is her account of 
“proper function”. She defines the phrase thus:
131 have to thank Phil Dowe for a talk he gave on cloning using time-travel for giving me the idea 
of swampbaby.
14 One should note that strictly speaking on the teleosemantic view it would be wrong to call either 
individual human. I shall explain and criticise the reasons for this in the following section.
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[F]or an item A to have a function F as a “proper function” it is 
necessary (and close to sufficient) that one of these two conditions 
should hold. (1) A originated as a reproduction (to give one example 
as a copy or a copy of a copy) of some prior item or items that, due in 
part to possession o f the properties reproduced, have actually 
performed F in the past, and A exists because (causally historically 
because) of this or these performances. (2) A originated as the product 
of some prior device that, given its circumstances, had performed F as 
a proper function and, that under those circumstances, normally 
causes F to be performed by means of producing an item like A. 
(Millikan, 1993, p. 14)
The disjunctive definition corresponds to two ways in which an item obtains its 
proper function either directly by copying (or reproduction, say) of ancestors. Or, 
as apparently in the case of human artefacts, the function is derived from the 
device that produces it. The great advantage of this account of functionality is that 
it provides a naturalistic understanding of the normativity o f functional properties 
and hence of malfunction. This is best seen with an example.
Take a paradigm case of a proper function: a body organ, let us say the 
heart. We can say that the proper function of the heart is to pump blood round the 
body because the ancestors of chordate animals had hearts which did, in fact, 
pump blood and because of this they survived and reproduced. Nevertheless 
certain animals related to the appropriate chordate ancestors may have hearts that 
failed to pump blood. These hearts would be malfunctioning. On M illikan’s 
account it is easy to see what this malfunctioning amounts to. The historical
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element, that is the selection history, in the definition o f a proper function 
provides a normative standard by which we can judge whether an item is 
performing as it should. In other words, when we consider the question of whether 
a certain item is functioning or malfunctioning we are, in effect, asking the 
question: does it perform the function it was selected for? Millikan claims that if 
one attempted to define functionality ahistorically15, for example in terms of 
present dispositions, one would lose this normative element; malfunctioning 
would simply collapse into having no function.
This clearly appears to be an improvement on Kim-style analytic 
functionalism. Recall that one of the serious difficulties for analytic functionalism 
was providing a principled discrimination between the sorts of causes and effects 
that were essential to the functional state being what it was and those that were 
merely accidental. Such a distinction falls straight out o f a teleosemantic analysis: 
the relevant causes of any proper functioning item are the ones it was selected to 
perform. It is a proper function of the heart to pump blood round the body but not 
to make a thumping noise that can be detected by a stethoscope. The former is a 
selected for function, the latter is not.
Notice as well that this kind of normal functioning does not equate with 
the statistically average functions of an item. The normal function of sperm is to 
fertilise an ovum since that is what it has evolved to do, even though very few 
sperm actually perform this function. The teleosemanticist’s project is to take this 
general account of proper function and apply it to representational states.
With the help of the technical notion of a proper function, we can 
formulate Millikan’s objection to Swampman more precisely. First, although it is
15 As for example Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) have attempted to do.
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clear Swampman is a copy o f Davidson (an exact copy of Davidson) this is only 
accidentally the case. It is not true that Swampman is a reproduction of Davidson. 
Swampman is not a reproduction of anything; he is a newly created being with no 
ancestral history. It is pretty clear then that given he has no ancestral history he 
can have no proper functions in the sense implied by the first half o f the 
disjunctive definition. His heart cannot be said to have the function o f pumping 
blood. His eyes cannot be said to have the functioning of seeing. And his brain 
cannot be said to have the function of thinking. All o f his apparent functional 
traits are just that -  apparent.
A little bit more I think though needs to be said about what the criteria are 
for ascribing proper functions to any item for there is an apparent ambiguity in 
Millikan’s account. An interesting illustration of this ambiguity might be to take 
the book of Genesis as more accurate than commonly supposed. Imagine that the 
human race began with Adam and Eve. But they were not created by God, they 
were in reality swamp people. On Millikan’s account it is unambiguously the case 
that neither SwampAdam nor SwampEve has proper functions. But what about 
Cain and Abel? Since they both have two ancestors is that sufficient to ground the 
ascription of proper functions to them? If not, how many generations do you have 
to go through before you can? Could we truly say that Noah’s heart had the 
function of pumping blood? Or that David was a thinking man? Here is what 
Millikan says on the matter:
The functional trait must be one that is there in contrast to the others 
that are not there, because o f historic difference in the results of these 
alternative traits. It must be tied to genetic materials that were selected
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from amongst a larger pool of such materials because of their relative 
advantageousness... Graphically, whether my shoulders have as a 
biological function to hold up my clothes depends on...whether there 
were once shoulderless people who died out because they had nothing 
to hang their clothes on. (Millkan (1993), p.3 8)
What is important then in the ascription of a proper function is a relevant contrast 
class o f beings that lacked a particular disposition (but therefore presumably had 
different dispositions) to compare against the class of beings we are interested in. 
That any function truly is a proper function in this sense will therefore be quite 
difficult to prove. It will require a detailed knowledge of populations and how 
different dispositions that individuals possess within that population affect their 
abilities to reproduce. It also follows then, and I don’t suggest that Millikan would 
deny this, that many, if not most, o f the functions teleosemanticists talk of as 
examples of proper functions are not known to be so in the sense just described. (I 
do not suggest in any way that this vitiates the teleosemanticist programme or that 
there may not be good reasons to think that only an adaptionist explanation could 
account for certain structures. For instance, no other explanation it might be 
thought could account for the complexity and arrangement o f biological systems. 
Although, of course in the case of Swampman such an explanation would beg the 
question.16)
16 There might be other problems though related to the unit of selection problem. It is usually 
assumed that a function is useful, which is why it is reproduced. However, if we believe something 
like the selfish gene model then features may arise that fall under Millikan’s account of proper 
function without being beneficial to the actual animal. See Manning (1997) for a discussion of 
meiotic drive as a possible example of this. This is presumably why Millikan claims her definition 
is close to sufficient.
99
So to summarise: the ascription of functions to the descendants of 
SwampAdam and SwampEve does not depend upon some arbitrarily chosen 
number of generations being reproduced but upon the contingent existence of 
members of the human population that lacked certain causal dispositions; and that 
those creatures did less well, that is produced fewer offspring, than those who had 
those dispositions.
The explanation of Millikan’s account provided thus far only covers one 
half of her disjunctive definition. To understand the second part of the definition 
we need to introduce what Millikan elsewhere refers to as a derived proper 
function. Unlike the first account these proper functions do not have their 
functions in virtue of a selection history but by being produced by something that 
has a proper function. We need some extended definition o f proper function like 
this if we are hope to explain all mental states in biofimctional terms. After all, it 
is very clear that some kinds of mental states involve entirely novel content and 
thus could not be covered by the first half of Millikan’s definition. For example, 
nobody thought of space and time, like Einstein before Einstein. The second half 
of the disjunctive definition is supposed to help here.
Consider a chameleon that is able to turn its skin a shade of brown that no 
chameleon has ever produced before in order to match its surroundings. We may 
still say that the proper function of this shade of brown is to make it invisible to 
predators, even though by hypothesis no chameleon has ever been that colour 
before. The reason we may do this is that the novel shade of brown is produced by 
some mechanism in the chameleon which has the normal selectionist-functional 
explanation for its existence. The proper function of the colour is derived from the 
function of the colour-selection mechanism.
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Again, prima facie , this definition seems to eliminate Swampman from 
being considered a thinker. Swampman is certainly not produced by anything 
which itself has an evolutionary history. So it would appear there is no way to 
construe Swampman as a thinker. However, Millikan elaborates her account of 
derived proper function to deal with some other examples. For example, although 
the proper function of a turtle’s flippers is to propel the animal through the water, 
they also used by the creature for digging holes in which to lay eggs. Millikan 
tries to accommodate the idea that this digging function o f the flippers is also a 
proper function. The full definition of proper function then reads as follows:
Being built by natural selection is sufficient for proper function, being 
maintained by natural selection is independently sufficient [like the 
functional attributes of Swamp Adam and Eve’s descendants], and 
having been utilized by other structures built or maintained by natural 
selection is also independently sufficient for proper function. [My 
emphasis.] (Millikan (1993) p.49)
Now, the last of these allows novel items like the chameleon’s skin colour and the 
turtle’s flippers qua diggers to have a proper function but it also follows that this 
kind of modification does not allow one to discriminate against the Swampman as 
teleosemanticists wish. For, if I, as a being with an evolutionary history, utilise 
Swampman, then Swampman has proper functions. If  I find SwampDavidson 
wandering alone and I engage him in conversation, utilising his noises as answers 
to my questions, then those noises have the proper function of being answers to 
my questions and so it seems natural to say Swampman has the proper function of
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thinking. Something has gone badly wrong with Millikan’s account, if I am right 
in thinking it ultimately leads to one being able to construe Swampman as a 
thinker.
One possible line of defence that might appeal to some would be to employ 
some notion of original intentionality here. My relation to Swampman here is 
similar to that many see between humans and computers. I think any such notion 
of original intentionality sits very uneasily with the externalist thrust of 
teleosemanticist thought. No-one can be truly said to have original intentionality: 
it is all derived from somewhere; either one’s ancestors or from someone with 
ancestors.
Another response one might be tempted to give is that the above quote 
represents an unfortunate concession on Millikan’s part. That is to say, the 
teleosemanticist should stick solely to the idea of production and ignore cases 
which seem to involve utilisation. But there are reasons to doubt the efficacy of 
such a response for teleosemanticists. It is does not appear there is any sharp 
distinction between utilisation and production relations, particularly once we 
move into the realm of human artefacts and language. As Beth Preston (1998), for 
instance, points out, language tokens, as events, are productions by individual 
language users, but are also utilisations of pre-existing language devices. 
Similarly, with Swampman: one can think of his noises as being utilised by me as 
answers or (at least to some extent) produced by my questions.17 Or consider a 
Swampbaby again. Couldn’t it be said that after years of training such a baby I 
produce an English speaker and thus a representer of propositional attitudes?
17 Perhaps in that case we might say then that only Swampman’s utterances have proper functions, 
not the individual.
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There is no neat partition of production and utilisation relations which could make 
this kind of reply persuasive.
Given Millikan’s definition, Swampman, I maintain, comes out a thinker. 
This is evidence of some kind o f flaw in Millikan’s theory and once we look at 
her account in detail it is not difficult to see the root of the problem. Millikan’s 
definition o f derived proper function seems to be at odds with her general view of 
proper function. The original account of selection involved simply an appeal to 
natural selection. The derived notion extended this to a kind o f second level 
selection, selection by an item that arose through a process of natural selection. 
Millikan introduces this extended notion of proper function in order to 
accommodate novel functions -  something which is essential if  mental states are 
to be considered proper functions.18 But, and here is the core of the matter, the 
normative element of the proper function is then lost since there is no history to 
compare the performance of the item now with the performance o f its ancestors. 
Hence, one of the main motivations of Millikan’s account is undermined.
Examples of novel usage stretch far further than thought and language; the 
same type of explanation is needed to account for both the invention o f and 
improvised use of artefacts. Millikan is explicit on the first of these:
[A] thing that bears no resemblance to a can-opener previously on 
Earth... may still be a can opener [i.e. have that as its proper 
function], and maybe one despite the fact that it doesn’t work. (1993.
p.22)
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Similarly, since the utilisation of an item can confer a proper function upon the 
item, it must be true that if I find a stick as I wander though the swamp and utilise 
it as a walking cane to support my tired body, it does indeed have supporting my 
tired frame as its proper function. But this obviously has the consequence that 
anything one treats as having a specific function has that as its proper function. 
Thus by treating Swampman like an artefact we ensure that he has all the proper 
functions we could desire. But then, we remove the idea that what counts as 
proper or improper functioning is given by the selection history; rather, it is the 
way we treat objects that confers the particular function upon them. So there is in 
fact no reduction here at all, the explanation of what does and does not count as a 
proper use of language or a right representation is given by other, non-biological 
factors; factors we choose to pick out. That is why, contrary to the expectations of 
Millikan, Swampman comes out a thinker.
Millikan (1999) has responded to analogous criticisms o f her account of 
proper function. There she maintains that the bifurcated interpretation of proper- 
fimction I have outlined above is a misreading. In reality, novel proper 
functioning items are not a new and special category of proper function but a 
particular way to describe the same old proper functions.
The job of the pigment arrangers is to produce the relational-structure, 
skin-color-matching-its-background. But neither relatum, brown 
background or brown skin, is an operative part of an historically 
normal set of sufficient conditions explaining the capacity o f the 
chameleon to become camouflaged.... Only the whole relational
lx Christopher Peacocke’s (1993) objection that Millikan’s account cannot deal with the content of
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structure has ... [a proper] function... However, given that brown is 
the colour of the background, the job of the pigment arrangers is 
certainly to make the skin brown. (1999, pp.202-203).
So in the case o f content bearing states such as beliefs, they can be said to 
have a proper function because they are particular concrete instantiations of more 
abstract belief-fixing mechanisms. Crudely speaking there is a belief-fixing 
something or other (in the brain, say) the proper function of which is to correlate 
beliefs in the head with environments outside the head. That is its relational 
proper function as Millikan would say. The belief is true when the mechanism 
functions normally and false if it malfunctions. Any particular belief is a concrete 
instantiation o f that general belief-making proper function. To speak o f the 
particular belief as having a proper function is only to speak o f it as a particular 
instance o f the general relational proper function. So, there is strictly speaking no 
new function here. Rather what we are doing when we pick out, say, the 
chameleon’s novel skin colour as a having some function is focussing on some 
particular part o f the proper functional story in some particular well-defined case. 
Where by a ‘well-defined’ case, we mean a concrete instance of the functioning of 
the whole abstract relational proper function. But even if we were to grant that 
there existed a belief-fixing mechanism along these lines, this does not sound like 
the kind o f explanation of beliefs (not to mention other psychological states) that 
we hoped for from teleosemantics. Teleosemantics held out the prospect of 
reducing psychological states to biological ones; all this sort of explanation does 
is provide an explanation of some very abstracted capacities that allow the
accidental generalisations is answered in the same way by Millkan (1993b).
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formulation of psychological states. That seems worlds away from providing a 
reduction of psychological states to biological functions. Consider again Einstein 
novel beliefs about space and time. On Millikan’s account as presented in these 
papers, we are to understand this belief as a particular instance of the belief-fixing 
mechanism operating normally. Such an explanation leaves the most interesting 
part of Einstein’s belief out, the part that we want a reductionist account of 
content to explain. It does not tell us anything about what is special or unique 
about Einstein’s belief content. As such it can hardly be considered a reduction.19
We can perhaps make the point more vivid by again contrasting Millikan’s 
account with Kim’s. Kim would tell us that there is a set of unique causal inputs 
and outputs associated with Einstein’s beliefs. The analytic functionalist has a 
problem identifying which inputs and outputs are definitive of the belief. 
Teleosemantics seems to provide an answer: the selected ones are the relevant 
ones. But now we see that notion of selection does not apply to individual beliefs 
and their contents so we are left with at best a proper functional explanation of 
what beliefs and desires20 do generally. Teleosemantictheory cannot tell the 
analytic functionalist which inputs and outputs are relevant, it is a story which 
works a higher level o f abstraction. We don’t have the reduction we hoped for.
We must now consider the broader implications these observations have 
for teleosemantic theories and set this discussion in a sharper ontological context.
19 This may be considered an idiosyncrasy of Millikan’s teleosemantic programme. Other accounts 
that claim to explain some basic concrete mental states (like Papineau’s (1987)) face an analogous 
problem when it comes to go from these basic beliefs and desires to more complex ones.
20 Or at best with an account of what the proper function of certain kinds of desires or beliefs. See 
Millikan’s (1993) response to Peacocke.
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3.2.3 Neander and swampcows
Key to the idea that Swampman does not think is that there is more to semantic 
content than merely the right physics. Karen Neander (1996) provides a colourful 
example of how deep this goes for a biofunctionalist. Instead of debating the 
existence of Swamppersons, Neander discusses the case of a Swampcow -  named 
Craisy (presumably it deserves this name by being molecule by molecule 
indistinguishable from a British bovine). Craisy, Neander points out, would not be 
classified as a cow by biologists. All biologists agree that classification of species 
is, in part, a matter of ancestral history. If one wants to suggest that Swampman is 
a thinker, then one will also be committed to saying that Swampcow is a cow. 
(The motivations must be the same for both claims: Craisy looks like a cow, 
walks like a cow and presumably milks like a cow.) Thus, one will also be 
committed to saying biological scientists are wrong -  high treason for a naturalist. 
O f course, this argument depends crucially on there being no principled difference 
between semantic/ psychological functionality and biofunctionality or, in fact, that 
a functional explanation is the right sort of explanation of psychological states in 
the first place.
Let me set this thought in a broader metaphysical context. The 
teleosemanticist claims that biological kinds do not supervene on present physical 
states. What constitutes a biological kind is its evolutionary history. By contrast 
physical entities, that is entities discussed in the physical sciences, are 
differentiated by their inner constitution. Even if, as a matter of fact, the 
explanation of the formation of the said entity is historical, as it would presumably 
be for the formation of all the heavy elements, that explanation is not part of what
it is to be that entity. The necessity o f introducing history is what prevents biology 
being reduced (at the theoretical, if not the ontological level) to physics.
The teleosemanticist’s next move is a reductionist one. They claim that 
psychological functions can be reduced to biological functions or at least this is 
their programme.21 But if we have good reason to reject this move, if  we have 
reasons comparable to the teleosemanticist’s rejection of the reduction of the 
biological to the physical then the whole programme is undermined. There might 
be two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) ways in which this is done. Either one 
demonstrates that psychology is more like the formation of the heavy elements 
(how the states were formed is not part of that which make them what they are) so 
there might still be the possibility of a reduction of psychology to physics on such 
an account. Or that the relation of biology to psychology is a similar kind o f non- 
reductive relation that the teleosemanticist claims exists between biology and 
physics.
To put it another way, one can agree with Neander that Swampman is not 
human (and therefore not offend any biologists) but still claim that it is at least an 
open question whether Swampman thinks, represents or speaks a language.22 One 
reason both Neander and Millikan offer to reject this move is that psychology is 
essentially a human study and only biology can tell us which species is human. I 
think this response involves an equivocation. It might well be true that there is 
some discipline which can be correctly described as human psychology, which
21 Millikan is far from clear on this matter it must be said. Sometimes it appears she is suggesting a 
reduction of psychofunctions to biofunctions, sometimes she appears to be suggesting that the 
notion of proper function is a highly abstract and general notion which has applications outside 
biology. Indeed, much of Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories can only be 
understood in terms of this latter interpretation. If that is the case Millikan is merely working by 
analogy, rather than by reduction.
22 Note, of course, that one can still answer no to this question while disagreeing with the 
teleosemanticists; that presumably would be the position of the historical externalist -  this is why 
the question is still open.
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necessarily involves understanding its subjects as having a certain evolutionary 
history; modern evolutionary psychology might well be that sort of discipline. 
However, there may be a more wide ranging science of psychology, one which 
studies any creature capable of language use or representation, which does not 
involve deference to any particular biological category. The range of application 
o f biological concepts is not simply given by what is considered physically 
relevant. Similarly the range of psychological concepts may not be given by what 
is considered biologically relevant.
Indeed the bulk of the second half of this chapter has been an argument to 
show the “may” of the last sentence should be an “is” . At the intuitive level, it 
seems difficult to see why evolutionary history does matter.23 More importantly, it 
seems clear that Millikan’s two-level functional analysis cannot accommodate the 
novel while staying true to its biological reductionist aims. Whatever way the 
teleosemanticist chooses to cut things up, the theory will founder on the problem 
of explaining new content. If we are to explain actual concrete instances of new 
function, then some kind of idea of secondary selection is needed. This 
undermines the attractive normative aspects of the proper function definition, the 
very element that made it seem superior to analytic functionalism. That can be 
avoided by working at a higher level o f abstraction, as Millikan has suggested.
23 This intuition even surfaces in teleosemanticists. William Devries (1996) remarks in a footnote 
that if Swampmen were common then they should indeed be considered as thinkers. (Papineau 
(unpublished) has said something similar.) This, admittedly, sounds very strange. Why should the 
existence or the non-existence of a certain number of other Swampmen affect whether any one 
Swampman thinks? How many would need to emerge from the swamp before we could safely 
declare this Swampman could think? I think this kind of intuition shows there is something deeply 
problematic about the teleosemanticist claim to reduce functional states to biofunctional states. If 
Swampmen can be thinkers if there are enough them that suggests that all we get from biology is a 
(reliable) story about the origin of some functional attribute, since that is all we get from the idea 
that Swampmen are common. This combined with the remarks above and Manning’s (1997) 
criticisms of proper function suggest there is little to be said for the claims of the teleosemanticist 
that they are offering a reduction.
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Unfortunately, that undermines the idea that teleosemantics provides a reduction 
of the semantic or intentional aspects of mental states; at best, it appears to be part 
of a story which explains their presence. This is, of course, not to suggest that 
there is anything wrong with evolutionary theory. In fact, as I said, I expect there 
will be insights from psychologists taking an evolutionary approach to our mental 
life. But they will be insights, I imagine, rooted in an autonomous understanding 
of psychology. The practice of evolutionary psychologists does not require and 
could not have a reduction of psychology to biofimctionality.
3.2.4 Why physicalism?
This last chapter has taken us a way from the immediate concerns of physicalism 
into a discussion of two reductionist projects. One could hold to either Kim-style 
analytic functionalism or teleosemantic theory and still deny physicalism. For 
example, one might deny that (MS) correctly characterises the relationship 
between physics and other non-psychological disciplines while holding Kim’s 
functionalism. Similarly, one might be a teleosemanticist but not a physicalist, if 
you consider biology to be autonomous of physics.
The failures of analytic functionalism and teleosemantics combined with 
the discussion o f supervenience raise an important question for physicalists -  why 
bother? If even limited reductionist programmes are clearly inadequate and non- 
reductive accounts lead to contortions regarding the efficacy of the non-physical, 
one might wonder what the remaining attractions of physicalism are supposed to 
be. It appears to be undermined by both the messy state o f current science and the 
failure of the metaphysician to accommodate this messy picture in any sort of 
plausible framework. My best guess is that people think it is forced upon them by
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physics; the completeness of physics makes any other position just plain crazy. It 
is to that thesis, the last pillar of physicalism, that I turn to next.
I l l
Chapter 4 
The Completeness of Physics
The completeness of physics (CP) is the foundation upon which physicalist 
metaphysics is built. David Papineau (1993) defines it thus:
I take it that physics, unlike other special sciences is complete in the 
sense that all physical events are determined, or have their chances 
determined, by prior physical events according to physical laws. In 
other words, we never need to look beyond the realm o f the physical 
in order to identify a set of antecedents which fixes the chance of any 
subsequent occurrence. A purely physical specification plus physical 
laws will always suffice to tell us what happened, in so far as that can 
be foretold at all. (p. 16)1
(CP) promises to provide a quick way to argue for physicalism. As Gene Witmer 
(2000) has confessed “piecemeal” physicalism -  the attempt to show that 
particular domains reduce to (or supervene on) the physical -  looks a poor way to 
argue. I agree. I hope that what has gone before has shown that evidence does not 
support this kind of physicalist argument. Nevertheless Witmer thinks physicalists 
should not lose heart, the quick route to their favoured conclusion is still open -  
the overdetermination argument. It may be paraphrased as follows:
1. Mental events cause physical events. (For example beliefs and desires cause 
actions.)
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2. Physics is causally complete. (Physical events have only physical causes.)
3. Most events are not overdetermined.
Therefore mental events must be (or be dependent upon or supervene on) physical 
events2
I think, as it stands, this is a pretty unconvincing argument. There is an obvious 
tension between the claim that physics is complete and the idea that some non­
physical domain (e.g. the mental) causes physical events. In the following I will 
consider various ways one might define physics so as to make the above argument 
cogent -  I shall argue none succeeds. There is no short cut to the physicalists’ 
conclusion, its plausibility stands or falls with particular claims about the 
particular relations between physics and other disciplines. However, before 
treading down that path, it is worth considering some problems indeterminism 
creates for (CP).
4.1 Causal compatibilism -  no chance
The overdetermination argument is standardly presented as forcing a choice 
between an identification of the mental and physical or massive causal 
overdetermination3; and the latter is thought to be so absurd as to not require 
further discussion.4 It should, though, be immediately apparent that since there is 
no determination at all in an indeterministic world, this kind of argument can have
1 See also Barry Loewer, “Strong supervenience” in Savellos and Yalgin (1995) for a definition 
along similar lines.
2 See also Peacocke (1979) and Jackson (1996). Clearly the argument is a variation on Davidson’s 
anomalous monism.
3 I have some empiricist friends who find this kind of talk of overdetermination embarrassing. 
They say that physics proper does not make use of the notion of cause and thus all talk of things 
like overdetermination makes no sense at all. Of course, if you are a physicalist and you don’t 
believe that there are such things as physical causes, it will follow a fortiori that the mental is 
epiphenomeal (that there are no mental causes).
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little force. The indeterministic equivalent of determination, namely that 
antecedent physical events are sufficient to fix the chance o f the effect does not 
readily substitute into the above premises to provide a convincing argument. 
What, for example, would it mean to say that the chance of any one event was 
overdetermined?
The question threatens the cogency of the overdetermination argument. 
Consider Witmer’s own analysis of the argument:
C Completeness Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.
I Impact Every seeming non-physical event is a cause of some physical event.
O Overdetermination There are very few, if any, events that are causally 
overdetermined, (p.276)
Now in an indeterministic world the first premise cannot be true; some causes are 
not sufficient for their effects. The standard picture of non-deterministic causation 
that is employed is one in which the cause is in some way taken to increase the 
chance of the putative effect. Hence the general picture one has is of a number of 
factors contributing to making the event, the putative effect, more or less likely. In 
this context, it is difficult to draw any parallel with the supposed absurdity of 
overdetermination. Given that no cause is sufficient for the occurrence o f the 
effect, there seems to be room for other factors to have a real effect on the 
likelihood of the outcome. So it could be true that all events have physical causes 
but they might also have non-physical causes as well, without the faintest 
suggestion of overdetermination. Indeed, for many people (for example Elizabeth
4 Although see Crane (1995) and Mellor (1995) for a couple of exceptions to the rule.
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Anscombe) because indeterminism seems to leave space for other non-physical, 
operative causes that contribute to but do not determine the effect, it is an 
attractive ontological alternative. O f course, it is true that such a model would 
violate the completeness of physics; even if all events did have physical causes, it 
would not be the case that the chance of any event was fixed only by physical 
antecedents. However, it less clear given an indeterministic universe why this 
should be thought to be absurd. In short, since there is no determination at all in 
an indeterministic world it is difficult to see what force the overdetermination 
argument is supposed to have.
I want now, though, to look at another aspect of the completeness of 
physics in an indeterministic context. It might be argued that the definition of 
(CP) could solve some of the problems physicalists encountered in chapter 2 -  
problems with mental caustion. A particularly vivid expression of those problems 
is provided by Tim Crane(1995). Physicalism, he points out, is supposed to solve 
the problems with mental causation that have plagued dualists since Descartes. 
Mental causes are just physical causes according to physicalists. However, that 
argument has been itself undermined by non-reductive physicalism (what Crane 
calls orthodox physicalism). Since the relation between physical states and mental 
states is no longer taken to be identity but something weaker, physicalists need to 
invoke a special and qualitatively different notion of causation to explain how 
mental events cause anything; and thus the original motivation for physicalism is 
undermined. In chapter 2, I employed essentially the same line o f thought: 
namely that non-reductive physicalists protestations that mental properties are 
causally efficacious or relevant or whatever because they fall under patterns of 
laws or counterfactuals makes them seem causally secondary in some way. That is
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to say, the real work of causation is done by the physical events and ‘mental’ 
causation is a happy accident which falls out of the way we name or locate mental 
properties in various patterns. It is a mere consequence of genuine causation, 
rather than causation itself Such is the basis o f the charge of epiphenomenalism.
One worry one might have about this argument is that if physical causation 
itself can be defined in terms of patterns or counterfactuals, then there seems little 
ground for insisting that it is substantially, that is to say metaphysically, different 
from non-physical causation. I shall argue that such a defence cannot work. Given 
the standard definitions of the completeness of physics and the kind of work it is 
supposed to do, attempts to give a satisfactory account of non-deterministic 
causation in terms of probabilities, whether conditional or counterfactual, face 
serious problems. To make the definition of the completeness o f physics 
workable, in the indeterministic case at least, causation cannot be defined in terms 
o f patterns or counterfactuals.
Let us consider how we might define (CP) in an indeterministic world. 
What would it mean to say that physics ‘determines the chances’ of all physical 
events? Perhaps the most natural interpretation of Papineau’s claim would be that 
physics fixes the probability o f all physical occurrences. Elliott Sober (1999) 
provides an explicit account along these lines. According to him the completeness 
of physics should obey the following relation:
(CP) Pr( B/P) = Pr (B/ P & M)
That is, the chance at time t that B will occur at time t+dt is fixed by 
the physical probabilities at time t; the value is unaffected by taking 
account of the system’s mental properties at time t as well. (CP) says
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that the physical properties instantiated at time t “screen o ff’ the 
mental properties instantiated at that time from behaviours that occur 
afterwards. (1999, p.4)
Before assessing Sober’s proposal in any detail, a couple of remarks are 
necessary regarding the interpretation of the probability calculus. Since this 
discussion is taking place under the assumption of indeterminism, the 
probabilities being employed must in some way be objective. Furthermore, I think 
it should be immediately apparent that a frequency interpretation of the 
probability calculus will not do. Since the frequency interpretation makes the 
correlation between initial conditions and outcomes depend solely upon the ratio 
of positive occurrences to actual trials, it cannot do justice to the modal force of 
the completeness of physics. The physicalist needs to be able to say that it is more 
than a matter of contingent fact that the physical screens off the mental; a 
frequency interpretation cannot give her that assurance.5
Some other account of objective probabilities is required, if  Sober’s 
definition is to work. Exactly what that would be -  some kind of propensity 
interpretation or something else -  does not concern me much here. Whatever your 
favourite objectivist interpretation of the probability calculus happens to be, it is 
possible to construct a counterexample to Sober’s proposed definition o f (CP).
Consider a situation in which the physical factors X, Y and Z determine the 
probability of some event, B, occurring. That is to say, given the laws of physics it 
is always the case that Pr (B/ XYZ) = 0.8. It is also true that XYZ “screens o ff’ B 
from any mental state, M. In other words, Pr(B/XYZ) = Pr(B/XYZ&M).
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However, this does not guarantee that mental states are not directly implicated in 
the causing of B. We might imagine that sometimes when the events X, Y, Z 
occur they are preceded by another physical event, D. D in turn causes two events, 
a mental event, M, and a physical event, P. Event M has a positive causal impact 
on the outcome. That is by itself it would make the occurrence of B more likely. P 
has a negative impact on the overall outcome of B. It just so happens that M and 
P never occur in this world without being preceded by D. It further happens to be 
the case that the amount which M increases the probability is exactly cancelled 
out by the amount which P decreases the probability. So the probability of B 
given X, Y, and Z is unaffected by the additional physical factor D. In other 
words, D and indeed P too are screened off from B. Should we conclude, though, 
that these three factors, X, Y and Z, are the only relevant causes? I think not, since 
the way I constructed the situation ensured M had a positive effect on the outcome 
of event B.6
In fact what is going on here is that I am making implicit use of the 
following counterfactual probabilities:
1. XYX & M & -P  □-» Pr(B), where P(B) >0.8
2. XYZ & -M  & P □—> Pr(B), where P(B) < 0.8
In this world, Pr (B/P) = Pr (B/P & M) holds because Pr (B/XYZ & M& -p )  and 
Pr (B/XYZ & “M  & P) are not well defined. The probability o f M occurring 
without P is zero; this is what ensures the mental events will be screened off from
5 Sober in fact wants to define all the standard physicalist relations in terms of probabilities, 
supervenience included. He admits himself that a frequency interpretation would fail to capture the 
requisite modal force of such notions.
6 John Dupre (1993, p. 207-8) suggests a concrete example of this. We might imagine that there is
a single gene which is correlated both with the desire to smoke and with the desire to exercise.
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the physical events. On the counterfactual analysis, on the other hand, it is evident 
that a mental event may cause a physical event even though it obeys Sober’s 
equation for (CP). Perhaps then if we cannot satisfactorily define (CP) in terms of 
conditional probabilities, we can do so in terms of counterfactuals. One way to 
formulate the relevant alternative notion would be:
(CP’) P & ~M □-> Pi(B), P & M □-> P2(B), where Pi(B) = P2(B). Where B is a 
physical event and P and M are antecedent physical and mental states, 
respectively.
In other words, no non-physical factors affect the counterfactual probability of 
any physical event occurring.
Unfortunately, such a definition will fare no better. Counterfactual 
accounts of causation suffer well-known difficulties with cases of pre-emption.
Imagine, the same situation as before, where an event D causes two events 
M and P which raise and lower the probability by the same degree. The above 
counterfactual relation might nevertheless hold because M might pre-empt 
another cause, S, which has the same degree of influence.
Figure 1
R ► S S is normally pre-empted by M.
M
Factors X, Y, Z are given in the background.
These two dispositions in turn increase and decrease the risk of cancer by the same amount. But
Hence in the closest possible world to ours, the counterfactual relations hold but 
intuitively the completeness of physics is violated.
Moreover, it is not clear to me that standard formulations o f the 
counterfactual analysis o f causation can avoid the problems o f the causal 
exclusion argument. Lewis’s account denies the backtracking counterfactual7 in 
order to avoid the possibility that epiphenomena might be counted as causes. But 
it seems likely that such a denial will also render supervening events causally 
irrelevant. That is to say, since supervening events are in causal structure very 
similar to epiphenomenal events, it seems unlikely that one could rule out one 
without ruling out the other.
A decision then has to be made for those trying to defend a probabilistic 
construal of (CP). Either what is and is not probabilistically relevant is given in 
this-worldly statements o f probability or the relevant definition of (CP) involves 
counterfactually construed probabilistic claims. If it is the former, then one cannot 
rule out cases described above where physical events ‘fix’ the probability but 
mental events are clearly implicated in the causal process. On the other hand, 
counterfactual accounts o f causation are vulnerable to the claim that they cannot 
pick out the causally relevant features of the world due to problems o f pre­
emption.
Is it then impossible to say what (CP) comes to given indeterminism? 
Clearly not, for one is always free to say that whatever the actual or counterfactual 
probabilities a complete as possible account of the cause can be given by only 
considering physical events. However, any definition along these lines must admit
would that mean that smoking did not cause cancer?
7 If AD-^B, does not imply BD-^A according to Lewis
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there is more to physical causation than is given either in terms of counterfactual 
dependence or nomological regularities; and thus if physicalists’ defence o f the 
causal efficacy of the mental depends on citing counterfactuals or “laws” 
involving mental properties, they must also admit that if the mental causes 
anything, then it does not do so in the same way as the physical. In other words, 
the argument for the qualitatively distinct nature of non-physical causation goes 
through and an argument in favour of physicalism (or monism more generally) 
falls flat; namely, that unlike dualist alternatives, physicalism can make sense of 
mind-body interaction.
Of course, physicalists are always optimistic. There is a lot of work being 
done on more sophisticated forms of counterfactual and probabilistic causation. 
(See in particular Noordhorf (2000) and Lewis (2000) and equally see the recent 
criticism, Ramachandran (2000) and the other papers in Journal o f Philosophy, 
April 2000.) Maybe, just maybe, there will be an account which gets everything 
just right, that defines away causation in terms of some sort of counterfactual or 
nomological relation. But until that day it seems to me that physicalists have yet 
to come to terms with the challenges of an indeterministic world; and yet to 
appreciate the effect it has on some of their favoured arguments for physicalism.
4.2 What is physics? Some preliminary remarks
There is a well-rehearsed argument against (CP) which goes along the following 
lines.8 If by the completeness o f physics we mean current physics then the 
doctrine is almost certainly false. Physics, as it stands now is not complete, that 
after all is why it is still an interesting area of research. On the other hand, if what
8 See Hempel (1980) and Crane and Mellor (1990)
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is meant by physics is simply the discipline that is complete or provides a 
complete account of everything, then (CP) will be vacuous. Either way there is no 
interesting sense in which we can truly say that physics is complete. I think the 
argument is broadly right. It is nevertheless worth considering in some detail the 
various ways in which physicalists have tried to avoid this conclusion in order to 
provide some flesh to the bare bones I have sketched.
What is needed by an advocate of physicalism is a definition of physics 
that makes (CP) at once an interesting and substantial thesis and yet not obviously 
false. There are essentially two ways to go here, each of which either flirts with 
the Scylla o f obvious falsehood or the Charbydis of vacuity. Either one defines 
physics with some regard to present physics, maybe with some extra spin to avoid 
the apparent problems of incompleteness or one tries to identify some means 
independent of current physics to pick out the bases for the physicalist 
programme. In the first camp we may place philosophers such as Geoffrey 
Heilman, Andrew Melnyk, John Post and Elliott Sober; in the second David 
Papineau and Jeffery Poland. I shall argue that their attempts to right (CP) fail. 
Whenever the notion of the completeness of physics is put to any metaphysical 
work, as in the overdetermination argument, then the old troubles reappear. Either 
the position put forward is vague and inadequate to bear the weight of physicalist 
metaphysics or the claim that physics is complete seems at best unwarranted and 
at worst false. Either way it undermines the force of the overdetermination 
argument.
4.3 Quantum quandaries
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The first strategy, that of defining physics with regard to what present day 
physicists practice, is more in line with the naturalistic pretensions o f current 
physicalism. A tempting way for such a naturalistically minded philosopher to 
finesse the problem of the obvious falsehood of current physics might be to draw 
on the work of contemporary scientific realism. The scientific realist holds that 
the theories we have now are approximately true; that is to say, whatever the 
future development of science, there will be a way of understanding contemporary 
science such that it approximates the true theory, whatever that might be. 
Likewise, the physicalist may claim that although current physics is perhaps 
incomplete, it approximates a complete theory. However, this does not appear to 
be much of an advance unless we have some idea of the particular constraints this 
is supposed to place on future physics or some better understanding of what is 
meant here by approximately true. And as any philosopher of science will admit 
there is no halfway decent theory of approximate truth.
Really the only way to get this position off the ground is to consider the 
plausibility o f some actual physical theory as a basis for physicalism. Physicalists 
must hope they can motivate the claim that this theory is complete, whatever the 
state of the rest of physics. The obvious candidate is of course quantum theory 
since, general relativity apart, it has the best claim to be fundamental; and unlike 
general relativity it keys into the mereological intuitions of most physicalists.
To assess the claims o f quantum theory to ground the physicalist 
programme will require some explication (but not too technical) of the formalism. 
Consider an electron. According to physics, electrons have certain properties: 
energy, mass, spin, momentum, etc. Let us focus on one of those properties, spin. 
I choose spin not because there is anything physically special about this property
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in terms o f its quantum description but because it will make the explanation 
easier. Spin’s appeal is that, for an electron at least, it can only assume one o f two 
values (eigenvalues) along any particular axis of measurement: it is either spin up 
or spin down. The obvious disadvantage of selecting this property is that it has no 
classical analogue, so it is perhaps difficult to obtain an intuitive grasp o f what is 
being discussed. If the reader finds that he is uncomfortable with the strange 
property spin, then he may replace talk of spin with one of the other more familiar 
properties such as position or momentum common to both classical and quantum 
physics. Nevertheless, he should appreciate that although this will not change the 
nature of my analysis, it would make the examples more complicated since, in the 
case o f the other properties, the electron has a large or in some cases infinite 
number of possible values it might take on.
In order to discern the value of spin for a particular electron, we must 
choose some axis of measurement. By convention we name one such axis the x- 
axis. Let us imagine we have just measured the spin o f the particle along this axis 
and we have discovered the electron is in a spin up state. We label the quantum 
state of the electron which corresponds to that result |Upx> (and we call this an 
“eigenvector”). Quantum measurements are such that if one were to remeasure 
immediately the spin of the electron along the x-axis one would always obtain the 
result, spin UPx9, since the particle remains in the state |UPx>. No great surprise. 
However, if we now take the same electron and try to measure the spin o f that 
particle along some different axis, say the y-axis, things start to become stranger. 
Sometimes when we measure the electron it will be spin up, that is in state |UPy>, 
and sometimes it will be spin down, that is in state |DOWNy>. A natural
conclusion to draw from these results would be that some electrons that have the 
property UP* also have the property UPy and some have the property DOWNy. 
One would then expect that, if we measured the electron along the x-axis o f spin 
immediately after it had been measured along the y-axis, we would always obtain 
the result spin UPx. This is not the case. The measurement of the system along the 
y-axis in some way disturbs the quantum system so that the outcome of 
measurement along the x-axis becomes totally randomised, sometimes one obtains 
the result UPx and sometimes the result DOWNx. This strange effect is a 
consequence o f what is known in quantum theory as the incompatibility o f the two 
variables, spin along the x-axis, and spin along the ^-axis. Other pairs of 
properties are also incompatible; for example position and momentum, the various 
components of angular momentum with each other. It is impossible to obtain 
definite values for any such incompatible pairs simultaneously. So given that we 
have obtained a definite value for spin along the y-axis, we cannot provide a 
definite value for the spin along the x-axis, it is neither spin UPx, nor spin 
DOWNx. However, one can represent the state of the system for the spin x- 
component after such a measurement, in the following way: A(a|UPx >+ 
b|DOWNx>), where, a and b are constants and A is some normalisation factor. 
This is called a superposition of states. Although the superposition itself does not 
represent a definite value, it does allow one to predict precisely the probability 
that either an |UPx> or |DOWNx> state will occur after measurement. It is these 
superposed states that I think are likely to cause some initial problems for 
physicalists.
9 I hope the nomenclature here is clear: the unbracketed state represents the value after 
measurement, the bracketed state is the wave equation.
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A first naive argument against physicalism might be to say that superposed 
quantum states do not represent definite properties and hence cannot form the 
bases for a physical description of the world. As Jeffrey Poland puts it in defining 
his physicalism: “[I]f there is no fact of the matter regarding as to what objects are 
included in the bases, then there is no fact of the matter regarding what the theses 
[physicalism] are expressing, and hence there is no fact of the matter regarding 
whether the theses are true or false. Vacuous or indeterminate content, therefore, 
undermines the significance of physicalist doctrine and obstructs the attainment of 
the goals of the physicalist programme.” (1994, p. 148)
The anti-physicalist might argue then that because superposed states are 
value indefinite, there is no fact of the matter concerning whether the electron is 
in one state or the other. Hence, a physicalist could not assert, say P = m or P 
supervenes on m, where P is a physical property and m a non-physical property, 
because P is not well defined for any superposed states (and all quantum states are 
superpositions under some description). But Poland has an obvious reply: “the 
wave function gives very definite descriptions of the system in terms o f the 
probability distributions; such descriptions give a complete characterisation of the 
system. Thus for any such description or associated probability distribution there 
is a fact of the matter whether it is in the physical bases. What more could anyone 
ask for in characterising such bases?” (1994, p. 174)
In other words, Poland is prepared to characterise the physical bases as 
completely and determinately described by the superposed states.10 Now, this may 
answer the naive objection that the bases are ill-defined but it simply gives rise to 
a more profound problem. Namely, if superposed quantum systems are the base
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physical states, then how do they give rise to macroscopic phenomena which 
never appear to be in superpositions but always in some definite property state? 
We seem to have simply reversed the direction of the mystery. Looking down 
from the macroscopic domain to the quantum domain, one cannot understand how 
quantum states can be well defined. Looking up from the quantum domain, we 
cannot see how to recover the macrophysical image.
Scott Sturgeon (1998) has made essentially the same point in the context 
of the overdetermination argument. He argues that inasmuch as we think it is at all 
plausible to consider physics complete, we generally have in mind high-level 
theories with well-defined dynamics like quantum theory. That is to say, we do 
not imagine that physicists will need to invoke non-physical causes or 
explanations when they do their experiments in the laboratory. However the sort 
o f physical events that we think are caused by mental events are macroscopic 
physical events. And since it is not at all clear how the macroscopic and the 
microscopic domains relate, because of the conceptual strangeness o f quantum 
mechanics, the overdetermination argument is no good.
Indeed, as Sturgeon suggests, raising the question of how the micro and 
macro images relate is a way into what is known as the “measurement problem” 
in quantum theory. It is perhaps easier to appreciate the force of Sturgeon’s 
objection in terms of that problem. To explain the details, we need a richer 
account of quantum theory than has been given up till now.
Quantum mechanical states are governed by the Schrodinger equation, 
which tells us how some state, say, |UPx>, develops through time. After 
interaction with the environment |UPx>will develop into some superposition of
10 Poland also suggests that the definite value states acquired after measurement could also form
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|UPx>and |DOWNx> states. However, on measurement, as was implicit in my 
earlier discussion, the wave equation “collapses” from a superposed state to an 
eigenvector either |UPx> or |DOWNx>. The problem here is that the 
measurement interaction is not part of the Schrodinger evolution of the system; it 
is a new type of interaction. If one treats the measuring apparatus like a quantum 
system that interacts with the electron, then one does not obtain a determinate 
property state but an entangled system of the form:
|M(UPx)> |UPx> + |M(DOWNx)> |DOWNx>, where |M(UPx)> and 
|M(DOWNx)>, represent the states of the measuring apparatus for measurements 
o f |UPx> and |DOWNx> respectively. But of course we never do observe 
situations like this. In fact, we probably cannot even begin to comprehend how we 
could observe superpositions o f states. Measurement then appears to induce a 
different sort of interaction not captured in quantum theory. The conceptual 
problem is how to understand what is special about measurement interactions that 
takes particles from superposed states to definite property states. And this is just 
the problem of how quantum systems relate to macroscopic systems, since the 
measuring device is a macrosystem.
Some of the solutions mooted both by philosophers and by physicists to 
account for wave function collapse should be disturbing for a physicalist. For 
example, Neils Bohr thought that collapse was induced when the system 
interacted with an irreducibly classical macroscopic object. He thus denied the 
possibility that one could apply quantum theory to the measuring apparatus. 
Irreducibly classical features that are always external to quantum theory, 
according to Bohr, govern measurement interactions. Hence, the completeness of
base properties. However, one should remember they are only definite states from one perspective.
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quantum theory is undermined.11 A similar but more extreme view, held by 
Eugene Wigner12, attributes collapse to the interaction of the human mind with the 
system. Again, non-physical, in this case mental, causes are taken to affect 
quantum events. Again completeness is undermined.
The above views both attribute collapse to some non-quantum element of 
the measuring situation. Thus both seem inevitably to lead to viewing quantum 
theory as incomplete. However, there are interpretations that deny this duality 
between quantum system and measuring system. Such interpretations, inspired by 
the seminal work of Hugh Everett III, all deny there is any such thing as wave 
collapse. The great advantage o f these interpretations is that they only utilise the 
dynamics of the Schrodinger equation. On the other hand the major problem for 
such accounts is to explain why we think we see collapses and never 
superpositions.
Explanations have split into two competing accounts: the many worlds 
view and the many minds interpretation. The former interpretation states that 
during measurement interactions the universe splits into many universes, each one 
corresponding to each possible outcome o f measurement.13 The latter formulation 
makes the comparatively speaking more modest suggestion that the human mind 
splits when measurement takes place.14 So, although on both accounts the 
universe is actually in a superposed state because my mind or body splits during 
measurement, I am confined to represent the world in a nonsuperposed way. 
There are technical problems with both approaches; in particular the many worlds
For an incompatible variable such terms will be superpositions of states.
11 Note, I mean completeness here in the sense formulated by Papineau in his description of the 
completeness of physics, not the sort of completeness of quantum theory that is discussed in EPR- 
type phenomenon.
12 See Hughes (1989) for a discussion of Wigner’s and Bohr’s position.
13 DeWitt, B. (1970)
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interpretation struggles to make sense of the probability assignments in quantum 
theory. But such technical problems are not, I think, the cause of the resistance 
amongst philosophers o f physics to either view. I take it that what most find 
objectionable, and no doubt what any lay physicist will think too, is that such 
views are fantastical. Who could believe in splitting worlds or minds? But what 
that strong intuitive objection expresses, I think, is a dissatisfaction with these 
theories’ attempts to explain the emergence of the macroscopic image. In fact, 
both interpretations make our perception of the macroscopic world false (or at 
best seriously incomplete). They are, in other words, eliminative about the 
macroscopic image of the world.15 I doubt it is the sort of world-view most 
physicalists will find satisfactory. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such 
theories have really explained measurement interaction and the connection 
between the quantum and the macroscopic level. What for example is so special 
about measurement interactions that they cause splits in the universe or minds. 
Why do splits not equally occur at lower levels o f reality? In short, the proposed 
solutions to the measurement problem seem either to lead to the imposition of 
non-quantum causes or to understanding the world as completely different from 
the way we think it is. But neither type of view elucidates the relation between the 
macroscopic and the quantum. One simply asserts there is a strong dichotomy and 
the other fails to give an adequate answer to why we think there is a strong 
dichotomy.
14 See Albert, D (1992). Chs. 6 and 8
15 In fact, the many minds view is consistent with the universe being in a vacuum state, that is 
empty although because of the superposed states we think otherwise. Of course, this raises the 
question what a mind is supposed to be in the many minds interpretation and if it could be 
accommodated into a broadly physicalist ontology.
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To leave the discussion here, as Sturgeon does16, would provide an 
incomplete picture. There are other more radical theories of quantum phenomena 
that do not create the problems I have outlined above and that should be 
discussed. The Bohm theory is perhaps the most heterodox. Bohmian mechanics 
posits an ontology of particles with definite position and, like standard views, a 
wave function. Again like standard views, the wave function evolves according to 
the Schrodinger equation. The position of the particle is governed by what is 
known as the ‘guidance equation’ which is dependent on the value of the wave 
function. The particles always have well defined positions and trajectories, 
governed by an entirely deterministic dynamics; probability only enters because 
o f our ignorance of the initial states of the particles. (The theory is cooked up in 
such a way to make sure this kind of ignorance is unavoidable, so there are no 
empirical disparities between Bohm theory and more orthodox interpretations.) 
There is no collapse of the wave function, it continues forever to evolve in line 
with Schrodinger’s equation. Nevertheless, there appears to be a collapse because 
the wave equation guides the particles along a particular path, which depends 
entirely on the particles’ initial state and this is what is registered when 
measurement takes place. Strictly speaking all measurements are therefore 
measurements of position. Spin is not a property of the particle at all; rather it is a 
way o f describing the wave function which guides the particle along certain 
trajectories when certain types of measurements are made. Hence all properties 
apart from position are, as they say in the jargon, ‘contextual’; that is partly a 
consequence o f the way a measurement is made.17
16 Indeed as I also did in my M. Phil (1998, University of London) thesis, The Limits o f  
Reductionism, ch. 3.
17 A good clear, elementary discussion can be found in Albert (1992), ch.7
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Because all the particles have well-defined positions it is easier to see how 
the macro and micro realms relate. Bohm theory then looks a more promising 
alternative for physicalist metaphysics. Appearances, though, are deceptive. 
Although measurement interaction appears less curious, and therefore the 
connection between the micro and the macro worlds seems less problematic, in 
Bohmian mechanics, there are grave difficulties in extending the approach to 
quantum field theory. In essence it is practically impossible to come up with 
anything that will take the place of position in the context of a field theory. So 
when we reach deeper into the physics the classical picture breaks down again. 
Even if the Bohm theory is conceptually less puzzling than standard quantum 
mechanics, it is not explanatorily adequate. Moreover, even if we were to grant 
that this were the correct interpretation, it does no more than orthodox quantum 
mechanics to explain how it is that any of the features distinctive of macroscopic 
phenomena, from chemical bonds all the way up to people, thoughts, and societies 
emerge. This is particularly problematic for Bohmians given the contextual nature 
of all properties other than position.
What the case of the Bohm theory does show, though, is that it is wrong to 
think of quantum mechanics as creating special, distinct problems for the 
physicalist as perhaps Sturgeon’s treatment would suggest.18 Rather what we have 
here is just a particularly vivid case of a general problem for the physicalist. Once 
we fix on some particular theory as our base, then consideration o f current science
lx Sturgeon argues that we cannot be certain that quantum mechanical events compose 
macroscopic macrophysical events because it is not clear that the quantum mechanical parts are 
essential to the macrophysical wholes. Here, he draws from the work of Yablo (discussed in the 
previous chapter) the idea that an event, A, is only the cause of another, B, if A brings about B ’s 
essence. As I suggested earlier I am quite sympathetic to Yablo’s treatment but I think one may 
circumvent this talk of essences. What both Yablo’s and Sturgeon’s work suggests is the much 
more mundane thought that we do not consider one event to be the cause (or part of the cause) of 
another unless we have some story, some worked out theoretical treatment which can make sense
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makes it highly implausible that the theory in question is complete in the sense 
required: different, unreduced theories must be invoked to account for a whole 
host of phenomena.
What is special about certain interpretations of quantum theory is the idea 
that the theory itself is incomplete is implicit in our understanding of it; and this in 
itself is instructive. One metatheoretical reason some physicalists suggest that 
physicalism is the best metaphysical theory is that it promotes the idea that one 
should look for underlying mechanisms to explain phenomena. As I stated in the 
opening sections, I do not think this is a very good argument. One does not need 
the metaphysics of physicalism in order to promote the idea that looking for 
underlying causes can often be a successful methodological practice. Moreover, it 
is certainly far from obvious that such a strategy applied generally in science 
would provide any backing for physicalism. The underlying mechanisms that 
scientists investigate are as theoretically diverse as the phenomena they are 
investigating. What certain views of quantum theory certainly do show us is that 
one can conduct perfectly good science without such commitments. It is arguably 
the lack o f such metaphysical presuppositions that enabled scientists to develop 
quantum field theory. (See Fine (1986) for just such an argument.)
A second important feature of a better understanding of quantum theory is 
that it provides an antidote to what one might call naive or vulgar materialism. 
Despite the much-vaunted naturalistic pretensions of present day physicalists, 
many, I believe, still conceive of the world like the old atoms-in-the-void 
materialists. In particular, composition or reduction is, in principle, taken to be no 
more problematic than the building of a wall from bricks.
of that claim; and we don’t have that for the relation of quantum events to macroscopic events. 
This is just the less metaphysical point I’m making.
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Quantum mechanics should dispel such complacency. Indeed our 
discussion of quantum mechanics provides us with an opportunity to highlight 
further some o f the problems in relating different domains that I discussed in 
chapter 1. Recall that I pointed out that quantum chemistry makes ineliminable 
use of the structure of the molecules that it is investigating. Our discussion of 
quantum mechanics can give these observations greater depth.
For the modelling of many molecules a pure quantum treatment would be 
useless, even if possible. Chemists are interested in the shape of molecules. In 
particular, certain molecules can take on different shapes: C6H6, for example can 
take several different forms, including the classic benzene ring structure. As I 
suggested it is this kind o f knowledge that is the basis o f quantum chemical 
calculations. However, the very idea of structure or of the same constituents 
arranged in different structures is impossible to recover from a purely quantum 
description of the situation. At best, one would be able to write down some highly 
complex superpositions of states for any given molecule but you would have no 
way of determining which particular structure or shape the molecule was in. 
Given chemists are often interested in investigating the particular properties of 
different chemical structures such superpositions would be as useless as the 
superpositions involving quantum system and measuring apparatus are for any 
real scientific investigation. The quantum treatment could tell them nothing about 
the particular structure they were investigating.
The lesson is straightforward enough: the relation between the quantum 
domain and other domains should undermine the simple-minded mereological 
intuitions that underpin much physicalist thinking. If physicalists reject naive 
physicalism, then microphysics should offer them little comfort and much
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disquiet. Quantum theory provides a clear demonstration of the implausibility of 
physicalism when confronted with real science.
4.4 Physicalism without physics
How about the alternative ways of defining physicalism? First let’s consider 
David Papineau’s suggestion that we try to say what is not physical and define 
(CP) in those terms. In his book Philosophical Naturalism (1993) he suggests that 
whatever the physical is, it is not the mental. The overdetermination argument 
then runs in the standard way. It is clear that mental events cause physical events; 
hence barring overdetermination the mental must be (or be dependent upon) the 
physical. As Elliott Sober (1999) has suggested it is not clear that this is much of 
an advance as it seems equally unclear what the boundaries of psychology are. 
Some of the arguments I presented in chapter 3 against functional reduction of 
content would lend support to that view. Actions, I argued, are individuated in 
terms of their motivations and relation to external objects -  do such actions count 
as physical or psychological on Papineau’s account? I shan’t pursue this particular 
point at any length; I wish simply to reiterate the claim which I raised at the 
beginning of the chapter.
Any apparent case of a «o«-physical event causing a putatively physical 
event must make us suspicious that Papineau-defined physics is actually complete 
or that the putative physical effect is really physical in the desired sense. To put 
the same point somewhat less tendentiously, given Papineau’s definition of 
physics and the apparent causing of physical events by non-physical events, there 
is more than one option before us. We might: a) agree with Papineau that non­
physical events are really physical events; b) think that the supposed effect is not
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really physical; c) that the supposed cause is not really non-physical; d) that 
physics is not really complete. Perhaps (b) or (c) seem unreasonable for all 
putative cases of non-physical events causing a physical event, particularly given 
Papineau’s liberal construal of physics. For example, because I believe that it is 
raining, I pick up my umbrella. The movement of the umbrella can be construed 
as a physical event; and thus we have a case o f mental events causing physical 
events. Granting this, though, it is not clear why either (a) or (d) is better (or 
worse).
What is needed to make Papineau’s argument go through is a defence o f 
the claim that everything minus the psychological is complete. Papineau’s 
overdetermination argument, as it stands, is at best a way of stating rather than 
arguing for physicalism, viz. that there is a domain which is complete and all 
other domains must depend upon it in some way. But without any real argument 
for why we should believe that physics so described is complete that’s all it is -  a 
statement of his metaphysical position.
Indeed once we think of physics as something other than our best current 
theories and instead conceive of it as mish-mash of generalisations from all 
disciplines, including commonsense, it is difficult to see why we should believe 
that kind o f physics (everything minus psychology) is complete. After all, there 
are certain kinds of events that we can only explain by citing psychological 
causes. Missing out such states from our definition o f what counts as physics 
would seem to render the completeness claim false. For example, if we can only 
explain why Tony stopped to look in the window because he was thinking of 
buying a rolex, then it is natural to say that it is necessary to cite such a cause, if  
we want a complete description of the kinds of thing Tony does. It seems arbitrary
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to exempt psychology from one’s definition of the complete science, unless we 
demonstrate that it is reducible to or eliminable from the rest of the mish-mash 
without loss. But I take it that our dependence upon everyday psychological 
explanations shows we cannot get by without psychology or reduce it to some 
other discipline. So there seems no motivation for claiming that this kind of 
physics is complete.
Similar remarks also apply to a more recent short paper co-authored with 
David Spurret (1998). Here Papineau claims that a more generalised form of the 
overdetermination argument can be used to argue for separate metaphysical 
theses. Instead of worrying specifically about what is meant by physics we may 
claim instead that various kinds o f domain are complete. For example, one might 
claim that the quantitative domain is causally complete and by plugging that into 
an overdetermination argument show that the non-quantitative is metaphysically 
dependent on the quantitative.19 (The other example they provide is again the idea 
that the non-mental is causally complete.) Again, though, one should not mistake 
these for arguments. Without any motivation for saying why the domains so 
described are in fact complete, they are simply statements of various features of a 
broadly physicalist position.
The only arguments I can divine in this paper are points against dualism 
and panpsychism (p.27-8). This I find curious. Arguments against dualism and 
panpsychism are just that -  arguments against two other metaphysical positions. 
Even if sound, they do not establish physicalism. It is true that the anti-physicalist 
has some kind of explanatory debt which must be paid or written off somehow:
19 Again, of course this presupposes there is a sharp boundary between the quantitative and the 
qualitative. Are considerations of structure used in physical chemistry to provide models of the 
phenomena, qualitative or quantitative? Is the complete science to be purely quantitative? What
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namely to answer the question if not physicalism, what else. I shall do my best to 
address this challenge in the second half of this work. Nevertheless, we still need 
some positive argument for physicalism.
In yet another paper, Papineau’s (1998) reason for concentrating on the 
deficiencies of dualism becomes more apparent. It is worth quoting the relevant 
section.
I think in the end [(CP)] must be upheld. The question you need to ask 
yourself is whether particles of matter ... are ever caused to accelerate 
by conscious causes alone, in the absence of any other force. In effect, 
do we need to include purely conscious causes alongside gravity, the 
electroweak force, and, so on, in the category of fundamental forces?
What appears to be at stake for Papineau when it comes to deciding your 
metaphysics is the number of fundamental forces you believe there are. Fixing the 
definition of physicalism is just a matter of fixing the total contribution of all 
factors into a giant force function (or Hamiltonian). Disputes between various 
metaphysical positions are just then a dispute about the number of different 
fundamental forces that exist.
If we think of all causes as Papineau suggests in the quote, then we have 
two options. Either we say mental causes are identical to physical causes or we 
have to posit an entirely novel and weird type of mental force. But this way of 
thinking of causation seems to me a retrograde move for Papineau and his attempt 
to make the overdetermination argument good. The advantage of the woolly
would this mean? Spurret and Papineau provide no general characterisation of the quantitative 
domain.
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conception of physics with which he began, was that it was clear that mental 
events did have same impact on those kinds of physical events. However, when 
we begin to think of causation in terms of fundamental forces that intuition 
evaporates.
For example, my belief that philosophy is not the kind of thing one can 
make money out o f might cause me to seek advice from a career’s counsellor but 
can that effect be thought of simply in terms of the acceleration of particles of 
matter? Clearly in some sense it must involve redistributions o f matter but at the 
very least it just begs the question to insist that it can be cashed out in terms of 
Papineau-sytle physical forces. Even if we added extra non-physical mental 
causes into the picture that would not make it any clearer that an explanation in 
terms of redistributions of matter was capturing everything that was going on. 
When we think o f a belief causing an action we do not conceive of it as some 
extra bump given to the physical factors present.20 The question the physicalist 
must address is how does our actual idea of mental causation fit into their 
metaphysical picture. It is at best an unfortunate caricature of anti-physicalism to 
suggest it implies that there are separately functioning mental forces which need 
to be taken into account when trying to understand how particles of matter 
accelerate.
Papineau’s argument employs a very narrow conception o f what is to 
count as a cause; one drawn for some idealised version of theoretical physics. As I 
have said it is not the sort o f picture of causation that fits mental causes; and that 
must undermine our confidence in premise one of the overdetermination 
argument. Why should we say the mental causes the physical, if the picture of
20 It is possible that Anscombe thinks of it in this way though.
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causation we are working with is one of fundamental forces accelerating matter? 
W orse than that, though, for Papineau his account of causation is not the sort of 
picture which fits physical causes either. As the discussion of classical and 
quantum mechanics made clear, the relation between different these domains is 
not one in which we can think of them making contributions to one giant force 
function or Hamiltonian. The measurement problem in quantum mechanics has 
nothing to do with thinking of the classical domain as providing an extra bump to 
add to the sub-atomic and gravitational forces. The problem in relating these two 
domains is precisely that there is not some general story to tell that can make 
sense of both the quantum and classical features of any system at the same time. 
The lessons o f quantum mechanics not only apply to those who want to define 
physicalism with reference to something like current science. They also provide a 
warning to any defender o f physicalism who imagines that whatever the particular 
relations between domains are, there is a simple, general story to tell about how 
we can possibly imagine everything fitting together.
Papineau makes the question of the completeness o f physics and thus 
physicalism turn entirely on how bits of matter (whatever they are) are 
accelerated. In other words, he puts the question in terms of a particular sort of 
(vulgar) materialism. O f course, if  you think of the matter (so to speak) in these 
terms then anything other than materialism is going to seem absurd. Self- 
evidently, if you think of causation only ever on the model of physical causation, 
then physicalism will seem the only option. But we, as a matter of fact, do not do 
that nor in reality can we do that since there is no single picture of causation that 
emerges from physics itself as the discussion of quantum mechanics highlights.
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The way we think of one event causing another is richly pluralistic, varying from 
one case to another.
To make the joint claim that physics is causally complete and that the 
mental causes physical events (where physical here must be understood in the 
same way as it is in the purported completeness claim) at all plausible, we would 
need a treatment of the physical which allowed us to recover the psychological. 
But as chapters 2 & 3 demonstrated, we don’t have that. So we are left with our 
ordinary and diverse causal talk which provides us with no reason to draw the 
substantial metaphysical conclusions advocates of the overdetermination 
argument desire.
I now wish to turn to the consider Jeffrey Poland’s definition of physics. 
He takes a more subtle line to avoid explicit commitment to the ontology of 
current science. The idea here, as far as I understand it, is that although there may 
be no fixed, determinate physical theory from which we can assess the likely truth 
or falsehood of the completeness of physics; this fact by itself does not mean that 
physicalism is without content. Physicalism, so understood, is not a theory about 
how any particular physical theory stands in relation to other domains, rather it is 
a view about a more abstract kind of thing called the research programme o f  
physics. Whatever physics in the end turns out to be, we have a firm grasp on the 
sort of questions and problems physics must solve. The completeness of physics is 
thus the claim that there is a theory which answers those questions and that theory 
is complete.
Obviously what needs to be filled in here is some idea of what the 
‘research programme of physics’ is and what constraints that places on physics. 
The dangers are apparent. A Quinean definition of the goals o f physics as the
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science that aims for full coverage would collapse this definition o f (CP) back into 
an analytic truth. Poland comes up with the following four questions which he 
thinks at least partially define the research programme of physics.
• What are the fundamental constituents o f all occupants o f space-time?
• What are the fundamental processes that underlie all causation and all 
interaction between such occupants?
• What parameters are relevant to the unfolding o f all space-time and hence to 
all change?
• What is the nature o f space-time itself its origin (if it has one), and its 
destiny?
(1994, p. 125)
Now, this is clearly an advance on Quine’s formulation. It certainly does not 
follow trivially from the above that whatever deserves the title of physics will be 
complete; and unlike Papineau’s original proposal it clearly provides some rough 
outline of what is meant by physics. Nevertheless, I don’t think Poland succeeds 
in providing an interesting formulation of physicalism.
The term fundamental is problematic for a start. Consider the case of 
psychology. Clearly people are occupants of space-time but what are their 
fundamental constituents? Well, that is not a question which can easily be 
answered in advance o f a particular theory about how it is that people interact in 
space-time. As things stand at the moment the best way to account for the 
interactions of people is by ascribing beliefs and other mental states to them. 
Either then these properties are fundamental, in which case what is standardly
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regarded as the psychological is part of the physical, or they are not. If  they are 
then this definition of physics again looks vacuous. If they are not, then this 
simply courts the problems discussed earlier in the chapter. Given what we know 
about the world and the way we describe it, there seems little reason to think that 
any description of physics as standardly conceived will in fact underwrite all other 
interactions in the way Poland maintains. Poland’s definition, without an account 
o f what he means by fundamental, seems stuck on the horns of our original 
dilemma.
The definition is also in some other ways too narrow. The only entity (or 
sort of entity) that Poland’s four questions commit him to is space-time. But that 
should immediately raise concerns in light o f our discussion o f quantum theory. In 
particular with regard to point one, superpositions of states (even position) are not 
happily thought of as occupants of space-time. Even on the Bohm theory, which 
arguably does more to satisfy classical intuitions than any other, the wave 
function, the physical guiding force of all the particles does not exist in space-time 
but in configuration space. Point three is also problematic. Measurement, at least 
on standard interpretations, involves a change (from a superposition to an 
eigenstate) but that is not happily thought of as “part of the unfolding of space­
time”.21 Poland’s characterisation then suffers from all the problems we have 
previously. It remains vacuous because there is no, non-question-begging 
explication of what is meant by fundamental; and it seems too restrictive as it 
limits the arena of interaction to space-time and that seems problematic on any 
understanding of quantum theory.
21 Not to mention the problems created by EPR phenomena.
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When one considers what one wants (what one should demand) from a 
definition o f physicalism, namely that it be non-vacuous and not false, it is not 
surprising no satisfactory definition can be found. In as far as the doctrine states 
anything remotely concrete about what physics means, it is bound to founder on 
the obvious problem that completeness claims are implausible given the current 
disordered state of science. What we see in fact is that contra Witmer there is no 
easy route to physicalism since there is no plausible and interesting way to 
motivate the completeness of physics given what we know about physics.
4.5 Keeping out the crazies
Some physicalists will no doubt just shrug their shoulders at this thought. “Look,” 
they might say, “okay there is no easy way to argue for physicalism. But you 
haven’t given us any real reason not to believe in physicalism. All we are saying 
is there is some physical theory, maybe we have it now, maybe it’s a bit different 
which, if we could work out all the detail properly we could show is complete. All 
you’ve shown is that we do not yet have any theory like that, worked out in that 
kind of detail. But that does not mean there is not one. After all, what are the 
alternatives?”
I gladly grant that I have not refuted physicalism. I ’m not sure how one 
refutes any metaphysical position. What I have tried to show is that physicalism is 
not naturalistic metaphysics. It is a doctrine that when any content can be pinned 
down at all seems implausible given the way the sciences currently represent the 
world.22 Of course, physicalists are free to pray for a brighter future, with a well-
22 Even when the content of what physicalism is can be pinned down the doctrine suffers from 
another kind of vacuity: namely, nothing concrete can be said about what kind of relation exists 
between the fundamental theory and the higher theory.
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defined fundamental physics and clear reductions of all other disciplines. The 
arguments, though, and the state of science lend their position no support.
What then explains the prevalence o f physicalism in Anglo-American 
philosophy for the last fifty years? An interesting paper by Andrew Melnyk 
(1997) provides an answer. Melnyk I think would agree with pretty much 
everything I have said: the only way to give content to physicalism is by defining 
it in terms of current physics; when we do so the doctrine looks implausible. 
However, according to Melnyk that does not mean we should not be physicalists. 
What we must consider first, before rejecting physicalism, are the relevant 
alternatives that try to discharge the same explanatory task. (Melnyk is a little 
vague on what precisely the explanatory task is.) If there are no competitors that 
are more plausible, then it is rational to back physicalism (even if one assigns it a 
low probability). The details of Melnyk’s argument and his particular assessment 
o f how one should assign probabilities to metaphysical theories are not important. 
What the general nature of this argument highlights is one of the deepest o f all 
urges to be a physicalist, one which we have also seen in Papineau’s writing: 
physicalism has to be right because everything else is just plain crazy. It is against 
this attitude that the rest of the thesis shall be directed.
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Section 2 
Pluralism
Introduction to Section 2
An open mind is no substitute for hard work
Nelson Goodman
If not physicalism, what then? There remain the three other metaphysical 
positions outlined at the beginning of this work: idealism, dualism and neutralism. 
Here, though, I wish to explore a fourth alternative -  pluralism. ‘Pluralism’ is a 
word with many philosophical and perhaps many not-so-philosophical uses. 
Construed as a straightforward alternative to physicalism, pluralism involves 
taking the world to consist of many and varied things -  properties, laws, whatever 
-  which escape the kinds of dependency on the physical that physicalists have 
thought unavoidable. In short, one might call this kind of pluralism, metaphysical 
pluralism. A philosophical exposition of metaphysical pluralism would be 
expected to achieve two tasks. First, to see if there is any such thing. That is, 
whether conceptual space will allow room for a metaphysics which is not a form 
of dualism or one of the monisms. The lack of a late, great philosophical 
heavyweight to champion the cause may make some sceptical that this task is 
possible.1 Even if it is, then the second task is even more daunting: to argue that 
pluralism is true.
I shall not here undertake either task, in any straightforward sense. Rather, 
I shall develop what I consider a viable pluralist alternative through the work of 
four contemporary philosophers: John Dupre, Nancy Cartwright, Nelson 
Goodman and Hilary Putnam. Dupre and Cartwight offer a scientifically 
motivated pluralism; Goodman and Putnam a pragmatist version of the same. The
1 Apologies here to William James and his followers.
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following chapter will discuss the works of Dupre and Cartwright, the next the 
pragmatic pluralism o f Goodman and Putnam. The aim will be both critical and 
constructive. Critical in the sense that both chapters will attempt to point out the 
weaknesses of each thinker’s position. Constructive, because what is positive will 
be used to form a tenable version of pluralism. As will become apparent, there is 
much that all four philosophers actually have in common, and the differences in 
their positions, such as they are, as often as not, concern matters of emphasis and 
interest, rather than o f principle. But before I begin with the detail, a broad 
distinction introduced by Huw Price (1992) will aid the discussion.
Price distinguishes two types of pluralism -  horizontal and vertical. 
Horizontal pluralism is the view that there are many equally apposite ways to 
carve up the things of the world. Quine’s famous (or perhaps infamous) doctrine 
of ontological relativity is a version of horizontal pluralism par excellence. 
Vertical pluralism, on the other hand, is the idea that there are many different 
levels o f description o f the world, corresponding to many different types of thing, 
all o f which have the same ontological status. The type of pluralism that I am 
interested in, it should be clear, is the vertical sort. And indeed, I take it this is the 
sort o f pluralism that Dupre (certainly) and Cartwright (possibly) are anxious to 
defend. What I hope to show through the work of the four philosophers I discuss 
is that a convincing version of pluralism must incorporate elements of both 
vertical and horizontal types. Through the work of Putnam, in particular, I hope to 
show that a version o f horizontal pluralism can be made plausible.
In the concluding chapter, through a discussion o f Donald Davidson’s Anomalous 
Monism, I shall suggest how to go from horizontal to vertical pluralism. By the 
end, it should become clear that my position is as much a rejection o f anything
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that might reasonably be called metaphysical pluralism as it is of physicalism. My 
real objective will be to show that if we reject physicalism and embrace pluralism, 
in my sense, we are not attempting to provide an alternative metaphysical picture 
but rather rejecting the idea that metaphysics, any metaphysics, can provide the 
very abstract and general answer to the question, what is the world like.
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Chapter 5 
Science without Laws
The following chapter will discuss the works of John Dupre and Nancy 
Cartwright. Both argue to a kind of pluralism from detailed studies o f the 
sciences; biology in the case of Dupre, physics in the case of Cartwright. Both 
converge on a similar view of causation that is, prima facie , at the heart o f their 
pluralistic positions. The emphasis here will be more on what I think is wrong 
with their respective positions; where they fall short in offering satisfactory 
explanations of what pluralism is or why one should adopt it. But that should not 
obscure the fact that I agree with a great deal of what both say about the sciences. 
Indeed, certain remarks of Cartwright’s provide an important insight into how 
pluralism can be developed and defended. And both represent what to me is an 
important general attempt to give a ‘face-value’ reading of the sciences and their 
relations to one another, unencumbered by traditional metaphysical thinking. In 
that respect, perhaps more than any other, they fight the good fight. However, as 
shall become clear in later sections, they lack a certain philosophical, or perhaps 
even metaphilosophical, attitude which needs to be developed explicitly before 
pluralism will seem persuasive.
5.1.1 Ontological democracy: John Dupre’s pluralism
John Dupre offers up two types of pluralism in his work The Disorder o f  Things, 
each a consequence of the rejection of another doctrine.
Pluralism, first in opposition to an essentialist doctrine o f natural 
kinds [is] the claim that are many equally legitimate ways of dividing
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the world into kinds, a doctrine I refer to as “promiscuous realism”; 
and second in opposition to reductionism, pluralism [is] the insistence 
on the equal reality and causal efficacy of objects both large and 
small. (1996, p.7)
Dupre’s arguments for the former doctrine are based mainly on an analysis o f the 
problems of taxonomy in the life sciences. The latter is defended by various 
arguments against reductionism, in tandem with what Dupre calls a ‘non-Humean’ 
theory of causation. The questions that we need to address here are: Does Dupre 
outline an alternative to physicalism? If so, what is it? And finally is it any more 
credible than the positions criticised in the first half o f this work?
5.1.2 Promiscuous realism
Promiscuous realism emerges from an attack upon a common position concerning 
natural kinds. According to this view, associated with the writings of Kripke 
(1970) and Putnam (1975), natural kinds are individuated by essences. The 
original Kripke-Putnam account suggests that an essence is a microphysical 
structure shared by all objects of that kind: the essence of water is, for example, its 
micro structure, H2O. However, some philosophers while acknowledging the 
significance of essences are more liberal in what they will count as essential. An 
essence may be some property or set of properties which is necessary and 
sufficient for the membership of that kind. On this account there will be a great 
many more essences than just microstructures.
Essences often figure explicitly or implicitly in some kind of physicalist 
thinking. Either in the broadly reductionist idea that each science identifies a more
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or less general set of kinds which bear some strong connection (reduction, 
supervenience, whatever) to the kinds at the lower level. Or, alternatively, in the 
more eliminativist or non-reductive idea that the very essence of everything is 
determined by some fundamental science, i.e. physics. The first option is 
indicative of a more liberal attitude to kinds; the second is more in tune with the 
Kripke-Putnam line that essences are physical microstructures.
Dupre rejects both positions. The promiscuous realism Dupre advocates, 
eschews the idea that there is one neatly arranged way to divide up the kinds of 
the world. Inasmuch as this involves a rejection o f the thought that there is any 
privileged set of kinds, physical kinds say, out of which we construct other, 
higher-order kinds, then this is a version of vertical pluralism. If Dupre considers 
his argument to show that at some level o f description there are many ways to 
divide up the same set of things, then it is a version o f horizontal pluralism.
Dupre’s argument that there are many and various ways to class objects 
into kinds can be divided into two strands. First he illustrates that the terms of 
ordinary language cross-classify objects into different kinds and that, in turn these 
kinds do not match up with those identified by the sciences. To borrow one of his 
examples: for us it is very important in culinary terms to distinguish between 
garlic and onions but biology makes no such distinction. In fact, according to 
biological classification these gastronomic staples are part of the same class as 
certain lilies. So everyday classification cuts across scientific classification. 
Dupre’s text is rich with many other examples.1 Nevertheless, the naturalistic 
foibles of modern physicalists give them grounds to reject the significance o f any 
such argument. Ordinary language, unlike science, they will say neither does nor
1 See Dupre (1996) pp.26-34.
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attempts to pick out natural kinds; therefore Dupre’s observations about common 
linguistic practice have no bearing on how the world is or how we take it really to 
be.2 We need then, if we hope to persuade the physicalist community at large, to 
turn to the second strand of the argument, that there is cross-classification of kinds 
within the sciences. Dupre’s test case is the classification of species.
Species are not natural kinds in the Kripke-Putnam sense o f being 
individuated by some microstructure -  on that everyone agrees. As was 
emphasised in the discussion of teleosemantics, Darwinist thinking has 
highlighted the importance of variation within species and their historical 
development. Everyone agrees, therefore, that there will be no set of 
microphysical constituents shared by all organisms one would wish to classify as 
members of the same species. Nevertheless, there still remains the possibility that 
there are unique criteria, in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions, for 
species membership. Dupre considers three such criteria of demarcation: 
morphological, biological and genealogical (or phylogenetic), each of which he 
argues is either practically or theoretically inadequate to provide a unified account 
of species.
Dupre first considers morphological criteria (p.44-5), the traditional basis 
for biological taxonomy. Species on this account are grouped together by likeness. 
As Dupre points out, this method suffers a major theoretical and philosophical 
drawback -  there is no satisfactory account (nor could there probably ever be one) 
of objective similarity. Moreover, there seems to be little or no motivation for this 
type o f grouping from biology itself. So the morphological account seems both 
theoretically suspect and scientifically unwarranted.
2 Two of Dupre’s detractors, Wilson (1996) and Wilkerson (1993) make this point. It is though 
quite a radical position, suggesting that we be eliminative with regard to most folk classifications.
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Using concepts from evolutionary theory, accounts of species grounded in 
biology have been suggested and the apparent arbitrariness o f resting 
classification on some ill-defined notion of similarity thus removed. What Dupre 
calls the biological account (p.45-6) defines a species in terms of the actual or 
possible reproductive links between individuals and reproductive isolation from 
other organisms.3 The thinking behind this idea is that reproductive isolation 
explains biological diversity. But here as well there are problems. One 
immediately apparent drawback for this way of taxonomising is that it can have 
no application to asexual species “everyone of which is isolated from every 
other.”(p.46) Moreover, Dupre argues, even within sexually reproductive species, 
isolation, particularly for plants, is not a condition that seems to be generally 
satisfied. One need think of the innumerable hybrids to see this. It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that reproductive isolation can be the sole criterion that 
explains divergent evolution and thus speciation.
The other biologically motivated alternative that Dupre considers, 
phylogenetic taxonomy, suffers limitations too (see pp. 47-49). Proponents o f this 
particular view insist that a necessary condition for being a member of the same 
species is common descent from some set of ancestors. Subtly different 
approaches within the phylogeneticist school of thought will suggest additional 
criteria to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for species membership. 
The most radical view, cladism, maintains that species membership must be 
matched up exactly to the branches in the genealogical tree. This results in the 
radical claim (by taxonomic standards) that birds and reptiles should belong to the 
same class, since we believe both have common descent from earlier, primitive
3 Dupre quotes Ernst Mayr as the authority on this view of species.
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reptiles. But whatever the particular approach, the general idea has some serious 
practical problems. It is very likely that, as Dupre says, genuine divisions by 
phylogenetic standards can be found well below the level o f species. So the 
strictest of phylogenetic classifications may have to realign a great deal of 
commonly used classification. In itself this is not a major theoretical problem but, 
as Dupre points out, it is likely to leave a classification which is useless for many 
biological purposes. Moreover, there is no a priori reason why any monophyletic 
accounts should not come into conflict with groupings made on other equally well 
theoretically motivated grounds. Again to borrow an example o f Dupre’s, it may 
be that certain creatures that are genealogically divergent share the same niche. 
Therefore, from an ecological point of view it may be more useful to classify 
these organisms together as one species. Why, as he says, should considerations 
of monophyly override this?
Dupre makes a convincing case that if one looks at how the term species is 
used in the biological sciences today, there is no unique set o f criteria on which 
that use is grounded; and, moreover, that any move towards a unique 
classification would be undesirable for biology. So we are led to the conclusion 
that classification of species, and classification in general, is not a matter of 
discovering a unique taxonomy “since there is none such; but [finding one] that 
serves some significant purpose better than the available alternatives.” (p.52)
Why should the physicalist feel threatened by Dupre’s observations?4 One 
possible line of thought might be that if different criteria can be used to pick out
4 One reason for thinking any species concept might threaten physicalism is that species appear 
vague; and that would create obvious problems when it came to trying to state physical bases for 
species. However, this does not appear to be any part of Dupre’s argument. See Kenneth Waters 
(1998) for an account of species as vague.; and Brian McLaughlin (1997) for an account of how 
vagueness may be dealt with by a physicalist. I shall not discuss this particular problem however
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different objects as belonging to different kinds, then there can be no objective 
answer to the question to which kind something belongs. Put like this, Dupre’s 
argument will sound to some more like it is directed against realism about species 
rather than physicalism.5 Nevertheless, Dupre explicitly denies that he is anything 
other than a realist: "Certainly I can see no reason why commitment to many 
overlapping kinds of things should threaten the reality o f any them." (p.262). One 
way to reconstruct Dupre’s thought that might assuage such critics’ fears would 
be to apply pluralism about taxonomy in a piecemeal fashion. It might be argued 
that certain criteria are more appropriate for grouping together some types o f 
object under one kind than others; morphological criteria with asexual species, for 
example. In that case there always is a determinate answer to the question whether 
any given individual belongs to a particular species or not; it is just that the way 
that has been decided will vary from case to case.
Whatever the merits of such view it is clearly not Dupre’s: “an organism 
might belong to one kind defined by a genealogical taxonomy and another by an 
ecologically driven taxonomy.” (p.58) This suggests a different interpretation: 
each of the different classifications corresponds to a different science. That is to 
say, species is an ambiguous (as opposed to vague) term that has separate 
meanings in the separate biological sciences; certain types of classification may be 
more appropriate for ecologists and others more useful for, say paleobiologists. 
Framed in this particular manner, the claim seems far less radical than it may have 
appeared at first glance. If all Dupre is saying is that there are different 
classifications for the same object, all o f which may be in some sense legitimate,
since it depends as much on your view of what kind of problem vagueness is as on any account of 
physicalism.
I think Wilson(1996) is tempted to see the matter like this. He suggests that the problems Dupre 
highlights only indicate that we have not quite hit on the right (or real) criteria for species.
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that is surely uncontroversial. Consider, for example, a universe in which there 
exist three objects: a red square, a blue square and a red triangle. There are two 
systems of classification, corresponding to two sciences, the colour-science and 
the shape-science. The red square is -  surprise, surprise -  an object which belongs 
to two sets of classification, the red-types of object and the square-types of object. 
But it remains an open question whether the sort o f properties characteristic of the 
red square are what they are in virtue of microphysical entities.6 Clearly 
something more than the idea that different classifications are possible is required 
if  Dupre’s argument is going to threaten physicalism and offer an alternative 
pluralistic ontology.
Certain remarks of Dupre’s do indeed suggest he is offering something 
more than platitudes about classification:
The point rather is to make it clearer what should be the grounds for 
accepting a taxonomic scheme: not that it is the right one for there is 
none such; but. that it serves some significant purpose better than any 
available alternatives, (p.51-52, my italics)
And more explicitly:
I have argued ... that the theories that science comes up with must 
depend on (that is will be relative to) the purposes for which they are 
intended, (p.261)
6 Dupre (1996) claims elsewhere that certain sciences, e.g. ecology, may simultaneously employ 
different concepts of species. Even if this is true, and I see no reason to deny it, there must be 
constraints on how species terms are used on pain of inconsistency. For example, I doubt Dupre
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Dupre’s thought might be that all classification essentially involves human 
assessments of purpose and significance. Therefore, no classification can be said 
to be simply supervenient on some base which ignores those interests and 
purposes; and unless those interest and purposes themselves could be explained 
away no kind of metaphysical reduction would be possible. This is an interesting 
(and I think not uncommon) thought.7 But Dupre fails to develop it further; he 
fails to explain why we must take classification necessarily to involve human 
interests and purposes; and indeed what ontological significance this has, if any. 
Many will think that the idea that classification cannot be divorced from human 
purposes is a straightforward admission of anti-realism. (Or if there are human 
interests involved, it can only be the desire to discover the true classification.) I do 
not discuss this topic here. Some of these issues will be dealt with in the next 
chapter. The question that concerns us is not whether Dupre is a realist or anti­
realist about species, but whether promiscuous realism is a genuine alternative to 
physicalism.
Even if Dupre is claiming that all biological classification ineliminably 
involves human interests, I do not see any reason why there should be a conflict 
between the two doctrines. In fact, physicalists are in a strong position to turn 
Dupre’s pluralism about classification into an argument for monism. If there are 
many ways of classifying individuals, the same individuals, we need some 
criterion for saying that the objects classified under one set of criteria are the same 
as those classified under another. What could this be? For the physicalist the
would wish to argue that an appropriate ecological analysis can use one notion of species one day 
and another the next as Quine has sometimes suggested one could about the physical world.
7 Arguably this is what Putnam was hinting at when he said that “the mind and world jointly make 
up the mind and world”.
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answer is simple. The same object is marked out by the physical properties from 
which all its other properties flow. Given an interest in specific properties for 
certain scientific purposes, whether it be size or colour or whatever, different 
classifications will emerge. Hence, the idea that classification of non-physical (or 
non-fundamental) properties essentially involves human interests can easily be 
accommodated by the physicalist. Unless the pluralist can extend Dupre’s 
argument to show that it must apply to physical kinds as well, the interest 
relativity of classification should be o f little concern. Physicalism and 
promiscuous realism about species are perfectly compatible.
Two important conclusions follow from these observations. First, Dupre 
has a problem about how to make sense of the notion of same object being 
differently classified. Second, and more importantly in the context o f trying to 
develop a pluralist alternative, if promiscuous realism is compatible with 
physicalism, then we do not even have the beginnings o f an argument for an 
alternative pluralist ontology.
Further investigation of Dupre’s work makes it tempting to construe some 
of his remarks as revealing a commitment to a broadly physicalist ontology. For 
example, he advocates what he calls compositional materialism as a means of 
distancing himself from Cartesian dualism and other ‘disreputable’ metaphysical 
positions (pp.93-4). This weak kind of materialism commits one to the view that 
all concrete things are composed of microphysical entities. That is to say, he is 
committed to the idea that everything that is made of something, is made of 
physical things. Moreover, even when stating his pluralism, he is prone to 
comments which sound reductionist in tone:
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The strongest possible notion of a real essence would be that of a 
property, or a group of properties, that determined ... all the other 
properties and behaviors of the objects possessing them... [SJuch a 
notion cannot work for type-essences, which are my present concern, 
for the simple reason that there are no kinds (with the possible 
exception o f microphysical kinds) the members of which are identical 
to each other in respect of all their properties... (64-65, my italics).
The sort of physicalist who is relaxed about promiscuous realism for higher order 
kinds may only require essences, in the sense described above, for microphysical 
kinds. All other methods of classification are interest-relative, more or less so, 
depending roughly speaking, on how far they deviate from the basic 
microphysical kinds. Such a physicalist could readily endorse Dupre’s comment 
that: “naturalness o f kinds will turn out to be a matter of degree, some kinds will 
be a good deal more natural than others.” (p.63) The more natural a kind the less 
anthropocentric it will be and the closer to the completely natural kinds of 
microphysics.
The following physicalist gloss on Dupre’s views becomes tempting: I f  the 
world is fundamentally composed of physical objects, as Dupre suggests, then 
what such objects do must surely be a result of physics too. At base there is a set 
of physical objects and these physical objects have certain causal powers, 
completely specified by their essences. Just as the structural properties o f the 
microphysical account for the structural properties of non-physical objects so too 
do the causal properties account for the large-scale causal properties of the non­
physical. After all, they are just more properties.
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It is the second strand of Dupre’s pluralism which is supposed to block (or 
at least discourage) this kind of thinking. Dupre maintains that what things do is 
not simply a consequence of what things are. He advocates, what we might call, 
an is/does distinction in ontology.8 What a thing is made of, is just a matter of 
physics (or physical things); what a thing does, is not. It is this thought which is at 
the heart of Dupre’s pluralism:
I ... suggest that less fundamental importance be attached to the 
delineation of kinds and attention rather be directed towards 
properties, dispositions and forces ... [WJhat makes a kind 
explanatorily useful is that instances share the same properties or 
dispositions and are susceptible to the same forces, (p.80)
The classification o f kinds for Dupre comes after the discovery o f properties, 
dispositions and forces; and this fact about discovery has ontological significance: 
properties, dispositions, etc. are fundamental. In other words, they are what some 
philosophers mean by the term ‘real’ -  they exist independently o f our 
organisational proclivities and ground the very possibility of such organisation. So 
here we have an answer, or at least the beginning of an answer, to the first 
problem I posed for Dupre. The identification of individuals does indeed seem to 
proceed on the basis o f physical characteristics but he maintains that there is no 
way to go from knowledge of structure to knowledge of behaviour; and what 
objects do, their causal dispositions, grounds our classification into kinds; so those 
classifications cannot be reduced to or explained away by purely physical kinds.
8 His way of putting it is rather more Aristotelian: “why should we emphasize matter so strongly to 
the exclusion of form.”
161
5.1.3 Causal pluralism
If promiscuous realism by itself is compatible with physicalism, as I have shown, 
then the key argument for Dupre’s metaphysical pluralism is not that there are 
many ways to organise the things of the world but that the properties and 
dispositions of non-physical entities are not simply the result of their physical 
structure. What we need to try to understand here is how, if at all, this leads to an 
interesting and plausible alternative to physicalism.
Dupre’s argument in favour of non-reducible causal powers again has two 
parts: one based on the failures of reduction in the life sciences and the second a 
metaphysical argument about the nature of causation. The first set o f arguments 
will not concern us here. Most modern physicalists are happy to admit that there 
will not be a complete reduction of all disciplines to physics. I have, o f course, 
argued that the ways physicalists have tried to do this are in general inadequate; 
that is the basis of the argument against physicalism in the first section. But no 
positive metaphysical alternative can be gleaned simply from these observations. 
If Dupre is to answer Melnyk’s challenge, he needs to say something more 
constructive.
The basis of that more positive alternative is what Dupre calls a ‘non- 
Humean’ theory of causation. By ‘non-Humean’ Dupre means that causation or 
causal powers are to be taken as basic, rather than conceived of as constituted or 
grounded by regularities as, according to philosophical folklore, Hume claimed. 
Regularities, such as they are, are just one form of evidence for the existence and 
working of these causes. Dupre thinks this is a significant move because “[cjertain 
views about the nature of causality suggest that only some kind of reductive
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relation between higher and lower levels can achieve such consistency. ”(p. 99) 
Here, he is clearly alluding to something like the overdetermination argument 
discussed in chapter 4.
Dupre seems to believe that by embracing this ‘non-Humean’ alternative 
we can avoid these implicitly reductionist commitments and understand the 
relations between the sciences in a new and pluralistic fashion. However, there is 
nothing about this ‘non-Humean’ position which is intrinsically inimical to 
physicalists. Indeed, I argued in the previous chapter that one cannot adequately 
formulate a core physicalist principle -  the completeness of physics -  employing 
only a regularity view9. So again it seems as though the elements Dupre is 
drawing upon are quite compatible with some kind of physicalist position. 
Nevertheless, even if the general elements are compatible with physicalism, it is 
possible to extrapolate something like an alternative ontology from Dupre’s 
remarks. He seems committed to something like the following: what is, is physical 
stuff and what does, does so in a way which is irreducible, even in principle, to 
what is or anything else for that matter (see in particular p. 106 & 117-118). To put 
the same point less enigmatically, questions about structure can be answered using 
physics but questions about behaviour have their own autonomous explanations; 
and that reflects not lack of knowledge but the underlying metaphysical structure 
of the world.
I think that this represents in some way or another what Dupre is aiming 
for but is it any better than physicalism? Well, Dupre, if I have him right, will 
argue that it is superior because it is truer to the disunified state of current science. 
But there are conceptual problems that might make us suspicious that answer is a
9 Though, I think the non-Humean does create profound difficulties (or yet more profound 
difficulties) for versions of physicalism formulated using supervenience.
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little glib. In particular, any advocate of physicalism is going to ask what the 
relation between structure and behaviour, between is and does, is meant to be on 
Dupre’s account. Dupre embraces compositional materialism in an attempt to 
distance himself from Cartesian dualism but it could be argued that by opening up 
the gap between is and does, he creates another dualism which it seems equally 
hard to bridge. Without an explanation of the relation between is and does, 
physicalists might rightly feel that Dupre’s metaphysics no better reflects the 
disunified state of science than their own. After all, they both agree (at least the 
non-reductivists among them do) that science as it stands now is, in fact, 
disunified. But it is not clear that either the physicalists or Dupre have provided a 
plausible metaphysical story to tell with which we can understand this disunity.
Let me reiterate: this is an extrapolation. Nowhere does Dupre explicitly 
commit himself to the metaphysical picture I have outlined. It is, however, the 
only metaphysics I can find in his writing that looks anything like a real 
alternative to physicalism; and Dupre is quite clear that he is putting forward an 
explicitly metaphysical account. His book is, after all, subtitled Metaphysical 
Foundations o f the Disunity o f Science. If the picture I have outlined is not what 
he means, then I do not know what is.
5.1.4 Concluding remarks on Dupre
What Dupre does brilliantly in his book is articulate the conceptual complexity of 
contemporary biology; and this I consider both highly important and informative. 
It reinforces the disunified picture of science that any who consider themselves 
remotely naturalistic in their philosophical leanings must accept. But I can’t offer 
up any more than two cheers for Dupre. He fails to come up with a viable version
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of metaphysical pluralism. The self-consciously different aspects of his world­
view, promiscuous realism and non-Humean causation, do not appear to threaten 
physicalism. His commitment to compositional materialism on the other hand, 
either seems to lead to a certain kind of physicalism or what looks like an 
untenable distinction between is and does. These negative points are not 
surprising. Since Dupre concentrates on articulating disorder in the biological 
sciences and since he stills seems, if only in a weak sense, to give physics a 
privileged role, he will always be vulnerable to the objection that there is either 
some mysterious relation between the physical and the non-physical or that if 
understood properly physics will be sufficient to explain away the apparent 
disorder in the other sciences. O f course, such objections are a long way from 
conclusive arguments in favour of any other alternative but there does seem to be 
a tension o f some sort between metaphysical pluralism and compositional 
materialism.
The way to progress from this dialectical stand-off would is to see if some 
of Dupre’s ideas could be applied to physics as well. In the following I shall 
discuss Nancy Cartwright’s work which sets broadly similar ideas of Dupre’s 
about causation in the context of the physics. We shall have cause later to see if 
some of Dupre’s remarks about the interest relativity of classification and the 
consequent horizontal pluralism can be generalised when considering the works of 
Goodman and Putnam. My final position, I must confess, will in many ways be 
remarkably close to Dupre’s. However, I hope to be able to provide a structure 
which can avoid some of the awkward questions Dupre’s avowedly metaphysical 
pluralism inevitably raises.
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5.2.1 Nancy Cartwright and the dappled world
Nancy Cartwright’s attack upon physicalism or what she calls fundamentalism 
emerges from an analysis of the explanatory methods of physics; an analysis 
which foists upon us a different conception of causation and which forces us to 
reconsider the scope o f our scientific laws. There are several strands o f argument 
which promote a pluralistic metaphysics in her work: arguments based on 
analyses o f causation and laws; on evidence; on the constructivist aspects of 
science; and on the interpretation of supposedly fundamental laws. The strategy 
will be the same as in the previous section: to see how far Cartwright’s views 
really do force us to be non-physicalists and what arguments she offers to support 
an alternative ontology. I will begin with a general account of Cartwright’s 
epistemology o f science; from there we will be able to see how this is connected 
to her metaphysics and see what, if any, support it lends to her position.
5.2.2 Lying laws and honest capacities
The laws of physics lie -  or so proclaims the title of Cartwright’s (1983) first 
book. Why? Because in general the laws of physics hold, if they do at all, only 
ceteris paribus, that is other things being equal. To take a simple example: 
consider Coulomb’s law for the force between two charged particles (F = 
qiq2/47C8or2). In any real situation with two charged particles, separated by a 
distance r, the force will never equal that predicted by the law. All sorts of other 
factors will generally interfere -  gravitational, magnetic and frictional forces, for 
example. Only if we have separate knowledge of and control over the interfering 
factors can we make the law come out true; and thus we can only have evidence 
that the law holds true for these particular circumstances. And, more importantly,
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we already know that given less fortuitously arranged circumstances the law will 
be false. Hence in general the laws lie.10
To many this argument will seem strange. The general claim, so the 
thought might go, is not that the laws themselves simply describe relations 
between two kinds of directly measurable or perceptible properties. Rather, they 
describe typical kinds of effects and interactions which take place in the world 
and, obviously, one has to arrange the world in certain ways in order to make such 
effects transparent. Cartwright would no doubt agree. However, if one begins to 
think of laws like Coulomb’s law as describing typical sorts of tendencies or 
dispositions that objects have, rather than as stating a general fact about the world, 
then one has already abandoned, according to Cartwright, one of the core ideas of 
empiricist philosophy o f science -  namely, that laws are regularities. What are 
really fundamental in this description o f the world is not the laws but what 
Cartwright calls the capacities which we think they (sometimes) describe. 
Capacities or Aristotelian natures as she sometimes calls them (1999, ch. 4) are 
highly generic and open-ended dispositions or causal powers; for example, charge 
bodies have the capacity to attract oppositely charged bodies. Traditional forms of 
empiricism in the philosophy of science have taken talk o f capacities or causal 
powers as the invocation of something mysterious and prescientific which should 
not feature in a mature and empirically tough-minded theory of the world. 
Cartwright, however, stands this idea on its head. Capacities are essential to the 
practice and understanding of the scientist. It is only those protected from the
10 The complete story is far more complicated, involving explanations of how theories via models 
are related to real world situations. The lying involved then becomes more dramatic than I have 
suggested above. It is not simply a case of the law truly applying in very limited real world 
situations, the law may not apply to the real world at all, only to the model used. The clever bit in 
science, according to Cartwright, is to match up real world situations to mathematically tractable 
models so we may obtain useful results and explanations.
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complexities o f experimental science who would think otherwise. What justifies 
the enormous amount of money spent on research, if  anything does, is that 
scientific theories and knowledge can be exported beyond the walls o f the 
laboratory to have new application. If we consider laws to be basic we can, 
Cartwright argues, have no justification for thinking that the results of physics 
hold anywhere else in the world -  these laws hold, if they do at all, only ceteris 
paribus. Only if  we consider laws, like Coulomb’s law, to describe tendencies to 
produce certain effects (even if they are frustrated in various ways) can we expect 
our knowledge gained in the laboratory to tell us anything about the world 
outside.
My immediate interest is not so much in the quality o f this argument but 
its bearing on physicalism. How does Cartwright turn an argument in favour of 
capacities into an argument in favour of pluralism? I think her writing is a little 
confusing on this matter. In the next few pages I will try and highlight some blind 
alleys that Cartwright’s philosophy might lead, before sketching some more 
promising alternatives.
5.2.3 Making laws
Laws are made, says Cartwright (1997, 1999, ch.3). We make laws like 
Coulomb’s law by arranging the features of our experiments so they will be true; 
we shield, we interfere, etc. -  we make what she calls nomological machines. This 
making presupposes capacities. They are, so to speak, the ingredients in our 
nomological recipes.11 Let us agree that it is so. Cartwright needs to tell us more
11 Cartwright (1999, p.77) claims that although capacities are basic, she means this to be taken in 
neither an epistemological nor metaphysical sense. The latter exclusion is odd, I think. The reason 
she offers is that law or regularity claims are as true as claims about capacities. Of course, this can 
be acknowledged while still giving metaphysical precedence to capacities; any reductionist story
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about these capacities. As a self-proclaimed empiricist what must be said about 
capacities has to be related to experiment and measurement if they are to be a 
respectable addition to our ontology. According to Cartwright, capacities are 
empirically kosher because they are, in certain, circumstances, directly 
measurable.12 But that is not especially the part of Cartwight’s story that interests 
me here; it is the conclusions about the world we can draw after we have done our 
experiments and made our measurements that I want to discuss.
Cartwright maintains that when we are not able to control things in our 
laboratory, when we can’t build nomological machines13, we can’t apply our 
scientific knowledge. She provides a simple example of an experiment that 
defeats theoretical treatment. Imagine we were to drop a $1000 bill from a 
window on a blustery day. Away from the neatly arranged experiments o f the 
laboratory we have no way to begin to model this situation with our current 
physics (or certainly at least not our elementary mechanics). Since even this 
mundane example is not covered by some nomological machine and it is only 
where we have such machines that we have laws, Cartwright argues, laws are just 
not universal.
These kinds o f examples are not apt to impress physicalists. Everyone 
knows, they will say, that we have no strictly accurate model for this situation. 
The reason why we do not, though, is equally obvious -  mathematical and 
practical complexity. We can’t model the situation not because there is something 
wrong with our physics but because either we do not have enough information of
will say something similar. Since it is hard, if not impossible to see what else Cartwright might 
mean here, I take it that we can safely say that more basic is, in fact, meant in a metaphysical sense 
and we can say that without impugning the reality of regularities.
12 This part of Cartwright’s theory of capacities is developed in detail in Cartwright (1989)
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the initial conditions or the mathematical know-how to say anything useful. For 
Cartwright though (and for me also) this response is far from obvious. Why 
should we believe that our inability to model this situation using classical 
mechanics is only due to problems of complexity? Where is the evidence or the 
argument for this claim? One, of course, could write down various systems of 
equations that one might think captured certain aspects of the interaction, and 
show that they were mathematically intractable. For example, one might think of 
the wind in terms o f lots of little particles bombarding the bill and try to write 
down some highly complex and mathematically intractable force function. But so 
what? That only shows it is possible to devise mathematically intractable 
equations; it does nothing to show that this is the right force function. Only if  you 
already believe in fundamentalism would you find any such arguments 
compelling. Without a treatment of this supposed force function that actually can 
predict the motions of the bill,14 we have no reason to think that the wind can be 
described by any force function.
The negative lesson, very familiar by now I hope, is that physicalism is not 
well supported by scientific practice or evidence. But what positive conclusions 
follow? Cartwright suggests we take our laws were we find them (or perhaps more 
accurately, where our nomological machines build them). The world is made up 
of lots of laws which apply in lots of different circumstances; sometimes 
overlapping, sometimes running out altogether. Perhaps we can’t get an 
explanation for our $1000 bill in terms of the laws of Newtonian mechanics but 
we might do better with fluid dynamics; and perhaps in some cases we will have
13 I should point out that Cartwright does acknowledge that certain nomological machines are 
naturally occurring -  the planetary motions are an obvious example. However, this is the exception 
rather than the rule.
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nothing worthwhile at all to say on the matter. We have what Cartwright calls a 
patchwork of laws, rather than the hierarchy dreamt of by physicalists.
Cartwright calls her position ‘cross-ways’ emergentism or pluralism and 
the name is apt for it cuts across Price’s distinction between horizontal and 
vertical pluralism. Price’s distinction seems to presuppose some kind o f hierarchy 
which we can move up or down. However, Cartwright’s ontology allows for many 
laws, at the same level of organisation, each true in a certain domain o f 
application -  so it cannot really be classified as vertical pluralism. On the other 
hand, it does not invoke the idea that the same things may have different 
descriptions, rather just that various sorts of description are limited in their 
applicability. So we have an ontology which is thoroughly pluralist and yet 
escapes being classified as either horizontal or vertical pluralism. Indeed the 
whole idea of there being any particular way to organise the structure o f reality 
(apart from trivial notions like size) is lost. We work with what works and that is 
all.
Be that as it may, Cartwright’s metaphysical conclusions seem a little 
queer in light of her claims about laws and capacities. Remember the world is a 
world basically of capacities, not laws; laws are made using capacities. Moreover 
the main reason for thinking that ours is a world of capacities is that capacity 
claims can be exported into new contexts, whereas laws only hold ceteris paribus. 
The question arises then does Cartwright understand the patchwork of laws as a 
patchwork of regularities or as a patchwork of capacities? Consistency o f usage 
would seem to demand that she means regularities.15 If that is so, then it is
14 Of course such a description should not bring any elements external to the supposedly 
fundamental theory. C f  my discussion of quantum chemistry in chapter one.
15 Cartwright’s pluralistic metaphors also invite this interpretation. Talk of a “dappled world” or a 
“patchwork” is suggestive of an impressionistic and superficial level of description.
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difficult to see what metaphysical weight her position would carry. Fundamentally 
the world could be made up of a few basic capacities interacting with one another 
giving rise, at the phenomenological level to a patchwork of regularities. In other 
words, a fundamentalist could accept Cartwright’s arguments concerning 
capacities but insist that there are very few, fundamental capacities which account 
for the behaviour of everything. On the other hand, if Cartwright’s observations 
about the limited power of scientific explanations apply to capacities, then the 
superiority of capacity claims over regularity claims looks threatened. If capacity 
claims hold only in limited circumstances, or one might be tempted to say, ceteris 
paribus, then they suffer the same faults as regularities. This particular dilemma is 
forcibly put by Margaret Morrison (1996) and reiterated by others (see for 
example Rueger and Sharp (1998)).
One way to relieve the tension might be to accuse Cartwright of sloppy 
writing. When she has used the term law, sometimes she has meant good old 
empiricist regularities and sometimes she means what we might call ‘real laws’ -  
generalised capacity claims or something similar. Real laws have greater 
generalisability than do regularities but they are not completely universalisable. 
Rather, they will have a certain domain of application. This interpretation is 
suggested in Cartwright’s (1996) response to Margaret Morrison and is supported 
by other remarks Cartwright makes (pp.53-54) 1999)16 which interpret the laws of 
physics as describing capacities. Assuming it is right to understand her as 
referring to capacities, we do not yet have a metaphysical argument that capacity 
claims only hold within certain domains in the way we do for regularity claims or 
for the application o f nomological machines. A physicalist could agree with
16 Possibly her remarks (1999) on p.29 support this: “It seems to me wholism is far more likely to 
give rise to ceteris paribus laws, whereas natures are more congenial to pluralism.”
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everything Cartwright has said about nomological machines and capacities but 
still insist that there were only a few fundamental capacities that explained the 
patchwork of laws.
5.2.4 An interlude regarding causation
Cartwright, like Dupre, is offering a non-Humean analysis o f causation as a first 
step to undermining physicalism. I must repeat that I am sceptical that any such 
analysis can aid matters at all. As I have argued above, it is not at all clear that one 
cannot formulate a coherent version of physicalism in terms o f causal powers or 
something similar. However, I feel I should pause to say something more about 
causation before moving on.
I agree with Cartwright and Dupre that a Humean account of causation is 
wrong. My reasons are boring and familiar: the problem of accidentally true 
generalisations, that there is no privileged set of properties (impressions, sense 
data, occurrent properties) from which to fashion regularities. But I do not have an 
alternative analysis to offer. In fact, I do not see much need when talking about 
causation to analyse away our common understanding. I cannot see what pressure 
there is to offer such an analysis unless one believes there is some privileged set 
o f properties (sense data, occurrent properties... all the usual suspects) from 
which everything else must be constructed. And I do not see why anyone would 
believe that there were such special properties, unless they were beholden to an 
empiricist epistemology; and I do not know of any remotely plausible argument
1 7which suggests why we should be so beholden.
17 There are ways to link these ideas conceptually with physicalism. That is to say, one might 
define occurrent properties as the basic physical properties of the universe. Such a stipulation, 
however, can hardly advance the case for physicalism; nor its denial promote an opposing 
ontology.
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This is not to say nothing can be said about causation. For example, 
causation must, I think, be admitted to have a modal and a lawlike dimension. 
That is to say, causes really do bring about their effects in some way. It is part of 
our conception of the fact that one event caused another that the same type of 
event would cause such an event again in similar circumstances. This is of course 
to offer up platitudes not analyses -  I use the terms Tawlike’ and ‘modal’ with 
unashamed informality. Causation is such a broad and highly abstract concept that 
it seems to me that we cannot hope for much more here. If  we must have more, 
then I would follow Donald Davidson (1995) in urging that the way we pick out 
objects, their causal dispositions, and how these dispositions relate to each other 
and work together is a largely holistic project. So our very conceptions of 
causation, event and object are all intimately bound up with one another. 
Davidson is right when he says that: “events are changes that require explanation. 
This is not an empirical fact, we decide what counts as a change on the basis of 
what we want to explain and what we think available as an explanation.”(p.273) 
Davidson’s point tallies well with Cartwright’s and Dupre’s insistence that one 
cannot have knowledge of what something will do unless one has knowledge of 
the context. Being able to identify a cause in context requires that one can 
understand what is and what is not a change and what requires explanation. 
Indeed, this is why I do not think you can possibly draw an interesting distinction 
between is and does in the way that Dupre attempts. Such divisions, when we 
make them, reflect our explanatory interests as much as any others. One can see 
this very clearly at the more formal end of physics. Is and does are reflected in 
divisions into “spaces”, not necessarily physical ones, and interactions within 
those spaces. These divisions provide the background against which we discuss
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and label changes or events, broadly construed. Where I would demur from 
Davidson’s analysis, is in his insistence that there is an a priori reason to believe 
that there is one framework in which it is possible to formulate the laws in terms 
of some complete theory or other. The way we approach the formulation of 
theories is piecemeal and this is reflected in the conceptual mess of contemporary 
science. But there is no reason to suppose that there must be some way to phrase 
things or parse things which will provide in any interesting sense a complete 
theory. The difficulties of relating quantum mechanics and classical mechanics 
illustrate the problems well enough.18
These are little more than opinions, of course. I do not expect my 
observations regarding causation to persuade those who take a different view. The 
point is to reiterate how little an account of causation will contribute to whether or 
not one is a physicalist. It is the relation between types of cause that matters. 
Davidson and I are largely in agreement about causation but not about these 
relations, as will become apparent later.
5.2.5 Wholism and pluralism
Capacities understood as an alternative to Humean causation do not lead to 
pluralism. Nevertheless, there are other features of Cartwright’s capacities that are 
more promising. Before moving on to discuss these issues, it is worth looking 
more explicitly at Cartwright’s writings on metaphysics. What she says here leads 
to another dialectical dead-end that it is worth illuminating so we may pass safely 
by on our way to constructing a viable pluralism.
18 Formally, one might consider the problem of quantum measurement as how to relate changes 
that occur in a Hilbert space, with changes (or measurements) that do not. See Albert (1996) for a
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In an interesting article, Cartwright (1991) offers a third alternative to 
physicalism and pluralism -  what she calls wholism [sic]19. To motivate such an 
ontology we begin, again, with the observation that our laws are formulated in 
highly specific circumstances in the laboratory. We shield and protect the objects 
we are interested in from external influences as far as possible. The wholist 
believes that the way we discover such “laws” may systematically mislead us 
about how the world is. The interactions studied by us are just small parts in an 
intimately connected whole. Wholists believe the behaviour of entities is 
dependent on the total structure, rather than the individual behaviours o f the parts. 
It would therefore be unwise to draw wide-ranging conclusions from our narrow 
experiments.
Wholism is more than just fancy for Cartwright, she gives an example 
from physics that might lend support to such intuitions. The ability of fibre optic 
cables to carry information with little loss is the product of two oppositely acting 
factors. All fibre optic cables suffer from pulse broadening (that is the light signal 
becomes more diffuse as it travels along the fibre) due to dispersion effects 
associated with all optical phenomena. However, this effect is counterbalanced by 
pulse narrowing effects. The intensity o f the light causes a small shift in the 
refractive index of the fibre, producing a non-linearity. This creates what is known 
as a ‘chirp’ which is essentially the pulse-narrowing phenomena which cancels 
out the dispersion effects. Hence one gets a stable, “soliton” wave with virtually 
no information loss. And that’s just as well for all of us since that allows us to 
move large amounts of information about very efficiently. Cartwright suggests 
two interpretations o f situations like this. One is her standard capacity account
discussion along these lines.
19 I will use her spelling throughout (and drop the sics too).
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which relies on stable tendencies. The other is the wholist picture which denies 
there is any underlying stability which would ground inductions from one case to 
another. The soliton phenomenon is a fortuitous result of the total arrangement of 
the universe. On the wholist picture, there is no way to analyse the phenomenon in 
terms of the stable interactions of parts.
Ultimately, though, Cartwright rejects wholism because she claims 
“metaphysically the fundamentalist is borne out.”(1999, p.31) Since the success of 
science is to be explained in terms of some fundamental arrangement o f the 
universe, some general theory of everything, Cartwright thinks that is just another 
version of the fundamentalist creed. But unless one holds a priori that there is 
something wrong with fundamentalism, this does not seem a compelling reason to 
reject wholism.
The mistrust of this kind of general, high-level account that Cartwright 
expresses here is explained by her empiricism. What Cartwright believes is really 
wrong with wholism is that, like the other forms of metaphysical fundamentalism, 
we have no evidence for its truth. As she says: “I am prepared to believe in more 
general theories when we have direct empirical support for them.”(p.31) No 
evidence, no metaphysical commitment. All that is left is, as was hinted at earlier, 
to take science at face value. But that might mean one of two things -  either we 
abjure metaphysics all together or we build our ontology from our best confirmed 
science. Cartwright takes the latter option:
Metaphysical nomological pluralism is the doctrine that nature is 
governed in different domains by different systems of laws not 
necessarily related to each other in any systematic or uniform way: by
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a patchwork o f laws. Nomological pluralism opposes any kind of 
fundamentalism, (p.31, my italics)
In light of the discussion above, we should, I maintain, interpret laws as here 
meaning some generalised capacity claims. Cartwright’s position, then is that this 
kind of pluralism is the metaphysics best supported by the practice of the sciences.
In my view she takes the wrong option. The argument used by Cartwright 
against all other metaphysical positions can also be used against her. What is the 
evidence, the direct evidence, that the universe is made up of a patchwork of 
laws? Perhaps it is true that we have good evidence for each of the laws that we 
take to hold true but that is quite different from having evidence of the general 
thesis that the world is made up of a patchwork of laws. In acknowledging that 
both physicalism (1993) and wholism (1991) are possible ways to construe the 
world, Cartwright has only provided one other possibility, one other metaphysics. 
What direct evidence is there that this metaphysical position is true? No more than 
for the other two positions she rejects.
It is difficult to understand why anyone as empirically minded as 
Cartwright should be bothered by the metaphysics of the situation at all. I f  she 
does not see “why we need to explain [scientific] success” (p.31), then what role 
has metaphysics to play? The patchwork view of the world just seems to be 
another explanation of that success, except it is one which in addition explains 
why we should never expect to obtain a theoretically neat conception of the world. 
If one insists that one should not commit oneself to anything other than that which 
can be supported by the best scientific evidence, then one should simply abstain 
from any kind of global theorising about the nature of the world.
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Cartwright it seems to me has a telling (and in this work familiar) 
argument against physicalism -  it is not backed up by the practice o f science. But 
she has little to offer in these papers to answer Melnyk’s challenge. The 
arguments from causation and evidence fail to show how metaphysical pluralism 
is any more reasonable than physicalism. In fact, if Cartwright were to apply her 
evidential standards consistently, then her own favoured metaphysical position 
should be ruled out.
5.2.6 Capacities, laws and abstract concepts
I think there are passages in Cartwright’s writing that might allow us to 
circumvent some of the problems I have raised. In particular, a charming article 
(1999, ch.2) o f Cartwright’s suggests a way of thinking of capacity or law claims 
that moves away (or at least can be interpreted as moving away) from the kind of 
metaphysical commitment implicit in the other articles I have discussed.
Cartwright argues that there is an analogy between the relation of high level 
laws, like F=ma, to concrete reality and the relation o f morals to fables. 
Specifically, she thinks that laws involve abstract properties which can only begin 
to be judged true or false in the concrete context of application. Her ideas draw on 
the work of Gotthold Lessing’s account of the relation between simple morals and 
the fables that are often invented to illustrate their force. According to Lessing’s 
account, or at least Cartwright’s interpretation of it, “the relationship between the 
moral and the fable is that of the general to the more specific.”
The account of abstraction that I borrow from Lessing to describe how 
contemporary physics theories work provides us with two necessary
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conditions. First, a concept that is abstract relative to other more 
concrete set of descriptions never applies unless one of the more 
concrete descriptions also applies. These are the descriptions that are 
used to ‘fit out’ the abstract description on any given occasion. Second 
satisfying the associated concrete description that applies on a 
particular occasion is what satisfying the abstract description consists 
in on that occasion, (p.38)
Now, this can sound like an edifyingly romantic reformulation o f Cartwright’s 
theory of nomological machines -  laws hold only where we can carefully control 
the circumstances and weed out possible interference. But one can interpret this 
paper slightly differently, I think. The alternative interpretation, which I hope to 
develop and enrich in my discussion of Putnam and Davidson, would be to 
suggest that once we think of laws as abstract, it does not even make sense to 
think of them holding everywhere. That is to say, without detailed knowledge of 
the how to ‘fit out’ the law, we cannot even begin to say what it means for the 
world to be governed by a set (or the set) of fundamental capacities that we take 
these laws to describe. Wholism and fundamentalism then are not viable 
metaphysical alternatives but make senseless claims based on a misunderstanding 
of high-level laws. This shifts the argument against physicalism away from 
evidence and towards claims about the best way to understand our physical 
theories. In other words, away from offering up an explicitly alternative
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metaphysics, towards an evaluation of the sorts o f philosophical claims that are 
available.20
I do not know if this is the gloss that Cartwright intended to put on her 
views but it seems to me to be an interesting and significant way to avoid 
physicalism. By considering some explicitly pragmatist theses, Cartwright’s 
specific claim about high-level laws can be put in a context in which a viable 
version of pluralism can be defended. However, since the arguments are quite 
involved and Cartwright’s writings offer only a hint as to how to develop such an 
alternative, this discussion will have to be postponed until later chapters.
5.2.7 Making entities
Another possible interpretation of Cartwright’s pluralism is suggested in the 
closing paragraphs of her essay on the patchwork view of laws. Here she makes 
some interesting remarks regarding theoretical entities. These comments have a 
bearing on Dupre’s is/does distinction and should allow us to segue neatly into a 
discussion of Nelson Goodman.
Ian Hacking is famous for arguing that ontological commitment to 
theoretical entities should be based on our ability to manipulate such entities to 
create new experimental phenomena. The argument is neatly summarised in the 
phrase: “if you can spray them, they exist” . Cartwright wants to change this to 
“when you spray them, they exist” . (1999, p. 34) The idea here being I think that 
we can only have sound knowledge of various phenomena in limited 
circumstances. Or to put in the language of capacities: we have knowledge of the 
capacities thought typical o f various entities in limited circumstances, so we can
20 Note the same ambiguities in interpretation arise here as elsewhere in Cartwright’s work 
because she is far from clear about what the relations between theoretical laws, regularities and
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only be committed to the existence of such entities in equally limited 
circumstances. Now this reiterates the argument for a patchwork of laws at the 
level of entities. Clearly and unambiguously, it also represents a denial o f the kind 
of is/does distinction that I have attributed to Dupre. The upshot is a position 
which suggests that what there is, the world, is partly a product of our 
experimental enterprises. Cartwright (ibid.) acknowledges that her position is very 
close to that of certain social constructionists here, who consider all knowledge 
claims to reflect our ways o f constructing rather than the world itself. Here, her 
overall position sounds less like a traditionally realist metaphysics and more like a 
rejection of metaphysics outright. In other words, more like the sort o f position to 
which, I think, her arguments lead. Again Cartwright offers here only a hint at this 
anti-metaphysical alternative. One could develop this idea further by considering 
the social constructionists Cartwright mentions. Instead I wish to turn to the 
writings of an analytic philosopher, Nelson Goodman. Goodman develops in a 
rigorous way the idea that the world is constructed by us and that this inevitably 
leads to pluralism.
natures or capacities are.
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Chapter 6 
From Pragmatism to Pluralism
The next two sections deal with two neo-pragmatists: Nelson Goodman and 
Hilary Putnam. Both philosophers could rightly be called anti-physicalist but this 
would hardly do justice to their views. Goodman defends a position which he calls 
‘irrealism’; a philosophy which opposes just about all o f the conventional 
ontologies in the canon. Putnam’s own position is ever changing and elusive both 
in name and content but one fixed point in his philosophy has been an attack on 
what he calls metaphysical realism. A position which he believes in its modern 
form is intimately connected to physicalism but also includes various forms of 
idealism and dualism. Because the targets of these two philosophers are much 
bigger than my own, it may appear that I wandering from the path o f constructing 
a pluralist position. But this is not so. In what follows I shall be concentrating on 
the special sorts of argument that Goodman and Putnam offer for horizontal 
pluralism. Both philosophers, but particularly Putnam, provide insights into the 
sort of position that one might credibly construct that would deserve the name 
pluralism; and it is on these insights I intend to build in the final chapters.
6.1.1 Making sense of Goodman’s worlds
Goodman’s writings are layered with metaphor, quips, puns, deliberate paradox 
and other devices, as he says, to keep the reader awake. In this he surely succeeds. 
But for those of us who pursue philosophy in a more prosaic fashion he leaves 
many questions and few answers. In what follows, I shall attempt to reconstruct 
sympathetically, carefully and, of course pedantically, exactly what Goodman’s 
views are.
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6.1.2 Conflicting truths
Consider the following two sentences:
(A l) The Earth is at rest.
(A2) The Earth is moving.1
(A l) and (A2) are contradictory, on that we can all agree. Goodman claims that 
both sentences are also true. But two contradictory sentences cannot be true 
together. Their joint assertion being a contradiction, anything would follow and 
that would obviously be a disaster. How is it then that two true but contradictory 
sentences can be asserted? The answer is simple, says Goodman, both statements 
are true but of different worlds; no contradiction arises because we no longer 
consider both assertions to be referring to the same world. This is a bold sounding 
way out of Goodman’s little puzzle but what on Earth can it mean -  surely there is 
only one world, a unique wraverse. Nothing could be more obvious than that. It is 
in determining what Goodman does in fact mean by a world, and how there can be 
more than one, which will mark out the path to our understanding of his pluralism.
6.1.3 How on earth can you make worlds?
Let us begin with the obvious. We make what Goodman calls versions. Versions 
are symbol systems2 of some kind which are intended to communicate certain 
thoughts, beliefs, emotions and other such characteristics. Clearly if anything 
makes a symbol system then we do. So far, so obvious. And it o f course then 
follows that if any versions that are made are true versions, then we make true
1 See McCormick (ed.) (1996) pp. 80-82 for Goodman’s discussion of this example.
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versions. Goodman, though, then goes onto claim that true versions make worlds. 
What can this mean? What a lot of commentators seem to think Goodman means 
is that we make versions true. There is a sense in which I think this interpretation 
is correct -  but more needs to be said. Essentially, Goodman offers three 
arguments (or better three stages of argument) to establish that we make worlds. 
One argument proceeds directly from considerations of what we do and do not 
make; the second from criticisms of the certain views about truth and the third 
from further considerations of two apparently true but jointly contradictory 
statements.
The best place to begin our unravelling of Goodman’s first argument is an 
exchange between Goodman and Israel Scheffler. Scheffler, a perceptive and 
persistent critic of Goodman’s views, challenges Goodman to illuminate what he 
means by saying that we made the world by asking did we make the stars. 
(McCormick (1996), pp. 13 8-9) Goodman, boldly replies that we did indeed make 
the stars and invites the reader to consider the following dialogue to illustrate his 
point.
The Great Dipper [sic] was made by an adopted world version.
No, it was made by nature.
Did nature make it the Great Dipper?
Well no; it was made the Great Dipper by being picked out and so 
called by a version.
What is it that was made by Nature and was there to be picked out and 
named?
2 Strictly speaking symbol systems are only one sub-class of versions; some versions like works of 
art are non-symbolic.
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A particular constellation.
Was it made a particular constellation by Nature?
Well, no; it was made a constellation by a version that distinguished 
certain configurations of stars from other under the general term 
‘constellations’.
But did Nature make the stars?
Certainly
Did it make them stars?
Again no; they were made stars by a version that distinguished certain 
conglomerations of particles, or objects in the sky, from others under 
the general term ‘star’.
Did nature make the -
This could go on and on; but your arguments seem at most to show 
that without versions stars do not exist qua stars, not that do not exist 
at all.
But do stars-not-^wa-stars, stars-not-^wa-moving and not-gwa-fixed, 
move or not? Without a version, they are neither moving nor fixed.
And whatever neither moves nor is fixed, is neither qua so-and-so nor 
qua not so-and-so, comes to nothing. (McCormick (1996), pp. 166-67)
The gradual transition in this dialogue from a concession about making a 
constellation (namely the Big Dipper) to making constellations to making stars is 
worth pursuing in greater detail. In what sense would we all agree that we make 
the Big Dipper? Certainly we all agree that we made the name “the Big Dipper” 
up and then applied that name by some linguistic function (pick your favourite
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theory of reference) or other to those stars. So we made the Big Dipper, “the Big 
Dipper” by so calling it exactly that. But then, the question arises for Goodman, 
what part of the Big Dipper did we not make? And the answer is obviously we did 
not make the particular stars that constitute the particular constellation which we 
call by the name “the Big Dipper”. And of course, Goodman’s riposte is that in 
exactly the same way that we made the Big Dipper the Big Dipper, we made 
constellations, constellations and stars, stars. But this is too quick. The Big Dipper 
is after all a proper name, not a concept and we make things have proper names 
by so calling them that proper name.3 However, we do not make things fall under 
concept terms by so introducing concept terms. It is true that words like star, 
constellation, etc. have parameters determined by some linguistic convention or 
other. It is indeed also true that we in a certain sense make the concepts star and 
constellation (or perhaps we can put this more clearly by saying we invent the 
words “star” and “constellation” for the concepts they pick out). But it is equally 
obvious that we do not make any thing fall under those concept terms simply in 
virtue of introducing those terms into our language. It is (in some sense yet to be 
properly articulated) up to the world whether anything falls under these concept 
terms. Goodman’s argument as it stands seems to conflate our use o f proper 
names and concepts to make his point.4
The foregoing analysis I believe is at least on some superficial level 
correct. It explains why Goodman’s claims sound so counterintuitive. But if the 
argument were so obviously defective then one might be left wondering how an
3 Of course, if your favourite theory of proper names is that they are in fact complicated quantifier 
expression, then not even Goodman’s claim that we make the Big Dipper, the Big Dipper can be 
supported.
4 Putnam gives precisely this analysis of Goodman’s argument in “Irreahsm and Deconstruction” 
in both Putnam (1992) and McCormick (1996). A similar point is made by Michael Devitt (1997, 
p. 245).
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astute philosopher like Goodman could ever have proposed such nonsense. The 
right answer to that question concerns (as always) truth -  or at least, two 
conflicting notions of truth. Goodman’s argument implicitly assumes that there is 
something wrong with a certain conception of truth (and equally on one level the 
response that Goodman’s argument is nonsense presupposes this very 
conception); and that as one tries to illuminate that conception one will come 
unstuck. It is our unguarded use of phrases like “the world makes certain 
statements true” (or “the world decides whether certain concept terms are non- 
null”) that Goodman is concerned to show are problematic. His real worry is that 
our simple argument against making worlds relies on an undiagnosed use of a 
correspondence theory of truth. That is to say, if we press the case against the 
correspondence theorist and ask him to explicate how it is this world apart from 
any version makes statements true, he will be at a loss as to explain how and 
indeed what this world is. So, as I interpret Goodman, if the way out of his first 
argument is to be viable, then we need an analysis or some explanation of this 
version-independent world and in what sense it is already there. Goodman is 
explicit that this cannot be done and to prove his case makes some familiar 
observations about how much conceptual machinery we need to pick out what we 
might think “is already there” .
I sit in a cluttered waiting room, unaware of my stereo system. 
Gradually I make out two speakers built into the bookcase, a receiver 
and turntable in a corner. I find a system that was already there. But 
see what this finding involves: distinguishing the several components 
from the surrounding, categorizing by function and uniting them into a
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single whole. A good deal of making, with complex conceptual 
equipment, has gone into finding what was already there. (McCormick 
(1996), p .155)
This can be read as making essentially the same point as the star-making 
argument; one that moves from saying we make concepts, or concept terms, to 
saying that we make worlds. It can though be interpreted as suggesting that the 
idea of finding what is already there, what a correspondence might mean by the 
world independent of all versions, is a non-starter for any kind of explanation of 
how we use and deploy concepts. Saying anything about this world-as-it-is-in- 
itself will necessarily invoke a version. To say anything at all one must use words 
and one cannot use words meaningfully without using a particular version. Now 
together with the first argument we can see how this observation makes the case 
for star-making. We suppose when we say that it is the world that makes certain 
objects fall under concepts, that this is unproblematic. But Goodman’s second 
argument shows us that when we try to say how the world is, we will have to fall 
back on some version or other. So we will not have any sense o f the world as-it- 
is-in-itself but rather some version of the world; that is some description o f the 
world. So our claim that the world makes it the case that certain objects fall under 
certain concept terms true turns out to be empty, since all we can mean by world 
here is just some version or other. Given the impossibility o f illuminating the 
concept of the world-independent-of-versions, Goodman suggests that the only 
way to define truth is in terms of some more general notion of rightness; and that 
notion will have to use version-dependent factors to provide a complete
explication. Hence, epistemic considerations like coherence, warrant, etc. must be 
used in the definition of truth. (See McCormick (1996), p. 157-8)
One might summarise this particular line of thought by saying that either 
what is meant by the-world-in-itself is just some version or other, or else it is 
something about which nothing can be said. That is to say, the explanation of truth 
as correspondence to the world-in-itself either collapses back into a version or is 
explanatorily redundant. Such anti-correspondence arguments are common 
enough. However, as Donald Davidson (1990, pp.302-3 03) has recently pointed 
out, Goodman’s argument and others like it are fatally flawed and question- 
begging. Why should any correspondence theorist or any other believer in the 
world-independent-of-descriptions have to be able to give an account of the world 
independent of a version? After all, his entire position rests on the idea that there 
is an extra linguistic reality which is quite independent o f any versions or beliefs. 
To tell him that he is unable to provide any positive account of how this world 
connects with our beliefs and versions is not to present him with a devastating 
objection but simply to outline one of the basic claims of the correspondence 
theorist. Namely, that the way the world is, is independent of our beliefs.
Nevertheless, one may still be disturbed by Goodman’s point. If the choice 
is between Goodmanian irrealism in which the world is made and the 
correspondence theory in which the world seems as though it may forever be 
beyond us, then some might feel it is better to have a world that has some definite 
connections to our beliefs or versions, however sullied by human making. 
Moreover, despite the popularity of talk of correspondence, no one has been able 
to come up with a remotely plausible theory that can cash out the metaphor. In 
particular, there seems little prospect of making sense of the idea of a fact as
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something which sentences correspond to: problems with negative facts and 
Davidsonian slingshot arguments5 have demonstrated as much.
Fortunately, though, we are not forced to make a choice between irrealism 
and the correspondence theory of truth. A perfectly ordinary sense of the world or 
the objective can still be recovered that does not invoke any mysterious notion of 
correspondence. The alternative is very simple and merely requires one to pay 
attention to our use of language. The way we talk, our linguistic competence, 
presupposes that there is something to be talked about other than the version. 
Speakers are aware there is a difference between simply the word “armchairs” and 
armchairs; between, as philosophers say in the jargon, mention and use 6 And any 
and everyone who can use a language competently is aware of this difference. 
(Just as any and everyone who has actually been punched in the face is aware of 
the difference between being punched in the face and just talking about (or 
representing) being punched in the face.) One is quite entitled, therefore, to say 
that some version of the world is about the world and if one is asked to describe 
the world one may do so unproblematically using some version or other. Such 
using does not require any theory of correspondence to make sense of what is 
gong on, only an ability to speak the language. The point is prosaic but worth 
repeating: being able to keep track of conversation requires us to know the 
difference between use and mention, between words and the world; and being 
able to note that distinction does not involve implicit commitment to a 
correspondence theory of truth or anything else which might be considered
n
philosophically suspect.
5 See Davidson (1984), “True to the Facts”.
6 This criticism can be found in Devitt (1997), ch. 13, Putnam (1992), p. 122.
7 What looks like a deeper discussion of these issues can be found in an exchange between John 
McDowell (2000) and Richard Rorty (2000). McDowell insists that the idea of objectivity,
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6.1.4 Conflicting versions again
Thus far we have seen that the first two stages in Goodman’s arguments that we 
make worlds and worlds are just true versions are, by themselves, wanting. But 
without the third part of Goodman’s argument -  the idea that there can be jointly 
inconsistent but true sentences -  the case for worldmaking is not yet complete. 
This is the critical stage in Goodman’s argument. If there can be two true but 
mutually inconsistent statements, then the idea that there is a world which both 
these statements are about seems to be hopeless. Once one makes Goodman’s 
move from one world to many, the conclusion that there is none at all follows 
quickly.
“[WJorld” is all inclusive, covers all there is. A world is a totality; 
there can be no multiplicity of totalities...By assigning conflicting 
versions to different worlds, we preclude composition of these 
totalities into one. Whatever we may mean by saying that the motion 
of the Earth, or of different earths, differs in different worlds, we rule
intimately related to the idea of the world, should not be given up. He claims that our very 
understanding of truth as involved in disquotation involves the norm of being “answerable to the 
world”. And that what McDowell calls claim-making requires that, as he puts it, “we direct our 
meaning” (p. 119) at the world. Again, this is in essence the same point as made above. It is part of 
putting a sentence forward as true, making a claim, that you use it to say something about the 
world. It must be thought of as more than a conversational manoeuvre in a game with you peers. 
Rorty responds by denying that any significance can be given to the idea of “answering to the 
world” as opposed to trying to achieve solidarity with ones peers. This is clearly the analogue of 
Goodman’s implicit challenge to say what this world is without invoking versions. So the 
argument here moves in the same small circles. The important point to repeat, which I think 
Goodman and Rorty ignore, is that one is not forced to choose between solidarity and objectivity 
or true versions and the world. Rather the pursuit of solidarity, the serious pursuit of solidarity in 
which we want to get things right, not just stop arguing so we can go to bed early, also involves 
the idea that we are answerable to the world.
Rorty in his response to Bjom Ramberg (2000) seems to accept something like this when 
he explains Davidsonian triangulation as follows: “It [is] a mistake to locate the norms [of 
enquiry] at one comer of the triangle -  where my peers are -  rather than seeing them hovering
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out any more comprehensive whole comprised of these. For a totality 
cannot be partial; a world cannot be a piece of something bigger... So 
if there is any world, there are many, and if many, none. (McCormick 
(1996), p. 153))
Indeed, we can see that the blurring of the distinction between worlds and 
true versions, which I have been resisting, is a particular instance of the general 
phenomenon. Sometimes we talk of worlds and their true versions and sometimes 
just the versions without the world; contradictory, but according to Goodman, 
equally right ways to look at the world. So, if Goodman can make good his claim 
that there are jointly true but contradictory statements, then we would seem to 
have an argument for worldmaking. And as a corollary, an argument that would 
undermine physicalism: for if there are many or no worlds, then no sense can be 
given to the privileged role physics is supposed to play in ontology.
However, the example Goodman offers here does not look promising. The 
first response will be that in absolute terms neither of these statements, (A l) or 
(A2) is true, each one is true given some relativisation. So we might say the Earth 
is stationary relative to a geocentric perspective and the Earth moves relative to a 
heliocentric perspective. Goodman, of course, is fully aware of the intuitive 
appeal of this move (see McCormick (1996), p. 154-5). In fact, he wants to tempt 
his opponent into saying something very much like this. If one does make this 
kind of perspectival move, Goodman can point out that the talk has shifted from 
objects (in this case the Earth) to versions; and we can see even more clearly now
over the whole process of triangulation. ... It is not that my peers have more to do with my 
obligation to say that snow is white than snow does, or than I do.” (p.376)
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that these are statements referring to different worlds (that is by Goodman’s lights 
different true versions).
Goodman, of course, is right that relativisation manoeuvres such as these 
involve a change of subject from things to versions of things. But this would only 
be troubling if there is supposed to be some problem in talking about two versions 
of the same thing. If, in other words, we could not make sense of the initial 
problem Goodman confronts us with. The physicalist will no doubt feel he has a 
good answer here which will avoid irrealism. Just as physicalism provides a 
background against which we can understand promiscuous realism, it can provide 
the background against which to make sense of horizontal pluralism. So the 
physicalist might, for example, invoke a general relativistic space-time 
understanding of the relation between the Earth and the Sun or they might say that 
really the Earth goes round the Sun but from the perspective of the Earth, it can 
appear as though the sun moves. Given such an objective framework on which to 
cast these two different perspectives, we have no difficulty accommodating the 
idea that there are two different perspectives on the one world. Just as when the 
fact that I  see a clock tower as taller than a building and you from a different 
perspective see the building as taller than the clock tower, this creates no deep 
philosophical problem. These two perspectives can unproblematically be 
reconciled against the common background of the actual heights of the building 
and how one perceives objects from differing perspectives.
Physicalists therefore have a straightforward line of argument to rebut 
Goodman. First, reject his attack on the version-independence of truth as simply 
question-begging. Second, insist that the idea of something extra-linguistic, the 
world, is presupposed in our very use o f language. Last, the physicalist is free to
194
respond to Goodman’s challenge o f two true but contradictory sentences by either 
denying the truth of one or other of the sentences or by providing some 
background against which both sentences can be seen in a sense to be non- 
conflicting perspectives on reality.
The first two of these points, I suggest, should be accepted by everyone -  
there is something fundamentally wrong with Goodman’s idea of worldmaking. 
However, the third part of Goodman’s argument, is a different matter. For those o f 
us pursuing a pluralist alternative, it should stand out as the most interesting. As 
Goodman himself points out, it is what distinguishes his view from various 
species o f idealism. The claim that the world admits o f a plurality o f descriptions, 
horizontal pluralism, is quite separate from Goodman’s claims about 
worldmaking. Can one make sense of this position and avoid irrealism? Or is the 
choice between denying horizontal pluralism (and thus accepting perhaps 
physicalism) or embracing irrealism? I have argued at length that physicalism is 
not credible. So if one rejects physicalism as providing the background against 
which to make all true statements consistent, then how should one respond to 
Goodman’s third point? Am I stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea, 
irrealism and physicalism (or some equally implausible patchwork view)? I do not 
think so. When given an example of two apparently conflicting versions, I think I 
can also say, without relying on some global metaphysical background picture 
that certain sentences represent perspectives on the same thing; and translate what 
that means by giving a more general perspective that removes the apparent 
contradiction. At least, that is how I would respond to Goodman’s challenge 
regarding how to reconcile sentences (A l) and (A2). However, I do not think that 
this need always be the case. There are plausible examples of horizontal
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pluralism, I maintain. One will be discussed in the following section, where, 
through the work of Hilary Putnam, I shall try to cultivate an alternative to 
physicalist and irrealist responses.
6.2.1 Putnam’s pragmatic realism
Hilary Putnam has defended a variety of views, with a variety of names (internal 
realism, pragmatic realism, and sometimes just plain realism), with an equal 
variety of arguments over the last twenty years. The most famous and most 
discussed of these is undoubtedly Putnam’s (1983) model-theoretic argument. The 
deluge of criticism that has surrounded this argument (note in particular Lewis 
(1984) and Devitt (1990)) and the continuing evolution o f Putnam’s thought make 
it difficult, perhaps impossible to reconstruct satisfactorily his original intentions, 
let alone what conclusions we should draw from this argument. In any case, the 
model-theoretic argument seems to have drifted out of favour with Putnam 
himself. Although he still discusses it, he does not present it as a simple refutation 
of any view. I doubt any great insight into Putnam’s later philosophy can be 
gained by a simple study of this part of his work. What I wish to concentrate on 
instead is a much simpler line of reasoning, similar in structure to Goodman’s, 
which provides an argument for what Putnam calls conceptual relativism.
6.2.2 Conceptual relativism
Consider a world with three individuals, x l, x2, and x3. How many objects are 
there in this world? Well, that depends on what you mean by object. One answer, 
the obvious answer, is that there are three objects. (After all, the way in which I 
have introduced the example suggests that is the right answer.) However, if we
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were to adopt a notion of object that admitted mereological sums, then we would 
say there were 78 objects: x l, x2, x3, xl+x2, xl+x3, x2+x3, and xl+x2+x3.
The similarities to Goodman’s example should be obvious: we have two 
apparently true but contradictory statements.
(A l) There are three objects
Asserted in the non-mereologists language and
(A2) There are seven objects
Asserted in the mereologists language.
However, the short way out which Goodman’s example is susceptible to, to claim 
that there is one privileged description from which we can see the others as 
perspectives, is not available here. For what would we say are the basic parts of 
the world from which the two perspectives spring? If I say both statements are 
true but one recognises the existence of mereological sums and the other system 
does not, then I am already committing myself to the existence of mereological 
sums, not providing a neutral background against which to judge the two 
statements as perspectival.
Putnam sees his argument as undermining a favourite metaphor o f the 
metaphysical realist: that there is one dough and many cookie-cutters. There is 
one dough, according to this metaphor, because there is one way in which reality,
* Ignoring the null object.
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so to speak, really is. (Alternatively one might say reality has one preferred
description.) There are many cookie cutters because we often view reality from
different perspectives which take different aspects of that one reality as salient. In 
this case, unlike the Goodman example, we don’t have any sense o f what the 
‘dough’ is. Any way of talking about the example either presupposes the 
mereologists or the anti-mereologists way o f looking at things.
How should one react to Putnam’s example and what morals should one 
draw from it? Commentators have reacted in two ways: what I would call the 
linguistic response and the metaphysical response. The linguistic response is to 
treat what Putnam has shown us as an example o f something which is simply 
uninteresting and self-evident: that meaning, truth and other semantic properties 
are language relative. (See in particular Blackburn (1993).) That is to say, the two 
sentences are not really contradictory at all; rather it is just that the words used in 
each sentence have different meanings.
Consider these two sentences of eschatology:
(B l) The world will end tomorrow.
(B2) The world will end next week.
These two sentences appear to contradict each other but if sentence (B2) is in 
some language other than English (call it English*) in which most words mean the 
same but “next week” means tomorrow, then the two sentences can be seen to 
assert the same thing. Putnam’s more recondite example is an example of the 
same thing. So there is no special problem o f conceptual relativity, just a standard,
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boring problem about the correct interpretation of a language. But this would be 
too quick. Putnam claims that the case he outlines above and the case o f the 
uninterpreted language are not analogous. He agrees that the two sentences, (A l) 
and (A2), are not contradictory; on pain o f inconsistency or a Goodman-style 
move into a universe of many worlds, he would have to. Nevertheless, there are 
important differences to note between the example above and the case o f the 
mereological sums. With respect to the two sentences B1 and B2, we have a 
simple translation of one sentence into the other. Sentence B1 means the same as 
sentence B2. But, claims Putnam, we cannot (or at least cannot so 
straightforwardly) claim that there is or could be a meaning preserving translation 
from one version to the other in the case of the language of the mereologist and 
the language of the non-mereologist. To make the point more vivid, Putnam 
enriches the story told so far by imagining that one of the objects in the non- 
mereological world is red and the other two are black. Then the following 
sentences would be true in the mereologist’s language but not in the anti- 
mereologist’s language: “There is an object which is partly red and partly black.” 
Nevertheless, there is a clear sense in which this sentence may be equated with 
one in the anti-mereologist’s language. For example, we might say that if  this 
sentence is true for the mereologist it must be true in non-mereologist language 
that “there exists at least one object which is red and one which is black” . But is 
this a translation, in any straightforward sense? Well, Putnam remarks it does not 
seem to be in accord with standard translation practice. We would not be happy to 
say (or at least it would be controversial) that these sentences in fact had the same 
meaning.9 For example, one has to admit that some of the logical primitives
9 People might be tempted to dig their heels in and say that the two sentences do mean the same. 
But without a fully-fledged theory of meaning it is not clear what they would be saying. On a
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(exists to pick just one) have different extensions in the two languages. There 
seems to be a profound conceptual gulf between the mereologist and the anti- 
mereologist which does not exist in the imagined case of English and English*. 
Still accepting that Putnam’s example is not so trivial as the linguistic 
interpretation suggests, we may still be left pondering exactly its significance to 
ontology.10
Let us turn then to the metaphysical interpretation. I associate this view of 
Putnam with Ernest Sosa and him alone. Unlike the advocates of the linguistic 
version, Sosa offers a sympathetic and detailed account of Putnam’s argument. He 
tries several formulations before arriving at version he thinks is o f interest and 
significance. He first rejects the linguistic interpretation; and then suggests a 
metalinguistic version of the same thesis. That is some sentence in the non- 
mereological language: “There are 3 objects, not 7” translates into the 
metalanguage as “In the non-mereological language ‘There are 3 objects, not 7’ is 
assertible as true”. But any such suggestion as Sosa (and indeed Putnam (1987)) 
note does not look promising. If it is being claimed that ascent to the 
metalinguistic level will avoid worries about conceptual relativisation then we 
need to know what’s so special about the meta-level. This looks suspiciously like 
the cookie-cutter metaphor in linguistic clothing. If not, then to follow this 
suggestion through consistently would require an infinite sequence of such 
metalinguistic moves to avoid the conceptual relativity that threatens at each
Davidsonian meaning theory approach, for example, they could not mean the same since the 
meaning of some of the logical primitives would be different (however this does not mean the 
sentences would be uninterpretable for Davidson). Putnam clearly sees his original paper as a 
refutation of Davidson but as we shall see later this involves a misinterpretation.
10 Another boring way to read the Putnam argument is that it shows us there is no absolute sense of 
number, only a number of certain things. (This is a very old philosophical point: one Berkeley 
makes against Locke’s suggestion that Number is a primary quality.) Those tempted to read the 
argument this way should concentrate not on sentences involving numbers of objects but rather 
questions like: “Do mereological sums really exist?”
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stage. Clearly then the meta-level has nothing to offer in helping us understand 
Putnam’s views.
Sosa eventually settles on the idea that the only way to understand the 
significance of Putnam’s ideas is by removing them from the linguistic context in 
which they are offered and transforming them into a more obviously metaphysical 
claim (or rather a claim which has more obvious implications for metaphysics). 
He does so by shifting the discussion away from the esoterica of mereological 
sums and focusing our minds on balls o f snow.
6.2.3 Sosa’s Putnam
Sosa begins with the observation that most things, natural or artificial, are made 
up of stuff and parts variously arranged. The way the parts are arranged is 
essential to the status of the object; change the arrangement o f the parts and the 
object may cease to exist. Sosa uses the example of a snowball:
Thus, the existence of a snowball at a time t and a location 1 requires 
that there be a round quantity of snow at 1 and t sufficiently separate 
from other snow, etc.; and for that snowball to endure through an 
interval I, it is required that for every division of I into a sequence of 
subintervals II, 12,..., there must be a corresponding sequence of 
quantities of snow Q l, Q2,..., related in certain restricted ways. By all 
this I mean to point to our “criteria of existence and perdurance of 
snowballs”. (Sosa (1993), p.619)
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This way of describing snowballs may strike some as a little pedantic but what 
Sosa wishes to highlight is that all objects have as it were criteria, however vague, 
that they must fulfil if  they are to be considered to continue to exist. Having made 
this point about snowballs, Sosa introduces a new entity (or a new word for an 
entity, lest I be considered to beg the question against certain realists): a 
snowdiscball. It too obviously has criteria for existence and perdurance. A 
snowdiscball is an object constituted of snow which may vary from being round 
to being disc shaped (and everything in between). Hence any snowball will also 
be a snowdiscball. We are forced to consider the entities -  snowball and 
snowdiscball -  distinct, since if one flattened the snowball in question one would 
destroy it qua snowball but not qua snowdiscball. But then, so the argument goes, 
since there are an infinite number of different forms between roundness and 
flatness that snow might take, there must also be an infinity o f different entities11 
which have criteria of existence and perdurance which correspond to these small 
changes in shape. So wherever there is a snowball, there is an infinity of other 
entities all located at the same point in space and time -  Sosa calls this the 
explosion of reality.
Perhaps understandably Sosa thinks that such a result is undesirable. One 
way to avoid this ontological extravagance is by adopting Putnam’s thesis of 
conceptual relativity -  or at least what Sosa thinks is Putnam’s thesis of 
conceptual relativity. On Sosa’s understanding o f the doctrine what does and does 
not exist is not an absolute, objective matter of fact; rather it depends on what 
conceptual scheme you adopt. In one scheme you may have snowballs but no 
snowdiscballs (presumably this would be our scheme), in another exactly the
11 Sosa does not consider the idea that vagueness of the parameters of existence and perdurance 
might save one from admitting an infinite number of entities. Perhaps he believes such vagueness
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opposite is true. This is not the only way to avoid the “explosion o f reality” 
according to Sosa. We could deny that any of the objects built up from the parts of 
matter have a real existence. That is to say, within perhaps certain natural limits, 
we could claim only the constituents are real, and regard talk o f the entity which is 
so constituted as merely a convenient abbreviation, a way of talking about lots of 
the real constituents together. So Sosa sees the Putnam style argument as 
presenting all philosophers with a trilemma. Either one accepts the explosion of 
reality (Sosa also refers to this as absolutism) or conceptual relativism or some 
form of eliminativist doctrine. Moreover, Sosa suggests that conceptual relativism 
may be the least of three evils. Absolutism commits one to a vast ontology 
without any explanation of why we choose to ignore much of “reality” in our day 
to day discourse (or to put it another way it fails to explain what is so special 
about the elements of reality we do fix on). Eliminativism on the other hand 
seems too high a price to pay. It would make much of our talk about the 
commonplace literally false.
Wherever most philosophical preferences lie with regard to Sosa’s 
trilemma, I do not believe he presents a position Putnam would be happy with. 
Sosa’s reconstruction of Putnam’s argument assumes that one can 
unproblematically identify the stuff that constitutes the world and then having 
done so interesting questions can be asked about the status of entities constituted 
by that matter. In fact, Sosa’s conceptual relativism is a precise account o f the 
“one dough and many cookie cutters metaphor” that Putnam takes himself to be 
criticising. The matter of the world is the dough and the criteria of existence and 
perdurance are the cookie-cutters. But the whole point o f the recondite example
might threaten his idea of a distinction between schemes.
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with the mereologists language and the anti-mereologists language is that there is 
no privileged set of objects and that includes the parts of everyday objects. If 
Putnam’s argument works at all, then it shows the illegitimacy o f all three of 
Sosa’s options.
6.2.4 Putnam’s Putnam
The real concern of Putnam’s argument is, I suggest, to offer a third way between 
Carnapian conventionalism and Quinean naturalism. Putnam in several papers 
offers different ways to understand the relation between the following two 
sentences:
(1) There exists one object which is red and one which is black. (As stated in the 
non-mereologists language.)
(2) There is an object which is partly red and partly black. (As stated in the 
mereological language)
You might say either (and here I quote Putnam (1987)) that:
(a) The two sentences are mathematically equivalent.
(b)The two sentences are logically equivalent.
(c)The two sentences are neither logically nor mathematically 
equivalent.
(d)The first sentence is false and the second is true.
(e)The two sentences are alike in truth-value and meaning.
(f) The two sentences are alike in truth-value but unlike in meaning.
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(g)The second sentence can be used as an abbreviation of the first, but 
this is really just a useful make-believe.
Putnam claims that his own view is that “there is no fact of the matter as to which 
of these positions is correct.” But what does such a position amount to? What 
Putnam wishes to contend is that certain decisions to describe the world in 
particular ways are conventional. However, he wants to give this way of thinking 
of the conventionality of certain theses (for example what you take the 
relationship between sentence A1 and A2 to be) a gloss which allows one to avoid 
the idea that there should be a sharp analytic/synthetic division.
As I have said, the two opposing views which Putnam asks us to steer 
between are Carnap’s and Quine’s. The exchange between these two great 
philosophical heavyweights is part of the folklore o f modern analytic philosophy. 
Philosophers have spent and still spend much energy trying to disentangle 
precisely the issues at stake between the authors.12 For the purposes of 
understanding Putnam the following summary o f the basic plot line will do. 
Carnap distinguished between what he called internal and external questions. The 
distinction is drawn relative to a linguistic framework. For Carnap a framework 
was a set of logical and analytic principles which defined the terms therein. 
Within the framework certain empirical questions might be meaningfully raised 
and evaluated as either true or false; these are the internal questions. However, 
questions about the framework itself cannot be meaningfully raised and judged 
true or false. The way you choose to express your theories, what language or logic 
you use, is a matter of convention, i.e. an external question. For Carnap, whether
12 See A. George (2000) for one of the most recent reinterpretations.
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or not there are mereological sums is such an external question. If you choose the 
)
mereologists language the answer is yes, if you choose the non-mereologists 
language the answer is no. But whichever language you choose is purely 
conventional. The question of whether mereological sums really exist cannot 
arise.
Quine famously criticised Carnap’s view for resting on an unworkable 
analytic/synthetic distinction. There is no way, Quine claimed, to parcel up the 
meaning of individual sentences into those that depend only upon the language 
and those which depend on the language plus empirical content. All our beliefs 
are intimately interlinked and no clear and unequivocal sense can be given to the 
idea that there are some beliefs which are true and unrevisable in virtue o f their 
meanings (that is the choice of language) alone. So to use just one of Quine’s 
famous metaphors, all our beliefs together face the “tribunal o f experience” and 
any one of them may be revised to accommodate unexpected data.
Putnam’s position, as described here, sounds much more like Carnap’s -  
some truths are conventional, just a matter of which language you adopt. In what 
sense, then, does he steer a middle course between Quine and Carnap? So far he 
just seems to be following in Carnap’s wake.
Like almost all late twentieth century philosophers of significance, Putnam
1 'Ihas been deeply influence by Quine. His earlier work indicates that he accepts 
Quine’s argument that there is no workable analytic/synthetic distinction or 
philosophically interesting notion of synonymy. The problem for Putnam then is 
how to make sense of this idea that some truths are conventional without invoking 
a Carnap like notion of the analytic/synthetic distinction. This is, I think, a matter
13 See, Putnam’s Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, in particular “The Analytic Synthetic Distinction”.
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of work in progress but some idea of his evolving position can be found in a 
recent paper, “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity”(1994). Here Putnam develops 
a line of reasoning which embraces interpretations o f Kant, Frege and 
Wittgentstein, as well as Quine and Carnap. Putnam sees himself, as he puts it, 
“detranscendentalizing” an intuition shared by Kant, Frege and the early 
Wittgenstein that illogical thought is not strictly speaking thought at all. That is to 
say, Putnam’s aim in this paper is to recover a sense in which we may deny that 
the negations of logical or mathematical statements cannot be comprehended by 
us and to do so in a way free of what he considers the excess metaphysical 
baggage of the analytic/synthetic distinction.
6.2.5 Sense and conceptual schemes
The argument Putnam offers is deceptively simple.14 First, to convince o f us of 
the difference between mathematical and physical statements, he simply 
highlights some commonplace facts. One can imagine circumstances where one 
might give up the view that charge was quantised or that one might can come to 
believe that the moon is made of Roquefort cheese (though the story told here 
would have to be pretty far fetched) but under what circumstances might I give up 
the idea that 2+2 = 4? There is none that we conceive of according to Putnam. A 
statement like “2+2 = 4 can be revised” is a statement, he claims, we can give no 
‘sense’ to. We have to be careful with this term ‘sense’. It is clear that by ‘sense’ 
Putnam does not mean meaning, at least as understood in conventional 
semantics.15 As James Conant has put it in a useful introduction to Putnam’s most
141 am going to ignore Putnam’s pre-Carnap historical remarks; these are subtle and, in the case of 
his interpretation of Frege, at least, controversial.
15 This is just as well since claiming that sentences like the one above are meaningless would run 
into well-known objections regarding compositionality.
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recent collection of essays: “[Putnam] wishes to drive a wedge between a sentence 
‘having a meaning in a language’ and our being able to make sense o f the 
sentence as the assertion of a claim” Since we are unable to provide conditions 
under which we might recognise the revisability or otherwise o f the above 
sentence, we do not understand what claim we are being asked to entertain.16 
Using this notion that some expressions are fo r us senseless, Putnam is able to 
reject Quine’s naturalism (which places all sentences in the total theory on a par) 
and simultaneously avoid invoking the analytic/synthetic distinction. For unlike 
Carnap’s position, the invocation of a conceptual scheme does not require a 
metaphysics of meaning that makes statements like “2+2 = 4” unrevisable, in 
principle. Rather, Putnam is drawing our attention to the fact that even if a 
sentence is grammatically well-formed and only involves words we can 
unproblematically attribute meaning to, we may be unable to understand that a 
claim is being made by those words.17 Quine’s statement about the possible 
revisability o f mathematics is an example o f this.
As I have suggested, it is important in establishing some distance between 
himself and Carnap that Putnam maintains what seems unrevisable for us now, 
may later seem to become revisable; and this may be done without a revision in 
the meanings of our basic terms. In other words, our language or our conceptual 
scheme will develop in such a way as to give a sentence which previously seemed 
senseless, a sense.18 Putnam provides a playful example from Wittgenstein’s 
writings to illustrate the idea that what might seem impossible can come to be so.
16 Putnam has some other discussions of what is meant by the term ‘sense’. See Putnam (1999), 
pp. 62-3, Putnam (1992), p. 375.
17 Note that on Putnam’s conception of what it is for a sentence to have a sense, the statement 
“‘2+2 = 4” is unrevisable’ must be equally senseless.
On Carnap’s most sophisticated account of his view something like this can happen but since it 
must involve adoption of a new framework, it must involve changes in meaning.
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A court lady once fell into disfavour with the king (one can easily 
imagine how). The King intending to give her a command impossible 
of fulfilment, told to her to come to the Royal Ball “neither naked nor 
dressed”. (1994, p.254)
Now, this does indeed sound impossible but the lady “finds a solution” by coming 
in a fishnet. Once we know the solution we can see the request is not impossible 
at all.
Concerning such riddles, Wittgenstein says that we are able to give 
them a sense only after we know the solution; the solution bestows a 
sense on the riddle-question. This seems right, (ibid.)19
The solution makes us appreciate that something that appeared impossible 
(necessarily not the case) actually is possible. And it has done so in a way which 
brings to light certain elements of our conceptual scheme which we did not 
previously focus upon. That is to say, once we have the solution in view, we can 
see how the words ‘dressed’ and ‘naked’ can be used as they are without paradox 
and without changing the meaning of either word. As Putnam emphasises, the 
particular terms used in the example are very important. If we changed the term 
‘dressed’ for some phrase we might normally consider synonymous (for example 
‘not naked’) the solution to the riddle would not work. For Putnam recognising
19 This is my interpretation of Putnam’s interpretation of Cora Diamond’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein. Fourth-hand analysis like this would be of some concern if my aim were an accurate 
reading of Wittgenstein. However, it is not; my objective is a plausible account of pluralism. 
Putnam’s Wittgenstein is important in that account, whether or not it is the real Wittgenstein.
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such facts is part and parcel of understanding this as a solution to the riddle. 
Roughly speaking, Putnam considers this riddle example to provide the model of 
mathematical discovery (making us aware of new possibilities) and mathematical 
necessity (marking the boundaries of what is and is not possible).
An obvious objection to Putnam’s appropriation of the riddle example as a 
model o f mathematical necessity and the unrevisability of the laws of logic, at 
present and by our current lights, is that it sounds too much like psychologism. It 
appears as though Putnam is advancing the very radical, and almost certainly false 
thesis, that what is and what is not necessary is a matter of what we can imagine 
to be the case. He thinks he can escape the charge of psychologism by again 
invoking the idea of a conceptual scheme. Putnam sees the limitations we suffer in 
not being able to answer the riddle or prove a mathematical theorem as involving 
more than lack of imagination. New insights require new concepts. Without such 
additional concepts we cannot, within our conceptual schemes, even begin to 
consider whether certain statements are revisable or not. For example, within the 
structure o f concepts possessed by speakers in the eighteenth century Euclidean 
geometry was unrevisable. That is to say, without the alternative geometries of 
Lobachevski and Reimann there was no sense to the idea that Euclidean geometry 
might be wrong. Simply because given any o f the conceptual schemes of the time 
it would not be possible to discern circumstances under which Euclidean 
geometry might be falsified (and thus by the same token confirmed).
A useful way to view this matter20 is to imagine oneself in the eighteenth 
century and in the position that our theory of the moment is falsified. We have to 
make a decision as to what part of that theory to change. Perhaps we set up a
20 This is another example Putnam uses in the paper and refers back to an earlier paper he wrote “It 
ain’t necessarily so”.
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committee of philosophers to investigate what to do next. These philosophers are 
anachronistically well-versed in Quinean epistemology and know that they may, 
logically, change any part of their total-theory. We set up sub-groups o f the 
committee each given the task of revising a different belief (or set of beliefs) 
which will resolve the anomaly. The first group are allocated the task of changing 
beliefs at the periphery21; the second some more theoretical belief and so on and 
so on proceeding closer and closer to the centre of our belief system. Given 
enough time and reasonable consultation with others we would expect each sub­
committee near the periphery to be able to formulate some hypothesis which 
accounts for the data: whether it involves denying the stimulus sentence or 
changing beliefs about the operation of measuring equipment or tweaking the 
parameters of the laws of physics, etc. But when we come to the sub-committee 
asked to save the phenomena by changing the geometry what could they have 
done? Could they have even understood the request? They might start changing 
some of the meanings of the terms in their geometry so that perhaps the word 
“point” refers to lines and vice versa. But although this would be a change, it 
could not be change that would help save the phenomena; the only way they could 
really change the geometry is by “discovering” non-Euclidean geometry. In other 
(or better Putnam’s) words, by changing (and in this case enriching) their 
conceptual scheme.
The argument in summary is something like this. What is and what is not 
necessary is a matter of what could and could not be falsified given some 
particular conceptual scheme. However, conceptual schemes are fluid, dynamic 
and open to continuous enrichment. One such enrichment is mathematical
21 Here I am employing Quine’s well-known spatial metaphor for our web of belief. Beliefs closest 
to the periphery are most closely connected to sensory experience; beliefs near the centre (logical
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discovery and that proceeds something like the riddle example: by constructing 
various answers (theorems) we “confer sense” on certain possibilities. Necessity 
is tied to the idea of possible revisability, which is tied to some particular 
conceptual scheme. Mathematical discovery involves extending and enriching 
one’s conceptual scheme by making sense o f possibilities not previously 
recognised.
Although mathematics is the main focus of the article, the implications (as 
some of the examples discussed suggest) are much broader. The two key concepts 
here, the concepts that help make up the middle ground between Quine and 
Carnap, are those of the sense of sentence and the idea of a conceptual scheme. 
Putnam is attempting to draw significance out o f notions that on a Camapian 
model collapse back into meaning and framework and on Quinean model 
language and theory. Now, I imagine a devotee o f Quinean doctrine might turn 
her nose up at the two ideas on which Putnam’s argument is based. She might 
insist that given one cannot make sense of these ideas in terms of a theory of 
meaning, the only notion of possibility that is tenable is a psychological one; and 
that is not one which is of any philosophical significance. Putnam responds thus:
But to convince me that it is possible to imagine the falsity of [a 
logical truth] you would have to put an alternative logic in the field; 
and that seems a fact of methodological significance, if there is such a 
thing as methodological significance at all. (1994, p.250)
and mathematical beliefs) are most remote.
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The concepts of ‘sense’ and ‘conceptual scheme’ provide us with a way of 
discussing acknowledged phenomena. Talk of conceptual schemes highlights the 
way in which it is not merely lack of imagination that can make us fail to see a 
proof or how to revise some part of the corpus of our knowledge. There are, as 
Putnam puts it, methodologically significant leaps which must be made in our 
conceptual repertoire before we can even begin to entertain certain options. The 
notion o f sense provides some insight into how this process may occur without 
necessarily involving changes in the meaning of the terms used. The Quinean who 
wants to relegate this all to psychology becomes blind to the significance o f these 
extensions to our conceptual repertoire.
6.2.6 Other worries
So much for balancing the insights of Quine and Carnap. There may be more 
fundamental worries that those not immersed in the Quine-Carnap discussion 
might have regarding Putnam’s argument. The argument, as presented, invites two 
extensions: what I call the strong reading and the weak reading. On the strong 
reading our conceptual schemes make a sentence necessary or not. Parallels with 
Goodman (and to some extent Carnap) here should be obvious. On the weak 
reading our conceptual schemes make it impossible to judge that any given 
statement really is necessary. Nevertheless, there is a fact of the matter about 
whether a statement is only necessary relative to our conceptual scheme (Putnam 
calls this quasi-necessary) or whether it really is necessary (that is necessary for 
all conceptual schemes).
Both are wrong I think. The strong reading is closer to the position that 
Putnam wishes to maintain but it goes further than is necessary. We do not make
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statements necessary by our conceptual schemes. Rather, the notion of the scheme 
draws attention to the fact learned from the history of science that certain 
possibilities cannot be genuinely understood without conceptual enrichment and 
the fact apparent now that no-one has been able to do this for claims about 
mathematics or logic. In so doing, Putnam does not see himself as presenting a 
metaphysical alternative to the pictures of Quine and Carnap, but providing a 
description “of our lives with our language” (1994, p.259).
Putnam is explicit that the weak reading is not intended.
“Whether a given statem ent... “could be revised” depends on whether 
an alternative theory could be constructed and confirmed and all o f the 
crucial terms “theory”, “confirmation” and “acceptable translation 
manual” have too much indeterminacy to make application o f the 
principle of bivalence convincing. The illusion that there is in all cases 
a fact of the matter as to whether a statement is ‘necessary or only 
quasi-necessary’ is the illusion that there is a God’s-eye view from 
which all epistemic situations can be surveyed and judged; and that 
indeed is an illusion.” (p. 258)
One might think that this talk of the spurious nature of the God’s-eye view 
introduces something new into the argument; something that Putnam’s model- 
theoretic argument might be required to justify. However, I do not think this is so. 
First of all, the denial of the God’s-eye perspective should be common ground 
amongst naturalistically inclined philosophers; and it is those philosophers 
remember who I believe put forward the only viable case for physicalism. Second,
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if we rid ourselves of an ontology of meanings, as we do if we reject the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, and of facts, as I suggested we should in the last 
chapter, there is no way to even to begin to make sense of the God’s-eye view. 
For without conceiving of the world as already waiting for description in some 
favoured language, all we can possibly have to go on in these matters is the way 
we do, as a matter of fact, talk about things in the world. If the reader remains 
unconvinced, the next chapter will contain further arguments to support the 
general point.
6.2.7 Horizontal pluralism
How does this talk of mathematical discovery help our understanding o f the 
example we began this section with? The Putnam’s land between the trenches of 
Carnap and Quine invokes the ideas of sense and conceptual scheme to allow us 
to see that often developments in conceptual resources are required before certain 
possibilities can even be entertained. If we consider some of the other cases 
Putnam cites in support of conceptual relativism -  whether there are particles or 
fields, whether there are really points or merely limits -  some people will have 
differing intuitions about which of these is an empirical question or not. What I 
suggest Putnam is insisting, is that we should take our decision to adopt one way 
of speaking or another as simply conventional until we can make some sense of 
what it would be for any of these questions to be empirical. Until, in other words, 
we can conceive of some sort of situation which would render the decision to 
speak one way or the other an empirically significant question. Without such a 
possibility that we can make sense of, we should embrace the thought, which we 
do in practice anyway, that these two ways ‘conceptual schemes’ are perfectly
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acceptable but different ways of speaking about the same thing. And we simply 
resist the idea that this in any way commits us to an underlying ontology from 
which we can see these two views as perspectives. In fact, we have no option but 
to resist this move since we have no neutral way to conceive of the situation.
Moreover, it should be emphasised there is no impediment in Putnam’s 
example to learning to speak in the other scheme. (How could there be? To 
understand the example we must understand both schemes.) A speaker of the non- 
mereological language can learn how to identify what an object is in the 
mereologists language. For example, one could point out that the number of 
objects for the mereologist is equal to the number of nonempty sets of 
individuals. The idea of sense, as opposed to meaning, plays a role here too. If 
we learn to speak as the mereologist does, then we learn a new sense, not a new 
meaning of the term object. Putnam’s analysis of conventionality allows us to 
embrace horizontal pluralism without committing us to either some underlying 
true ontology from which such examples are merely perspectives or Goodmanian 
irrealism.
In the next section I shall examine two famous papers by Donald 
Davidson, “Mental Events” and “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. 
Through this discussion, I hope to show how Putnam’s considerations in favour of 
some sort of pragmatic horizontal pluralism can be turned into an argument for 
pragmatic vertical pluralism.
22 See Putnam (1994), pp.308-9 for some further discussion.
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Chapter 7 
Anomalous Pluralism
The following discussion o f Davidson is the beginning of my attempt to draw 
together the elements of a version of pragmatic pluralism. My strategy will be to 
indicate some tensions between my reading o f two of Davidson’s most famous 
papers, “Mental Events” and “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. 
Interpretational fidelity is, I blush to confess it, not my main concern here. My 
interest in Davidson’s Anomalous Monism is to outline a position that escapes the 
concerns raised about non-reductive physicalism in chapter 2. Such a reading is 
possible but it comes into conflict with Davidson’s rejection of the scheme- 
content distinction. Drawing on the work of Putnam, I shall argue that this tension 
can be resolved by adopting a form of pluralism. In fact, I (perhaps immodestly) 
hope to show that pluralism becomes inevitable.
7.1 Anomalous monism
The position Davidson calls anomalous monism in his paper “Mental Events” 
arises from three premises: (1) That the mental is causally related to the physical;
(2) that singular causal relations are backed by strict laws; (3) there are no strict 
psycho-physical laws. (Davidson 1993) The first premise is the least 
controversial: any non-eliminativist, non-epiphenomenal account o f the mental 
will say as much. Premise two has been discussed and criticised at length in my 
treatment of the completeness of physics and the views of Nancy Cartwright. I 
shall not elaborate on that here. Reductively minded philosophers will no doubt be 
dismayed by premise three, whereas for me this is just a particular instance o f the 
fact that there are no strict laws at all. At least initially, I am not concerned with
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the truth o f any particular premise. It is becoming clearer about Davidson’s 
ontology that interests me first.
How can one make these three premises consistent? Standard accounts of 
the supervenience relations fall into familiar troubles. To summarise some o f the 
points made in chapter 2: if mental properties only weakly or globally supervene 
on physical properties, then it becomes difficult to see how mental properties can 
make any difference to the world. So premise (1) is violated. If we adopt strong 
supervenience that implies counterfactually supporting relations between the 
mental and the physical; in other words, psycho-physical laws, hence premise (3) 
seems to be violated.
A quick and airy dismissal of the notion o f the supervenience as means of 
explicating Davidson’s views might seem strange. After all, it was Davidson who 
was responsible for introducing this term into discussions o f the mind-body 
problem. Nevertheless, I claim, the concept as generally discussed now has little 
to do with Davidson’s original intentions. The most important difference to note 
between Davidson and the majority of contemporary advocates of non-reductive 
physicalism is that he defines supervenience as a relation between predicates.
A predicate p is supervenient on a set o f predicates S if and only if  p 
does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S. 
(Davidson 1993, p.4)
This shift from talk of properties to talk of predicates changes the way in which 
we view the causal relation. An assumption made by Kim and many others is that 
one event causes another in virtue of the properties it instantiates. (Again see
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chapter 2.) This is categorically rejected by Davidson. The causal relation is, he 
claims, extensional: if X causes Y, it does so independently of how it is described. 
No doubt, everyone will accept this up to a point. There is nothing special about 
any description if all we want to do is pick out the events. Nevertheless, so the 
thought might go, if we want to understand why one event causes another, then we 
need to know the properties in virtue of which that relation is causal; and these are 
the properties which figure in laws. Davidson rejects this metaphysical picture 
because he repudiates the idea that there are intensional entities (properties) which 
are picked out by certain predicates of a natural language. One event cannot cause 
another in virtue of instantiating some property because the idea of the world-by- 
itself (that is without description) having some metaphysically basic or preferred 
set of properties is itself suspect.1 Many are troubled by this observation. If it is 
not the properties of objects that ground the causal relation, then what makes a 
cause, a cause, they ask? (See for example Crane (1995).) Moreover, the very fact 
that physical descriptions are special in the sense that it is only in the physical 
language, according to Davidson, that we can formulate strict laws, might lead us 
to think that they must pick out some privileged set of properties. After all, it is 
this special fact about the physical language which makes Anomalous Monism a 
version of physicalism, right? Whatever the intuitive appeal o f this picture is, it is 
not the way Davidson sees things. There is no special set of properties which glue 
together events that cause and are caused by other events; if something causes 
something else then there is no deep, underlying metaphysical reason which 
explains why this is so.
1 Davidson suggests that any attempt to explicate the causal relation in terms of properties will 
violate his insistence that the relation is extensional. I think McLaughlin (1993) has shown that 
this is not necessarily so.
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Once it is clear that Davidson rejects the idea that there is a metaphysical 
basis to causation, his position becomes clearer. Briefly, it goes something like 
this: there are these things in the world called events; events can be described 
using a physical-language or a mental-language; some events are causally related 
to one another; the events that are causally related to one another are tokens of 
types of event classified by the physical-language which can be formulated as 
strict (i.e. exceptionless) laws. The relation between the physical-language and the 
mental-language is anomalous because there is no systematic way o f translating 
from one to the other. There is no threat of epiphenomenalism because the only 
thing doing the causing is the events -  whichever way you describe them.2
I believe this position is internally consistent. Nevertheless, I think it 
conflicts with another famous doctrine of Davidson’s -  his rejection o f conceptual 
schemes.
7.2 Conceptual scheming
“On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (hereafter OVICS) rejects what 
Davidson calls the third dogma of empiricism, the scheme-content dichotomy. 
Davidson aims his attack at least two types of philosopher. First, there are thinkers 
like Kuhn and Feyerabend who have claimed different world-views are 
‘incommensurable’. A typical example given by these writers is to contrast the 
Ancient Greek astronomerVview of the world with the way a modern astronomer 
sees it. The Greek thinks of the Sun as a planet but the Earth not; the modern that 
the Earth is a planet and the Sun a star. There is according to Kuhn no means of 
drawing a comparison between these two conceptual schemes: the change of
2 One might call this event neutralism', Davidson occasionally explicitly distances himself from 
physicalism, suggesting instead that his views are more similar to those of Spinoza and Russell.
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meaning in the terms ‘star’, ‘planet’, etc. makes this impossible. Hence, the 
schemes are incommensurable. The other target of Davidson is Quine. In 
“Ontological Relativity” Quine famously argued that there were many different 
and incompatible conceptual schemes, each of which could organise our 
experience, make predictions, etc. in an equally satisfactory way. Since 
experience is the only external constraint on theory building, there is no fact o f the 
matter, according to Quine, which of these schemes is correct.
Davidson’s argument against schemers can be summarised as follows. 
Conceptual schemes are to be identified with a language (or sets of 
intertranslatable languages). The criterion for difference between conceptual 
schemes is failure of translation between the languages. This criterion cannot be 
met because:
[N]othing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of 
activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the 
same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech 
behaviour. (Davidson 1984, p. 185.)
Stated baldly like this, Davidson may seem to be conflating the epistemic question 
of whether we could tell such a language was spoken with the metaphysical 
question o f whether, in fact, there was such a language. In the following, I shall 
try to indicate why this should be viewed as the conclusion to Davidson’s 
argument, not a self-evident premise. First, we need to appreciate the kind of 
picture that an advocate of conceptual relativism is offering -  Davidson suggests
(See, for example, Davidson (1994).)
221
two. A conceptual scheme is a way of systematising or organising the world:; the 
targets here are Kuhn and Feyerabend. Alternatively, a conceptual scheme is a 
way of organising the stream of experience (and so different conceptual schemes 
are different ways o f so organising). Clearly Davidson has Quine in mind here.
Let us consider the first possibility that what is to be organised by a 
conceptual scheme is the world. Davidson puts it like this:
It is essential to this idea that there be something neutral and common 
that lies outside all schemes. This common something cannot, of 
course, be the subject matter of contrasting languages, or translation 
would be possible...the neutral content waiting to be organised is 
supplied by nature. (1984, p. 190)
If what the neutral content amounts to is the world, then the metaphor of 
conceptual schemes organizing or fitting is empty. The world being as it is one 
thing does not lend itself to organisation. If we turn from the world itself to its 
contents, we shall not do any better. Disagreements and differences regarding 
organisation of objects must take place against a common, agreed background. 
(As I emphasised in my discussion of Dupre.) There is therefore no sense that can 
be given to the noumenal world waiting to be conceptualised. The only world it 
makes sense to talk about organising is the familiar world, full of familiar objects 
that we encounter everyday.3
3 Note this is not to deny that there is a world independent of our descriptions as Goodman 
sometimes wishes to do, but merely to reject the idea of the world-in-itself can illuminate the 
scheme-content distinction. Davidson’s final sentence in OVICS makes this clear. “In giving up 
the distinction between scheme and world, we do not give up the world but re-establish 
unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our theories true or false” (1984, 
p. 192)
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The other possibility, that what is organised by conceptual schemes are my 
unsullied experiences, faces similar difficulties:
The notion of organizing applies only to pluralities. But whatever 
plurality we take experience to consist in -  events like losing a button 
or stubbing a toe, having a sensation of warmth or hearing an oboe -  
we will have to individuate according to familiar principles. A 
language that organizes such entities must be very like our own.
(1984, p. 192)
And so translatable into our own scheme. Even if we shift the metaphor of 
organizing to that of fitting or coping with sensory experience, then Davidson 
argues the idea of a conceptual scheme fairs no better4 If we think of our scheme 
as coping with the world, then we must be thinking of such schemes in terms of 
sentences or beliefs expressible in sentences, since only such sentences can be 
used to make predictions or confront evidence. As Davidson says: “To speak of 
sensory experience rather than the evidence, or just the facts, expresses a view 
about the source or the nature of the evidence, but it does not add a new entity to 
the universe against which to test conceptual schemes.”(p. 193)
If the idea o f alternative schemes is to have bite here, Davidson claims, 
evidence must mean more than what we count as such, here and now. Obviously 
one can have false theories of the world that fit some of the evidence we have 
actually obtained. But that only shows we can have false theories that fit some of 
the facts, not that we can have alternative conceptual schemes in any interesting
4 The object of Davidson’s attack here is clearly Quine.
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sense. The schemer must have in mind something more powerful than that: he 
must believe that a scheme is relative to all the evidence there ever could be. No 
extra evidence one way or the other could possibly arbitrate between such 
schemes. But what can it mean to say that a theory fits or copes with all the 
available evidence? “ [F]or a theory to fit or face up to the totality of possible 
sensory evidence is for that theory to be true.” (p. 193). So the idea of differing 
conceptual schemes comes down to the thought that there may be two true (or 
mostly true, since Davidson will allow some disagreement about the details) but 
non-translatable languages.
In the original paper, Davidson provides a highly compressed and curious 
sounding argument to get from the premise that a conceptual scheme is mostly 
true to the conclusion that it is translatable. Tarski’s Convention T, he claims, 
makes the idea of truth inseparable from that of translation into a familiar idiom. 
Briefly, the thought is that Tarski has identified an essential feature o f truth; 
namely that a theory of truth should entail sentences of the form: “snow is white” 
is true if and only if snow is white. When both the quoted sentence on the left of 
the biconditional and the used sentence on the right are in the same language, the 
truth of such sentences is obvious. However, if  the quoted sentence is in some 
other language, then that must be a translation of the used English sentence. So 
our understanding of truth in a foreign tongue is dependent on our understanding 
of translation.
Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the concept 
of truth is used, there does not seem to be much hope for a test that a 
conceptual scheme is radically different from ours if that test depends
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on the assumption that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of 
translation. (1984, p. 192-3)
But this does not seem quite right. As Davidson (1990) notes elsewhere: “Tarski’s 
definitions give us no idea how to apply the concept [true] to a new case, whether 
the new case is a new language or a newly added word to a language.”(1990, 
p.287). The idea of a rival conceptual scheme might reasonably be considered 
such a new case. So whatever insight Convention T provides concerning the 
nature of truth, it is not one that we can with a clear conscience apply here.
We might put this point another way. Davidson’s theory of meaning 
depends on the idea that we take truth as basic. It is only by doing so that we can 
use Convention T as the basis o f a theory of meaning. Convention T is used by 
Davidson to explicate meaning, not truth. It cannot, as he as often emphasised, do 
both. Given then that Convention T can not, by Davidson’s own admission, 
exhaust the concept of truth, there is no argument yet against saying a scheme is a 
mostly true but different world-view since our grasp of true (by Davidson’s own 
lights) as used in that sentence must be independent of Convention T.
The principle of charity demands that we try to make Davidson’s views 
appear more plausible. I suggest that the argument offered in this paragraph is 
elliptical; Davidson is drawing on more than merely Convention T. In the 
background is his entire theory of meaning. One can perhaps illustrate the point 
best by turning our attention to what Davidson calls triangulation.
Interpretation and therefore meaning are only possible for Davidson when 
two or more people interact in a shared environment (hence the triangle). 
Simplifying slightly, it is through this three-way causal interaction (and the checks
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and balances that each corner of the triangle provides) that propositional thought 
and, with it, the idea of objectivity arise. Speaker and interpreter through their 
interaction home in on common distal causes o f sensations in their environment 
and with the emergence of language comes the recognition of the possibility of 
error in one’s beliefs regarding those objects. There is no subjective given coming 
from experience playing a special role in this story. Talk of sensory evidence is 
just a kind of talk about beliefs, since evidence implies justification and only 
another belief can justify a belief. That is why to say that one has a world-view 
which fits the evidence can be to say no more than that a great many o f one’s 
beliefs are true. The process of triangulation which speakers of a language 
inevitable find themselves in ensures the evidence, or better the perceptual beliefs, 
will concern {be about) entities in the shared environment of speaker and 
interpreter. Such commonality of subject matter implies translatability.5
To repeat: the two key points are firstly that only another belief could justify 
a belief 6; a conceptual given cannot plays this role since at best it could cause 
beliefs, not justify them. All talk of fitting the evidence, thus, collapses to the idea 
of being mostly true. Secondly, interpretation and communication more generally
n
presuppose a shared environment ; and mostly true beliefs of a shared 
environment must be translatable using Convention T into our idiom. So 
Davidson concludes:
5 Of course this kind of picture lays a great deal of weight on a shared environment. As I will 
contend below, at least locally, if not generally, this cannot be guaranteed. This explains certain 
conceptual asymmetries.
6 There is an extremely sophisticated debate involving John McDowell, Hilary Putnam and Robert 
Brandom (to name only the heavyweights) concerning whether perceptions can be thought to 
justify beliefs rather than just cause them. Or to put it another way whether one can revitalise 
epistemology with a direct theory of perception. Interesting and important as this is, I am going to 
put it to one side. My main interest in Davidson’s scheme-content distinction is the scheme-world 
distinction. That is to say, I’m concerned with how we conceive the world, not how we perceive it.
226
In abandoning this search [for a theory neutral background], we 
abandon the attempt to make sense of the metaphor of a single space 
within which each scheme has a position and provides a point of view.
(1984, p .195)
The metaphysical lessons to be drawn are clear. There is no sense to the idea of 
something waiting to be organised by concepts, whether it be the world, the facts8 
or experience. Either these ideas are just empty or come to no more than the 
thought that most of our beliefs are true. Against such a background of largely 
true beliefs, local disagreements can, of course, be understood but there is nothing 
like the exciting relativity dreamt of by Kuhn and Feyerabend.
7.3 Events as bare particulars
The conflict between Anomalous Monism and Davidson’s rejection o f the 
scheme-world distinction is, I hope, clear. If we think o f our mental vocabulary as 
one conceptual scheme and the physical as another, organising the world-of- 
events, then Davidson himself seems to have a counterexample to OVICS.
One obvious line o f response is that both the mental and physical 
vocabulary belong to the same language. Davidson (1984, Reply to Solomon) 
himself has said something similar when this objection has been raised. A 
language, he claims, that contained only physical predicates would not be an
7 The idea of a common environment that I have made explicit is implicit in Davidson’s talk of all 
the possible evidence. I think the argument is more convincing spelt out like this because it avoids 
difficult questions concerning exactly what talk of all the possible evidence might mean.
8 Although Davidson does not say so explicitly in this article the same argument applies to the idea 
that facts are to be organised by experience. Facts are either true sentences or if conceived as
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adequate language. One can see why this is so in light of Davidson’s theory of 
meaning. The radical interpreter must begin by imputing intentional attitudes to 
the speaker of the foreign tongue and correlating them to his own using 
Convention T and the principle of charity. Thus to be a radical interpreter one 
must have some concept of propositional attitudes. To cut off mental predicates 
would be to lose one corner of the triangle of speaker, interpreter and the world 
that Davidson’s claims is essential to interpretation.
All this may be granted. It may well be the case that we could not have a 
language at all without both a physical and a mental vocabulary. It may well be 
that this fact supports the intuition that these vocabularies are part of the same 
language. Nevertheless, we appear to have all the elements Davidson requires to 
conclude that we have different conceptual schemes: two non-translatable areas of 
discourse and a neutral something (namely events) waiting to be organised. The 
real problem is that Anomalous Monism, as I have described it, makes events 
seem like “something neutral and common that lies outside all schemes”. And, if 
that is so, his own explanation o f the mind-body relation does in some way invoke 
the scheme-world distinction Davidson is seeking to remove from philosophy.
This worry would be removed given some clear criteria of event 
individuation; one that allowed us to see how it could be the case that a token 
mental event is identical to a token physical event. Davidson’s initial account 
(1980, “On the Individuation of Events”, pp. 163-180) suggested events should be 
individuated on the basis of their causes and effects. Since what is and what is not 
a cause or an effect is a token of a physical type, this might suggest Anomalous 
Monism is a more robustly physicalist position than my presentation allows. One
entities corresponding to sentences are ruled out by Davidson’s slingshot argument. See Stephen 
Neale (1999) for a useful discussion.
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might be led to think that the physical vocabulary is doing the work of picking out 
events. If this is right, then it would be difficult, I think, to resist the conclusion 
that the physical vocabulary is picking out something special that the mental 
vocabulary fails to pick out; and familiar charges of epiphenomenalism or down­
grading the mental won’t be far behind. I don’t think this is inevitable. I still 
believe my interpretation can be maintained; Davidson would merely have to 
deny that causes qua causes are either physical or mental. Anyway, the matter is 
largely academic since the proposed individuation is obviously faulty.
As Quine (1986) pointed out the criterion is circular “not as a definition 
but as an individuation”9 since causes and effects are themselves events. That is to 
say, in order to individuate the event we must first individuate the causes and 
effects of the event. But since the causes and effects are events too, they too must 
be individuated in terms of their causes and effects (which will include our 
original event). Davidson has accepted this point. What Davidson considers a 
suitable replacement, is far from clear. Quine has suggested identifying events 
with space-time slices. But Davidson seems wary o f this proposal, fearing that 
criterion by itself would lead to the identification o f objects with events. In any 
case, such a suggestion has equally serious drawbacks. If all there is to an event is 
a slice of space-time that will make many events that we intuitively regard as 
different, identical. (See the discussion of the Macdonalds in chapter 2 for a more 
detailed discussion of this claim.) Moreover, the criterion seems at once too 
lenient and too stringent. If we concern ourselves with only classical physics, then 
no interesting ontological conclusions could follow from such a view. Providing 
one is not a dualist, it will just be trivially true that mental events are identical
9 A much more detailed account of the problems of token identity is given in Hornsby (1981).
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with some physical event (or set of physical events); a host of clearly non- 
physicalist views, in particular various forms of emergentism would come out as 
versions of anomalous monism if Davidson followed Quine. That is to say, if you 
suppose that non-physical mental events can occupy space and they may occupy 
the same space as their physical bases, as some emergentists clearly did, then you 
are by Quine’s criterion committed to event identity. But intuitively that is wrong. 
The relation between mental events and physical events the emergentist is trying 
to articulate is different from that of physicalists or monists like Davidson. On the 
other hand, once we move to the realm of quantum physics, then the criterion 
breaks down since quantum states can be superpositions of space and time. 
Quantum states and events, what one might regard as the best candidates for 
fundamental physical events, thus do not fit this picture. So, rather embarrassingly 
for Quine, it seems his criterion o f identity cannot be adequate, even at the level 
of physics.10
An alternative picture is suggested in a recent article by J. Van Brakel 
(1999). He interprets Davidson’s argument for Anomalous Monism as giving 
priority to our ordinary talk or what he calls, following Wilfred Sellars, the 
manifest image. Van Brakel’s view is controversial but there are passages in 
Davidson’s work, particularly those that seek to establish some distance from 
Quine11, that make this a more plausible suggestion than one might think at first 
blush. Whatever the interpretational rights and wrongs, it is clearly not a 
suggestion that can help with the individuation problem. There is just no criterion 
of individuation in ordinary discourse, other than the loose way in which we do as 
a matter of fact demarcate events. That is to say, we know what event stubbing
10 These issues are discussed in greater depth in chapters 2 and 4.
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our toe or hearing an oboe is; at least we English speakers do. But that provides 
no general criterion for event individuation from which we can make sense o f the 
idea that some token physical events are identical with some token mental events. 
Once the idea that there is a neutral stuff onto which the labels of the physical and 
mental can be applied is undermined, once in other words we drop the scheme- 
world-of-events distinction, anomalous monism crumbles.
There are obviously two ways to go here. Either one may start to call into 
question the arguments of OVICS or the premises which make up the argument 
for Anomalous Monism. Against the background of this work, it is not difficult to 
guess where my preferences lie.
OVICS complements much of the material discussed in the last chapter. 
Davidson’s arguments against conceptual schemes should be read as further 
criticism of the one dough and many cookie cutters metaphor that Putnam rejects. 
It provides conclusive arguments to reject the physicalist idea that we have 
mooted in our discussions of Goodman and Dupre: viz. the underlying ontology 
which makes sense of the various ways of describing the world is physicalism. 
Since physicalists cannot tell us what this physical background from which all 
other views are merely perspectives is, this view is as empty as the invocation of 
the world as neutral background on which schemes are cast. When “we abandon 
the attempt to make sense of the metaphor of a single space within which each 
scheme has a position and provides a point of view” (p. 195), we also abandon this 
physicalist and metaphysicalist idea of a privileged, though unarticulated role for 
physics.
11 See his “Reply to Quine”, for example, where Davidson claims his main concern is with 
ordinary language to which science is merely an “exotic suburb”.
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Davidson, then provides the necessary supplement to Putnam’s argument; 
he demonstrates the emptiness of the God’s eye view. That said, there is the 
embarrassingly obvious problem that the two philosophers seem diametrically 
opposed on the question of conceptual schemes. Davidson rejects them, Putnam 
embraces them; and this might make any synthesis of their views appear 
impossible. The apparent dispute, however, is just that, apparent. Davidson and 
Putnam simply understand different things by the term ‘conceptual scheme’.
To return to the dough and cookie-cutters again: it is tempting to read 
Putnam as rejecting the dough while retaining the cookie-cutters and Davidson as 
allowing only one set of cookie-cutters. But that would be to misunderstand both 
philosophers. The differences, such as they are, are matters of emphasis, not 
principle. Davidson is drawing our attention to the shared and common aspects of 
language and belief that we must have in order to understand one another. Putnam 
is highlighting the way language develops and is enriched by increased conceptual 
resources. Davidson is right I think to insist that relativism is the wrong term to 
use for the kind o f phenomenon Putnam highlights. Talk of relativism 
immediately begs the question: relative to what? The answers, as OVICS shows, 
are either platitudinous or pernicious. But what Putnam calls conceptual 
relativism, and I call horizontal pluralism, explicitly denies that we should say that 
differing schemes offer any relativity other than to the scheme (or the language) 
itself. Putnam’s examples highlight the conceptual diversity that exists within 
commonly understood languages such as English. There is no reason why Putnam 
should not admit that despite their conceptual asymmetry, the mereologist and the 
non-mereologist share many beliefs -  and that provides a background against 
which we (who can speak either way) can understand their differences. For
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example, it is because they share beliefs about the particulate objects, the colour 
predicates and numbers that they may recognise that they use the concept ‘object’ 
with a different sense. Similarly there is no reason why Davidson should object to 
the kinds of conceptual differences (or asymmetries) existing in one language that 
Putnam highlights. In fact, his own discussion of the Quinean phenomenon of 
inscrutability o f reference and underdetermination of theory by data suggest he 
should accept exactly the points that Putnam raises. It is true that the kinds of 
examples Davidson offers of these phenomena tend to be trivial -  the choice, for 
example, of whether to formulate one’s physics using Celsius or Fahrenheit. But 
the particular point he recognises here should transfer over to Putnam’s example. 
In fact, Davidson’s theory of meaning demands that he acknowledges this sort of 
horizontal pluralism. Truth-theoretic accounts of meaning, like Davidson’s, do not 
single out a unique set of reference (or satisfaction) axioms for singular terms. 
Nevertheless, some notion of reference is ineliminable from these theories. Hence, 
the theory must be interpreted as talking about some objects or other. In other 
words, once we know what sense we are using the term ‘object’, there can be no 
difficulty in establishing the truth conditions of our utterances. This is, I take it, 
just Putnam’s point.12
All the pieces are in place now to construct a pragmatic pluralism: 
Putnam’s ideas regarding conceptual schemes and sense and the rejection o f the 
privileged perspective from which other views might be seen as relative, what we
12 Stephen Neale (1999) provides a useful discussion of the significance of these points and their 
relation to Davidson’s rejection of conceptual schemes. There are some subtler issues regarding 
the details of Davidson’s theory of meaning that I am ignoring here which might suggest that the 
gap between the two philosophers is greater. In particular, Davidson thinks that the requirement 
that a theory of meaning must be formalisable in terms of a Tarskian theory of truth places, he 
claims, constraints, on the kind of logic that might be used. Such disagreements though are minor. 
They may be glossed as concerns about how holistic a theory of meaning should or can be and 
how central the Tarski-style formal axiomatisation is to a theory of meaning.
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have called, following Putnam, the God’s eye perspective. I shall try to draw all 
this together by again returning to anomalous monism.
7.4 Pluralism without global metaphysics
If  events simpliciter cannot be individuated in any credible way by Davidson’s 
own lights, then we have to take them in the motley way we find them. 
Anomalous monism accepts that there is a difference between parts of a language, 
the mental and the physical parts. In the original paper Davidson takes the 
difference between the mental and physical vocabularies to be mirrored in the 
difference between intensional and extensional idioms. However, as he confesses, 
this is unsatisfactory and liable to make all events come out mental.
Setting up principled divisions between different areas of discourse is, I 
have suggested in chapter three, difficult; at least if one’s aim is to defend 
completeness. Nevertheless, it is a ubiquitous part of our discussion o f language. I 
therefore suggest that we conceive of language generally, and the language o f the 
sciences more specifically, as split up in to many parts: a physical part, a 
chemical-part, a biological-language part, etc., each different but perhaps also 
overlapping.13 Each part o f language will identify a set of events with which it 
will explain or seek to explain the occurrence other events. Each is in a minimal 
sense a different conceptual scheme. By which we simply mean that it is as yet 
not the case that we can translate (that is reduce) one to the other.
I suggest Putnam’s discussion of conceptual schemes and sense provides 
us with the best way to understand the relation between these schemes. The
13 Note I am not suggesting we divide the world along the lines of the school curriculum. When I 
speak of a conceptual scheme associated with physics, chemistry and biology, this is a short-hand 
way of picking out the multifarious sub-disciplines of each subject, not to mention the fact that
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decision to adopt the mereologist or anti-mereologist languages is conventional 
because we can give no sense to the idea that there is any kind of empirical 
question which hangs on the decision; hence horizontal pluralism. Similarly, 
despite much heroic effort, we cannot make any sense of the idea that the different 
ways of talking that we have in the different sciences are really ways of talking 
about the very same thing; hence vertical pluralism. Unless we can enrich our 
conceptual scheme in some way so as to provide a means of allowing us to 
understand the circumstances under which we might count a mental event as a 
physical event, unless in other words we have something very like a reduction, 
then the idea that the mental is just the physical is senseless. But doesn’t this kind 
of talk threaten to cause the world “to disintegrate into a diptych of mental and 
physical” (Davidson (1980), xi) or a polytych (if there is such a word) of a 
thousand sciences? No, I claim. There is no need for any Goodman-style 
pluralism here. The point is not to drive a wedge between different areas of 
discourse so it seems impossible to relate one to the other. They are related. 
Quantum physics plays a role in quantum chemistry; broadly physical events are 
causally implicated in mental phenomena. I do not wish to deny any of this. 
Rather I want to place these undeniable facts in better view. So we can see that 
they do not involve any need to privilege one part of the story over the other and 
that each element is necessary in providing a full account of what is going on.
Anomalous Monism tries to link all these stories by providing one account 
of events and causation. I have some sympathy with this view. Davidson is right 
to emphasise the important role causation plays in all o f these stories. But in each 
case our understanding of event and cause is given a slightly different sense. As
they often overlap and complement one another. The explanation of those complementary 
relations I take to be one of the worthwhile projects of a philosophy of science.
235
Putnam has shown us with the term ‘object’, so with ‘events’; both “hav[e] an 
open and ever extendable family o f uses” (1994, p. 301). There is unfortunately 
no one single, general story to tell about the relation o f different conceptual 
schemes to one another. The causal stories are as complicated and pluralistic as 
any other.
In the concluding section, I shall try to make this brief sketch into a more 
compelling and concrete alternative and deal with some obvious objections.
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Conclusion
The Point of Pluralism
Never mind mind, matter doesn’t matter
Nelson Goodman
8.0 What is the world like?
That’s a big question and one might expect a correspondingly long and 
complicated answer, if any answer can be given at all. And one would be right to 
expect that kind of answer. That’s the only answer we can give with a clear 
conscience. There are electrons, societies, gibbons, books, pork pies, 
mitachondrial DNA and, of course, philosophers. What these various things do is 
not something I expect any single person can or could ever hope to know. The 
best description of how the world is the sum of human knowledge, and the sum of 
human knowledge at any moment in time is just of course our best descriptions of 
the world. Never mind, the tautology, if you want to know what the world is like, 
look to all things we take to be true of the world.
A good place to start, one which has been assumed in this thesis, is with 
the sciences. If we take the different vocabularies of the different sciences at face 
value, then we are just as a matter o f fact pluralists, committed to a vast array of 
things and properties and events.1 Each discipline remains more or less 
autonomous from others: chemistry and biology both involve independently 
motivated theoretical concepts, in the same way that psychology inevitably does. 
To paraphrase Putnam: this is something which I take to be a description o f our 
lives with our science, rather than a piece of metaphysics. Hence, pragmatic 
pluralism. No doubt this strikes some as glib, an abrogation of philosophical
responsibility and a triumph of theft over hard, honest, philosophical toil. I 
disagree. Suggesting that physicalism and the like are senseless is not a 
conclusion that we can reach quickly. It is only something we can be justified in 
saying after detailed study of the particular claims of the physicalist. In other 
words, only after going through the kinds of argument offered up in the first half 
of the thesis. Physicalism is senseless because of its failure to explain the relation 
between the imagined tidy world of physics and the messy world of contemporary 
science. The apparatus employed -  whether it be supervenience relations or 
functionalist stories -  is not up to the job. Most explanations in terms of 
supervenience fail on their own terms. They fail to rule out various non- 
physicalist ontologies. Even proposals that do succeed in fulfilling physicalist 
desiderata in the abstract, like Yablo’s, do not translate into accounts we can 
understand in the concrete contexts which they are supposed to illuminate. 
Similarly, functionalist accounts fail to cope with the complexity and richness of 
intentional phenomena or, in the case of teleosemantics, hold out false hope o f the 
possibility of reduction. Worse still, physicalists cannot provide an account o f the 
physical that does not come into conflict with physics itself or can only offer one 
so open-ended as to be utterly vacuous. A point which undercuts physicalists of 
all persuasions -  reductive, non-reductive and eliminativist. It is for these reasons 
(elaborated at length in the first section) that we must take physicalism to be either 
straightforwardly false or merely offering promissory notes with little suggestion 
as to how they might be cashed in.
Employing Putnam’s notions of sense and conceptual scheme does not 
provide us with another argument against physicalism; rather it is way of
1 This is part of my naturalism. It is similar to the attitude Arthur Fine (1986) advocates as natural 
in his natural ontological attitude.
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rationalising the arguments already provided. It is because physicalist have failed 
to articulate what physics is in their imagined metaphysics and how it relates to 
other disciplines that we must take their claims as senseless (or false, if we are 
supposed to understand by physics the discipline practised by those who call 
themselves physicists). I must confess it would be nice if  the terminological 
innovations of Putnam were an extra argument. It would be great to have a nifty 
philosophical tool like the positivists’verification principle that could rule out a 
whole host of problems without the need for detailed argument. But, alas, I have 
no such labour-saving device. We cannot dismiss physicalism by just declaring 
‘metaphysics’ and moving on. Nor, I should stress, do I mean to cultivate a post­
modern, post-metaphysical, post-argument stance from which the arguments of 
the first section can be viewed as ironic moves in an ultimately hopeless language 
game. I am not offering argumentative short-cuts or a kind of intellectual balm. 
When I say physicalism is senseless, I mean that as a summary o f the arguments 
already provided. It is because o f the failures o f contemporary physicalists to 
articulate an adequate account of their doctrine that we are left with the long- 
winded pragmatic pluralist response as the only possible response (at the moment 
at least) to the question how the world is. Talk o f conceptual schemes provides us 
with a way to refocus attention on the actual theories of our current sciences.2
No doubt this does not alleviate the feeling that this is a glib and unhelpful 
response. The task of the metaphysician is thought (by some at least) to involve an
2 I find some people still do not get what I’m talking about. A way of putting which is entirely 
illegitimate given my other beliefs is as follows: We do not have the concepts to express 
physicalism, only the concepts to express a pluralist position. Given we do not yet have the 
concepts to express physicalism, attempted expressions are either false or, to use Putnam’s term 
again, senseless. This is illegitimate because it implicitly invokes some kind of God’s eye 
perspective. It makes it seem as though there is something to be expressed which might rightly be 
called physicalism but we have not developed the concepts to express it yet. I hope that it is clear 
that on my interpretation of Putnam, this view is equally senseless but I hope that gives some sense 
to the idea that I am trying to get across.
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attempt to go beyond the theories of one’s time, to provide a unified, underlying 
picture. All I am doing, it might be argued, is pointing to the mess o f science and 
the failure of current metaphysical alternatives. It is not even a though I am 
claiming that there is anything intrinsically wrong with metaphysics, only that the 
accounts of physicalism so far offered are a failure. Such anodyne and general 
comments hardly constitute a philosophical alternative. In fact, the following 
response seems apropos: pragmatists are concerned with what difference things 
make to practice but my position (by my own admission) makes no difference to 
the way metaphysics is conducted. Therefore, by my own pragmatist lights 
pragmatic pluralism is self-defeating.
A troubling conclusion, to say the least, if it were true. But it is not. 
Pragmatic pluralism does make a difference. While, it is correct to say that it is 
not an attempt to provide an alternative metaphysics, it should, I claim, make a 
difference to the way we think about metaphysics and the way we think about 
continuing to do metaphysics.
To see why, we first need to consider what metaphysics is an attempt to 
do. In the following I shall concentrate on two themes in metaphysical writing. 
First, what seems to be the most fundamental aspect of metaphysics, is that it tries 
to say truly and perhaps completely what the world is like. In other words, it tries 
to address in the most general terms the question with which I began this work. 
Second, a point often emphasised by philosophers of science is that metaphysics 
plays an important methodological role in the development of science. I discussed 
this aspect o f metaphysics briefly in chapter one. There, you may recall, I was 
interested in metaphysics supposed methodological role in science as an argument 
for the truth of physicalism. Obviously no such argument can be made good; there
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is no necessary connection between the fruitfulness of an idea or picture and its 
truth. Nevertheless, there remains an interesting issue about how to think o f the 
role metaphysics plays in methodology. Pragmatic pluralism, I claim, can suggest 
new ways to address both aims o f metaphysics; and that is enough to render it by 
pragmatic standards a significant doctrine.
8.1 Global versus local metaphysics
Pragmatic pluralism, at first blush, seems to remove metaphysics from the job of 
answering the question how the world is and hands it, wholesale, over to science. 
But this would be to overstate my claims. As I have already said, I have no 
argument against metaphysics in general, just many separate arguments against 
the particular metaphysics on offer. I do, however, think that there are bound to be 
general problems encountered in any attempt to reconcile metaphysics as 
traditionally pursued and the naturalism that many contemporary philosophers 
subscribe to. The fundamental difficulty seems to be that metaphysics sets itself 
up as the ultimate answer to ultimate questions. It represents in that way the end 
of inquiry. Science, on the other hand is a continuing process o f inquiry; it is an 
ongoing search for better and better answers to specific questions. Since 
metaphysics wants to be the last word (even if in highly generic and abstract 
terms) on all matters, it inevitably comes into conflict with the more modest, 
inquiry led attitude of science. I suggest metaphysicians can become better 
naturalists by adopting the more modest attitude of science. They should think of 
metaphysics itself not as the last word on all matters but part of an on-going 
attempt to understand the world better. I admit pragmatic pluralism can look 
unsatisfactory, if we view it like traditional metaphysics as the final solution.
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However, it should not be seen as that kind of imperialistic metaphysics but rather 
as a description of the background against which certain kinds of metaphysical 
project might flourish.
For example, even if we have some clear grasp of conceptual schemes as 
relating to various different parts o f our science (or experience) of the world, we 
need to understand better the relation between the conceptual schemes: how one 
set of breakthroughs in one field can influence another; how to understand what is 
going on when you think you have two conflicting theories. From a properly 
naturalistic perspective, these questions can only be fruitfully addressed using the 
concepts of the theories that we currently possess. Pragmatic pluralism should 
therefore suggest that we approach such metaphysical problems in a piecemeal 
fashion rather than attempt to do it all in one go. Pragmatic pluralism should make 
us sceptical about global metaphysics but it should not stop us doing small-scale 
local metaphysics.
For an example of the sort of local metaphysical problems that can be 
addressed I want to return to my brief discussion of quantum chemistry. In chapter 
one, I showed that although quantum mechanics is employed in investigating the 
properties o f molecules, the way the theory is applied makes ineliminable use of 
knowledge of the structure of the molecule that comes from classical chemistry. A 
reasonable question for a pragmatic pluralist is: How are we to understand the 
relationship between the physics and chemistry used in this particular 
explanation? Well, some of the views of Nancy Cartwright suggest one way to 
understand the relationship between quantum mechanics and classical physics. 
Recall that Cartwright argues that the fundamental laws of physics are abstract; 
they require to be fitted out by a concrete model. Where there is no model, there is
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no way to make sense of the idea of those laws applying. Clearly this tallies well 
with pragmatic pluralism. It does not deny the truth of physical laws, just that we 
can make sense of the claim that they are at work everywhere. It also provides us 
with a way of describing the relationship between the two conceptual schemes in 
this particular example. We may say with Cartwright that quantum mechanics is 
an abstract set of laws that are fitted out, given a concrete realisation, by the 
models of classical chemistry. Cartwright’s analysis allows us to see the two 
domains as complimentary rather than as necessarily in conflict. Hence, we are 
able to avoid the anxieties created by the overdetermination argument. Once we 
understand the role of physics and that of classical chemistry properly, the very 
idea that they offer competing causes seems absurd. A piece of local metaphysics 
like this, grounded in a particular understanding of quantum mechanics and 
classical chemistry, is exactly the kind of metaphysics that pragmatic pluralism 
should recommend. At least, if one’s aim is to say how the world is. Metaphysics 
pursued like this blends imperceptibly into scientific disciplines that deal with 
overlapping conceptual schemes, like quantum chemistry. But that, I take it, is 
what one should expect of any naturalism.
Let me repeat, however, that I do not wish to be censorious. If  other 
philosophers set their horizons higher and wish to attempt more radical, more 
complete metaphysical projects, then I have no argument to stop them. I simply 
wish to suggest that one is more likelyto be successful in enhancing our 
understanding of how we think about the world if we try to do metaphysics on a 
smaller scale. However that may be a matter of taste as much as anything else. 
Whether your preference is for the panoramic or the close-up, acknowledging 
pragmatic pluralism should cultivate a modest attitude to metaphysical projects.
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So although Robert Brandom may have higher ambitions than me, his general 
view of metaphysics is consonant with mine when he says:
[T]he task of this genre of creative, non-fiction writing [i.e. 
metaphysics] is still understood as the engineering of a vocabulary in 
which everything can be said... The modest metaphysician aims only 
to codify the admittedly contingent constellation of vocabularies with 
which her time (and those that led up to it) happens to present her -  to 
capture her time in thought. She sees her task as that of constructing a 
vocabulary that will be useful to employ to get various sorts of 
practical grips on [how] things hang together. (Brandom, 2000, p.
181)
Metaphysics modestly pursued in the way Brandom recommends I have no 
objection to; but it must be rooted in an understanding o f other practices and it 
should be as attuned to differences and disanalogies as it is to connections and 
similarities.
8.2 Metaphysics as metaphor
What then of the methodological role of metaphysics? As I argued in chapter one 
this is sometimes overplayed or misinterpreted by philosophers. Various general 
methodological maxims, like, for example, that it may be fruitful to search for 
reductionist explanations, do not need (nor could they probably have) a 
metaphysical underpinning. Nevertheless, I think, a convincing case has been 
made by some philosophers that metaphysics does indeed play some role in
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scientific development. Karl Popper (pp. 159-172) gave a particular clear and 
persuasive account of this in his postscript to The Logic o f Scientific Discovery. 
There, Popper set out, in a compelling potted history of science, ten broadly 
metaphysical theses, ranging from Parminedes block universe to Einstein’s vision 
o f a unified field theory that have shaped and influenced scientific research. These 
he dubbed metaphysical research programmes. He explored one such programme, 
the development of the modern idea of matter, in detail and showed how extra- 
scientific ideas helped shape our modern understanding. Popper’s rational 
reconstructions are convincing. Metaphysical claims (though they tend to be more 
specific than the claims o f physicalism) do clearly play some role in scientific 
advance. The question is how to understand this role.
It may seem that one is at a disadvantage in accounting for any positive 
role for metaphysics, if one, like me, thinks that most such claims are either false 
or without a truth-value. However, as will become apparent, I suspect it is an 
advantage. The key to understanding the connection between general 
metaphysical claims and methodology is provided by Davidson’s theory o f 
metaphor.3
In opposition to almost all other philosophers who have written on the 
subject, Davidson has claimed that there is no such thing as metaphorical 
meaning. “Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation 
mean, and nothing more.” (1984, p.245) It is Davidson’s central claim that if  this 
were not so then what is special or peculiar about metaphor, what divides it from 
the literal, would be lost. An attempt to graft onto the meaning of words used in 
metaphor an additional special meaning is an attempt to render the metaphorical
3 I draw heavily on the elaboration and elucidation of Davidson’s theory provided by Richard 
Rorty. See in particular Rorty (1991), pp. 162-172
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literal. That is to say, once we think of the metaphorical elliptically or indirectly 
expressing a certain proposition, then it becomes impossible to distinguish it from 
it having that literal meaning. The case o f dead metaphors makes this clear. 
Saying that someone was a pig, no doubt, once was a surprising and interesting 
use o f English. It functioned as a metaphor, directing us to make comparisons 
between pigs and the person in question. However, habitual and agreed upon use 
has killed the metaphor off. One of the meanings o f the word pig is now, 
according to my dictionary, “a greedy, obstinate, sulky or annoying person” . 
Accounts o f metaphor that employ a notion o f metaphorical meaning are attempts 
to assimilate all metaphor to dead metaphor. Living metaphors like, “Juliet is the 
sun” engage us precisely because we do not feel there is a way to paraphrase the 
sentence plainly so as to convey everything that the metaphor does. And this is so 
because the metaphor does not convey any meaning apart from its literal meaning. 
This is not to belittle metaphor. Davidson makes it quite clear that he heartily 
agrees with those, like Max Black and others, who have stressed the importance 
of metaphor in helping us see the world in new ways. His point is simply that the 
notion of an additional metaphorical meaning is not the right way to understand 
how metaphors function. Metaphor, he claims, is used to evoke all kinds o f effects 
in its audience and it is generally these non-propositional effects that critics 
confuse with a separate and additional meaning. As Davidson says: “what we 
attempt in paraphrasing a metaphor cannot be to give its meaning, for that lies on 
the surface; rather we attempt to evoke what the metaphor brings to our 
attention.”(1984, p.262). Metaphor belongs, as Davidson puts it, to the realm o f 
use, not meaning. It is something we do with words, rather than an attempt to 
convey a proposition using words. The power of metaphor thus lies not in having
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a separate meaning but in presenting us with a sentence which has various kinds 
of effects on us; by prompting us, as opposed to elliptically telling us, to look at 
things in a new way.
All we need to add to this account for my purposes is that metaphysics as 
methodology is a species of metaphorical talk. What is being said is false or 
without a truth-value but it may inspire people to look at the world in new ways. 
Metaphysical theories are the smelling salts of inquiry; raising our eyes and 
heightening our awareness of different ways of thinking.
Such an account is, I contend, both an enlightening presentation of the role 
metaphysics plays in methodology and a fruitful and interesting way to try to 
develop metaphysical pictures. Certainly, it seems to me the metaphysical views 
of Nancy Cartwright fit neatly into this picture. Talk of the patchwork of laws or 
the dappled world4 is transparently metaphorical talk. In the introduction to her 
latest book, Cartwright makes it clear that talk of the dappled world is not, at least 
primarily, an attempt to provide a true description of the world. Read that way, as 
I have argued, it simply fails. It is no clearer than for physicalism what accepting 
the patchwork view commits one to. Both are senseless. But if  we consider this 
talk as metaphorical such objections can be put to one side as simply 
inappropriate. Cartwright’s metaphysics can be reappraised in terms of its effects. 
Read like that we see a very different picture. It becomes clear her main objective 
is to change our attitude towards the sciences. “The worry is not so much that we 
will adopt the wrong images of the world, but rather we will use the wrong tools 
with which to change it.” (1999, p. 12) The metaphor of the dappled world forces 
us to look askance at reductionist assumptions we might be making and that
4 Cartwright takes the term from the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins.
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influence our research; it makes us aware of the messy state of contemporary 
science; and draws our attention away from the abstract to the particular. So even 
if it fails as a description of how the world is, it may be successful as metaphor in 
promoting some of Cartwright’s wider aims. Generally speaking, I claim, this is 
the role metaphysics plays in methodology: prompting others to look at the world 
in fresh ways and inspiring new research.5
This should be liberating for metaphysicians. Instead of grafting away 
with technical relations between p ’s and m’s, they can put their work on a par 
with poets; they can hope to inspire others to see the world in new ways. They can 
also hope to point the conversation in new directions. Like Cartwright they may 
with a clear conscience try to wean us way from puritanical questions about the 
rightness o f theories and force us to ask other questions. Questions about the point 
of pursuing various programmes of research, of what we hope to do, rather than 
just what we think we know.
But, as the voices of my Presbyterian ancestors tell me, let’s not get 
carried away. As well as inspiration, there must be perspiration or better yet 
argumentation. Given that metaphor does not distinguish itself by special 
meanings, it always open to being misinterpreted as a literal truth. That is to say, 
the aim o f evoking various kinds o f effects can be mistaken for the task of trying 
to describe how the world is. So metaphysicians must warn against this and direct 
the conversation towards the kind of changes they hope to evoke with their 
metaphorical talk. Some metaphysicians may o f course prefer to direct themselves 
to the question of how the world is. In that case, they should try to strangle the life 
out o f their favourite metaphors. With the heavy hand and pedantic manner which
5 Given this analysis of metaphysics we should probably avoid talk of metaphysical research 
programmes and say instead that metaphysics may inspire particular scientific research
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philosophy specialises in, metaphysicians (or at least some of them) should try to 
turn the metaphorical into the literal, to make their claims not only inspirational 
but to provide an argument for their truth.6 Such a process is just a particular 
instance of giving a sense to a previously senseless claim. O f seeing how a form 
of words connects to a body of knowledge; of learning what is at stake in making 
a commitment to the truth of one or other thesis. In other words, part of the on­
going process o f inquiry.
8.3 The end of the beginning
So I claim pragmatic pluralism does make a difference, a difference in our attitude 
to metaphysics. It should make us modest when trying to say how the world is. 
And it should make us bold when trying to inspire new ways of looking at the 
world. Metaphysics should be rooted in a detailed knowledge of the scientific 
theories o f the here and now. It should also dare us to be imaginative about how to 
go on from those theories. Metaphysics after pragmatic pluralism should see itself 
performing these two separate tasks: the inspirational and the argumentative; the 
poetic and the prosaic; the methodological and the theoretical.
Why pragmatic pluralism matters, in the end, is because it provides the 
best representation of what we know about the world now; and that is significant 
not just because of some pedantic desire to be right but also because it should 
change the way we think about metaphysics. The hope is that we can avoid sterile 
disputes and make the subject relevant and interesting to practitioners o f other 
disciplines. I confess that I have not done that here. I have been almost
programmes.
6 Conversely, of course, one can think of the task that I have been engaged in -  showing that 
various form of physicalism are false or senseless -  as a demonstration that we should construe 
these utterances as made by metaphysicians as metaphorical.
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exclusively concerned with argumentation, with the negative task of 
demonstrating the failings of particular metaphysical doctrines. But the hope 
remains that if we attend more closely to the practice of other disciplines and the 
wider issues of our culture, then metaphysics can be both more accurate and more 
interesting. Accepting pragmatic pluralism is just the first step.
251
Bibliography
Albert, D.Z. (1992) Quantum Mechanics and Experience (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)
Auyang, S. (2000) Analysis o f Complex Systems (Proof)
Beckermann, Flohr, Kim (eds.) (1992) Emergence or Reduction (Berlin/New 
York: Walter de Gruyter)
Ben-Yami, H. (1999) “An Argument against Functionalism” Australasian 
Journal o f Philosophy, 77: pp.320-24
Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R. (1987) “Functions”, Journal o f Philosophy, 84: pp. 
181-196
Blackburn, S. (1993) “Enchanting Views”, in Clarke and Hale (1993)
Block, N (ed.)(1980) Readings in the Philosophy o f Psychology, Vol. /(London: 
Methuen)
- (1986) “Advertisement for a Semantic for a Psychology”, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, pp. 615-678
(1993) “Holism, Hyper-analyticity and Hyper-compositionality”, Mind 
and Language, 8: pp. 1-26 
Boghossian, P. (1993) “Does Inferential Role Semantics rest Upon a Mistake”, 
Mind and Language, 8: pp.27-40
Boyd, R. (1980) “Materialism without Reduction: What Physicalism Does Not 
Entail” in Block (ed.)(1980)
Brandom, R. (ed.) (2000) Rorty and his Critics (Malden, Mass. Oxford : 
Blackwell)
Brandom, R (2000) “Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesising Naturalism and 
Historicism” in Brandom (ed.) (2000)
252
Burge, T (1979) “Individualism and the Mental”, in Studies in Metaphysics, 
French, Vehling and Wellstone (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 
Campbell, K (1990) Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Blackwell)
Carruthers, P. (1996) Language, Thought and Consciousness: Essays in 
Philosophical Psychology (Cambridge New York : Cambridge University Press) 
Carruthers, P. and Botterill, G. (2000) Philosophy o f Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press)
Cartwright, N (1983) How the Laws o f Physics (Clarendon Press: Oxford)
(1989) Nature’s capacities and their measurement (New York: 
Clarendon-Oxford Press)
(1991) “Can Wholism Reconcile the Inaccuracy o f Theory with 
the Accuracy of Prediction”, Synthese, 89: pp.3-13
(1995) “A Reply to Humphreys, Morrison and Eells”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: pp. 177-87
(1996) “Fundamentalism versus the Patchwork of Laws” in 
Papineau (ed.) 1996
(1997) “Where do Laws of Nature come from?” Dialecta, 52: 
pp.65-78
(1999) The Dappled World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press)
Causey, R. (1977) The Unity o f Science (Dordrecht: Reidel)
Causey, R. (1981) “Reduction and Ontological Unification: Reply to McCauley, 
Philosophy o f Science 48: pp.228-231
Chalmers, D. (1996) The Conscious Mind. : in Search o f a Fundamental 
Theory(QxLoxfr. Oxford Univesity Press)
253
Charles, D. and Lennon, K. (1992) Reduction, Explanation and Realism, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).
Churchland, P. M. (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity o f the 
Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Clark, P. and Hale, B. (1994) Reading Putnam (Oxford: Blackwell)
Crane, T. (1995) “Mental CdLUSdAiovP Aristotelian Society, Supp(69): pp.211-236 
Crane, T. and Mellor, D.H. (1990) “There is No Question of Physicalism”, Mind 
99, 185-206 reprinted in Moser and Trout (eds.) (1994)
Davidson, D. (1980) Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon)
(1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation(Oxford: Clarendon)
- (1986) “Knowing One’s own Mind”, Proceedings o f the American
Philosophical Association, 60: pp.441-458
(1990) “The Structure and Content of Truth”, Journal o f Philosophy, 
87: pp. 279-328
(1993) “Thinking Causes” in Heil and Mele (1993)
- (1994)
(1995) “Laws and Causes”, Dialectica, 49: pp.263-279 
Dennett, D. (1996) “Cow-Sharks, Magnets and Swampman” Mind and Language, 
11: pp. 76-7
Devitt (1997) Realism and Truth, 3rd edition (Oxford: Blackwell)
Devries, W (1996) “Experience and the Swamp Creature”, Philosophical Studies, 
82: pp.55-80
DeWitt, B. (1970) “Quantum Mechanics and Reality” Physics Today, 23: pp.30- 
35
254
Dupre, J. (1996a) The Disorder o f Things, 3rd edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press)
Dupre, J. (1996b) “A reply to Wilson”, British Journal fo r  the Philosophy o f 
Science, 47: pp. 441-444
Ehring, D. (1996) “Mental Causation, Determinables and Property Instances”, 
Nous, 30: pp.461-480
Field, H (1978) “Mental Representations”, Erknenntnis, 15: pp.9-61 
Fine, A (1986) The Shaky Game (Chicago: Chicago University Press)
Fodor, J. (1974) “Special Sciences”, Synthese, 28: pp.97-115
Fodor, J. and LePore, E. (1991) Wholism: A Shopper's Guide (Oxford Cambridge,
MA : Blackwell)
Goodman, Nelson (1984) O f Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press)
Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
Haugeland, J. (1984) “Ontological Supervenience” Southern Journal o f  
Philosophy 22, Supplement: pp. 1-12
Heil, J (1992) The Nature o f True Minds (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press)
Heil, J (1998) “Deconstructing Supervenience” The European Journal o f  
Philosophy
Heil, J. and Mele, A. (eds.)(1993) Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press)
Heilman and Thompson (1975) “Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and 
Reduction”, Journal o f Philosophy, 72: pp. 551-564
255
Heilman and Thompson (1977) “Physicalist Materialism”, Nous 11: pp.309-345 
Hempel, C. (1966) Philosophy o f Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): 
Prentice Hall)
- (1980) “Comments on Goodman’s Ways o f Worldmaking", 
Synthese, 45: pp. 143-9. Reprinted in McCormick (1996)
Hooker, C.A. (1981) “Towards a General Theory of Reduction”, Dialogue 20: 
pp.38-59, 201-306, 496-529.
Horgan, T. (1993) “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the 
demands of the Material World”, Mind 102: pp. 555-586.
Hornsby, J. (1981) “Which Physical Events are Mental Events?” Aristotelian 
Society Proceedings, 81: pp.73-92
Hughes, R.I.G. (1989) The Structure and Interpretation o f Quantum Mechanics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
Jackson, F.(1986) “What Mary didn’t Know” Journal o f Philosophy, 83:pp. 291 - 
295
- (1996) “Mental Causation” Mind, 105: pp.377-413
Kain, S. (2001) Constructing the Perfect Ground State Potential fo r  Water, PhD, 
University of London
Kemney and Oppenheim (1956) “On Reduction” Philosophical Studies, 7: pp. 10- 
19
Kim. J. (1989) “The Myth of Non-reductive Materialism” reprinted in 
Contemporary Materialism, ed. Moser and Trout (eds.)(1994)
(1992) ““Downward Causation” in Emergentism and Non-reductive 
Physicalism” in Beckermann, Flohr, Kim (eds.) (1992)
256
(1993) Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (New 
York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press)
(1996) “Non-reductionist Troubles with Downward Causation” in Heil 
and Mele (eds.)(1996)
- (1998) Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press)
(1999) “Supervenient Properties and Micro-Based Properties: A Reply 
to Noordhof ’ Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 99: pp. 115-8 
Kripke, S (1970) Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell)
LePore, E and M^cLaughlin, B (eds.) (1985) Actions and Events: Perspectives on 
Philosophy o f Donald Davidson. (Oxford: Blackwell)
LePore, E (ed.) (1986), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the philosophy 
o f Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell)
Lewis (1983) “New Work for a Theory of Universals” Australasian Journal o f  
Philosophy, 61, pp. 343-3 77
(1984) “Putnam’s Paradox” Australasian Journal o f Philosophy, 62: 
pp. 221-236
Macdonald, G. and Macdonald, C.(eds.) (1995) Philosophy o f Psychology^ Oxford 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell)
(1995) “Supervenient Causation”in the above
(1995) “How to be Psychologically Relevant” in the above 
Manning, R. (1997) “Biological function, selection and reduction”, British 
Journal for the Philosophy o f Science, 48, pp. 69-82
McCormick, Peter (ed.) (1996) Starmaking (Cambridge, MA London: MIT
McDowell, J. (2000) “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity” in Brandom (ed.) 
(2000)
McLaughlin, B. “On Davidson’s Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism” 
in Heil and Mele (1993)
- (1997) “Supervenience, Vagueness and Determination”, Philosphical 
Perspectives 11: Mind, Causa^ton and World
Mellor, D. H. (1995) The Facts o f Causation (London: Routledge)
Melynk, A. (1998) “How to Keep the Physical in Physicalism”, Journal o f  
Philosophy 95: pp.662-637
Merricks, T. (1998) “Against the Doctrine o f Microphysical Supervenience” 
Mind,, 107: pp.59-71
Millikan, R. (1984) Language, thought, and other biological categories : new 
foundations for realism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
(1993) White Queen psychology and other essays fo r  Alice 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
(1995) “A Bet with Peacocke” in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995)
(1996) “On S wampkinds”, Mind and Language, 11: pp. 103 -117
- (1999) “Wings, Spoons, Pills and Quills: A Pluralist Theory of 
Function ”, Journal o f Philosophy, 96: pp. 191-206
Moser, P and Trout, J. D. (1995) Contemporary Materialism: a reader (London, 
New York: Routledge)
Morrison, M. (1995) “Capacities, tendencies and the problem of singular 
causation” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: pp. 163-68 
Neale, S. (1999), “On Representing” in The Philosophy o f Donald Davidson
Neander, K. (1996) “Swampman meets Swampcow” Mind and Language, 11: pp. 
118-129
Oppenheim, F and Putnam, H. (1958) “The Unity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, Vol. 2 
Papineau, D (1987) Reality and Representation (Oxford: Blackwell)
(1993) Philosophical Naturalism, (Oxford: Blackwell)
(ed.) (1996) The Philosophy o f Science (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press)
(1996) “Doubtful Intuitions” Mind and Language, 11: pp. 13 0-2
(1998) “Mind the Gap” Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, 
Mind and Ontology
(unpublished) “A Reply to Brandon-Mitchell and Jackson”
Papineau, D. and Spurrett, D. (1998) “A Note on the Completeness o f ‘Physics’”, 
Analysis, 59, pp. 25-29
Peacocke, C. (1995) “Concepts and Norms in a Natural World” in 
Macdonald and Macdonald (1995)
Poland, J. (1994) Physicalism ( Oxford: Clarendon Press)
Popper, K. (1982) Quantum Mechanics and the Schism in Physics (London: 
Routledge)
Post, J. (1991) Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: 
Paragon House)
Prades, J. and Corbi, J. (2000) Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms : a Case 
Against Physicalism (Oxford: Blackwell)
Preston, B. (1998) “Why is a Wing like a Spoon? A Pluralist Theory of 
Function.” Journal o f Philosophy, 95: pp. 215-254
Price, H. (1992) “Metaphysical Pluralism”, Journal o f Philosophy, 89: 
pp.3 87-409
Putnam, Hilary (1960) “Minds and Machines” in Hook (ed.) Dimensions o f  
the Mind  (New York: New York University Press)
- (1975) “The meaning of ‘meaning’” Language, Mind and 
Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, vol. 7
(1979) Philosophical Papers, vol 2: Mind, Language and Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
(1987) “Truth and Convention” Dialectica, 41: pp. 69-77
(1990) Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press)
(1992) Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA London: Cambridge 
University Press)
(1994) Words and Life(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press)
(1999) The Threefold Cord(New York: Columbia University Press) 
Rorty, R. (1991) Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
- (2000) “Reply to McDowell” in Brandom (ed.) (2000)
Sahorta, S. (2000) Genetics and Reductionsim (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press)
Savellos and Yal^in (ed.) (1995) Supervenience, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
Shoemaker, S. (1984) Identity, Cause and Mind : Philosophical Essays 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Sklar, L. (1995) Physics and Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
260
Smith, P.(1992) “Most Reductions and the Unity of Science” in Charles and 
Lennon (1992)
Sober, E. (1999) “Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View”, Philosophical 
Studies, 95: pp. 135-174. (Page numbers in text refer to web version.)
Sober, E and Segal, G. (1991) “The Causal Efficacy o f Content”, Philosophical 
Studies, pp. 1-30
Sosa (1993) “Putnam’s Pragmatic Realism”, Journal o f Philosophy, 95: pp. 605- 
626
Sturgeon, S. (1998) “Physicalism and Overdetermination”, Mind, 107: pp. 411- 
432
Van Brakel, J. (1999) “Supervenience and Anomalous Monism”, Dialectica, 53: 
pp. 3-24
Waters, K.(1998) “Causal regularities in the Biological world o f Contingent 
Distribution”, Biology and Philosophy, 13: pp.5-36
Wilkerson (1993) “Species, Essences and the Names o f Natural Kinds” 
Philosophical Quarterly, 43: pp. 1-19
Wilson, J (1999) “How Superduper does a Physicalist Supervenience need to be?” 
Philosophical Quarterly, 49: pp.33-52
Wilson, R (1996) “Promiscuous Realism”, British Journal fo r  the Philosophy o f 
Science, 47: pp. 303-316
Witmer, G. (2000) “Locating the Overdetermination Argument”, British Journal 
for the Philosophy o f Science, 51: pp. 273-286
Worrall, J. (1989) “Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds”, Dialectica, 43: 
pp.99-124. Reprinted in Papineau (ed.) (1996)
Yablo, S. (1992) “Mental Causation” Philosophical Review, 101: pp. 245-280
261
(1997) “Wide Causation” Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, 
Causation and World
262
